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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth in 
the case of Turkey with Greece used as a basis for comparison. 
The thesis starts with a review of relevant literature and a survey of the Turkish defence 
economy including Turkey's newly- developing defence industry (Chapters 2 and 3). 
Chapter 4 empirically estimates Turkish defence-growth relationships using a supply-side 
model. Both externality effects and the size effects of defence expenditure are estimated for 
Turkey. Lags and human capital variables are introduced into a Feder type supply-side 
model. Chapter 5 uses an alternative model (Deger model) to test the relationships. In this 
Chapter, the relationship is investigated using 2SLS and 3SLS simultaneous equation 
methods and also some results from coiý-itegrated regression are provided, together with 
Granger causality tests for Turkey. Chapter 6 applies the analysis to Greece. It uses supply- 
side (Feder type) and demand and supply-side (Deger type) models to analyse Greek 
defence-growth relationships. Firstly. Chapter 6 provides a review of the Greek defence 
economy, then the relationship is estimated using both a supply-side Feder model and Deger 
type demand and supply-side multi-equation model. Finally, Chapter 7, assesses the effects 
of Turkish and Greek disaggregated defence expenditure on economic growth using an error 
correction mechanism. 
This thesis concludes that the effect of defence expenditure differs among the countries. 
The thesis shows a positive impact of defence spending on Turkish economic growth but 
the effect is not clear for Greece. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Objectives of the Thesis 
Defence expenditure is irnportant in the government budgets of all countries and is a maýjor 
user of scarce resources. Although defence expenditure has been decreasing in recent years, 
i, nost parts of the world still have high defence expenditures implying the sacrifice of 
alternative civil expenditures (e. g. schools, hospitals). Total world defence expenditure was 
estirnated at US $864 bflbon in 1995 (US ACDA 1996). On average, 2.8 per cent of GNP 
and over 13 per cent of' A central government expenditure arespent on defence In the 
developing world (US ACDA, 1996) and these are countries facing major problems of 
poverty, starvation, ill-health, lack of education and poor housing. Moreover, some 
countries continue to spend a huge amount on defence each year, apparently for security 
considerations. Turkey and Greece are examples of such countries. Their military burdens 
remain the highest in NATO, namely. 5.74,17( of GDP for Greece and 4.42-7( for Turkey 
compared to NATO's average of 3.517, ( for the last decade (Dunne et al. 1998). For these 
reasons defence expenditure and its economic effects needed to be carefully and critically 
evaluated. 
An important and controversial area for defence economists is the relationship between 
defence spending and economic growth. Until 1973, it is difficult to find any study on 
defence- growth relatio i-iships. The i-nost important contribution was made by Benoit (1973). 
After Benoit's NN, 7ork many studies were carried out 'in the literature. However. there is no 
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consensus to whether defence spending has a negative effect or a positive effect on a 
nations' economic growth. 
1.2. The Central Hypothesis 
This study explores the defence-growth relationship for Turkey. It is hypothesised 
that Turkish defence spending should have a positive impact on its economic growth. 
Turkey is an example of a developing country with a substantial defence burden. Turkey 
has achieved considerably high economic growth over the last four decades at a tUne when 
its defence expenditures have also shown an increasing trend during the time. Military 
spending has some apparent economic benefits for a iiation's development. In Turkey, 
ah-nost every man apparently benefited from compulsory military service. For example, 
technology training giveii during mihttry service turns conscripts into qualified personnel 
able to contribute to the economic development of the country; the Armed Forces also 
organise hteracy courses for their personnel. Further benefits of mihtary expenditure result 
tI rom the production of medical drugs irt the military plants, from the treatment of civilians 
in military hospitals, from mapping services and frorn the military contributing to the 
development of communications, transport and infra-structure (e. g. roads; bridges; 
telecommunications: all of which create a national market). These are all examples of 
possible ways through which defence spending contributes to the Turkish economy. This 
thesis undertakes an in-depth analysis of the defence-growth relationship using time-series 
data for Turkey. 
Greece is included in the thesis to provide a cornparative study. Greece is also a member 
it is in a potcritial contfict ot'NATO, it is a devc1opin-L, nation with a high defencc burden, III 
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situation with Turkey-, and both are Mediterranean countries. Thus, Greece provides a 
comparative country case study to test the robustness and reliability of any defence-growth 
relationships esth-nated for Turkey. 
In addition to the central study of the defence-growth relationships for Turkey, this thesis 
addresses several subsidiary research questions: 
1. Does the newly- developing defence industry of Turkey help to lower its arms 
imports? 
2. What is size effect of defence expenditure in Turkey? 
3. Are there externalities from defence to the rest of the Turkish economy? 
4. Is there a causal relation between Turkey's defence spending and economic 
growth? 
5. Do disaggregated defence expenditures (i. e. equipment, personnel) have different 
impacts on Turkey's economic growth? 
6. Do the effects of defence spending differ among countries? Comparisons will be 
made with Greece. Questions wifl be asked about the impact of Greek defence 
spending on its economic growth and the size effect of defence expenditure in Greece 
compared with Turkey (e. do the size effects differ and why? ). 
This thesis will analyse the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth 
iri the case of Turkey reinforced by comparisons with Greece. To analyse defence-growth 
relationships, the previous empirical evidence on defence-growth studies is critically 
reviewed and Turkey's military industrial sector is described and evaluated. The impacts 
of'defcnce spending arc empirically estirnated for Turkey and then compared with Greece. 
-3- 
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This study differs from other coi-nparable studies in that: 
1. It evaluates the Turkish defence industry, its armed forces and the trends in Turkish 
defence expenditure over the period 1955-1996 (i. e. Turkey's military- ind us trial 
complex): 
2. It makes an origh-ial contributimi to the literature through an empirical case study. 
There has been no rigorous empirical study relating to economic growth and defence 
spending in Turkey. The reliability and robustness of the results for Turkey are then 
tested using Greece as a comparative case study. 
This study uses financial data mainly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/ 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the Stockhoh-n International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the 
State Institute of Statistics (SIS) Turkey, the State Planning Organisation (SPO) Turkey, 
and the Ministry of Finance of Turkey. 
1.3. Plan of the Thesis 
This study is prirnarily focussed on Turkish economic growth and defence spending between 
1955 and 1996. The thesis is organised as foRows. Chapter 2 assesses the existing literature 
oii defence expenditure and economic growth. This Chapter starts by reviewing defence- 
economic growth relationships from Benoit's (1973) path breaking study, f6flowed by the 
Studies using supply side models, demand and supply side models and finally. the studies 
using Granger causality are reviewed. Data sources are also assessed in this Chapter which 
concludes with a summary and assessment. 
-4- 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 3 examines the Turkish armed forces. the new-developing Turkish industry and its 
modernisation and the trend of Turkish defence expenditure. Turkey IS an important 
country in the region. This Chapter briefly reviews the history of the Republic of Turkey 
and presents some historical data, it also analyses Turkey's defence industry and its 
development. 
Chapter 4 provides empirical th-ne series evidence for Turkey. The relationship between 
Turkish defence expenditure and economic growth is estimated using an augmented Feder 
model with the addition of human capital. There are some novel results of this analysis. 
Firstly, a labour force data set was constructed: this allows us to obtain a clearer picture of 
defence-growth relationships. Secondly. both level and first differences of the variable are 
regressed to avoid spurious regression. Thirdly. human capital and lags are introduced into 
the Feder model. 
Chapter 5 is also an empirical analysis of defence-growth relationships for Turkey but using 
aii alternative model. The model is based on Deger (1986a, 1986b) which applies 
sifnultaneous equation methods. Some results from cointegration analysis are presented and 
this Chapter also provides a causal analysis of Turkish defence-growth relationships for the 
period 1924 to 1996. 
Using the analysis and results for Turkey, Chapter 6 applies the models to test for a siMflar 
relationship m Greece. This Chapter is comparative: the empirical model used in Chapters 
4 and 5 is applied to Greek data. Firstly. a defence- gro Nvth trade-off for Greece is estimated 
Nvith a supply-side (Fedcr tvpe) model usIng OLS estimation for the period 1958-1994. and 
- 
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secondly, a Deger type (demand and supply side) model is tested using the Greek data. This 
Chapter also briefly reviews the defence economy of Greece. The results suggest that the 
effect of defence spending differs between the two countries. 
In Chapter 7, the relationship between defence expenditure and economic growth is analysed 
using disaggregated defence expenditure data for Turkey-, and then comparisons are made 
with Greece. This Chapter uses recent econometric techniques of error correction 
mechanisms. The Chapter mainly considers the effects of equipment and non-equipment 
defence spending. The evidence showed that the effects of equipment and non-equipment 
defence spending are different and the results also differ between the short-run and long-run. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents some concluding remarks and proposals for further research. 
This thesis makes a major contribution to the defence economics literature it should also be 
of interest to public sector economists and practitioners of government spending as wel-I as 
development economists. It is of interest to public economists because defence expenditure 
is an h-nportant proportion of the government budgets of all countries. It is of interest to 
practitioners because they are in need of more case studies about the possible economic 
effects of defence expenditure. It is of interest to development economists because defence 
has an important role in the development of countries: it is a user of scarce resources in poor 
iiations. This thesis should also be of interest to applied economists who are concerned with 
the relationships between defence spending and economic growth. 
It is important to understand how defence expenditure affects economic growth and whether 
these eflects diffcr arnong, countries. This is an important topic for theoretical and empirical 
-6- 
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work in the defence economics discipline. A starting point for the analysis requires a review 
of the relevant literature. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND THE DATA 
2.1. Introduction: overview 
The aiin of this Chapter is to review existing studies of defence-growth relationships and 
critically analyse data problerns and give the data sources used in this thesis. To explain the 
relationship between defence spending and economic growth, demand side and supply side 
studies were used. Some of the models included both demand side and supply side 
considerations. The majority of demand side models in the literature have found a negative 
effect of defence spending on growth. On the other hand, supply side models might have 
a positive effect of defence spending on economic growth through spin-off and externalities. 
However most supply side models reviewed had no significant effects on growth (Sandler 
& Hartley 1995). Furthermore, some studies applied Granger causality tests (Chowdhury 
199 1, Jeording 1986). The fmdirigs of these studies are Mconclusive. While some studies 
found defence is endogeiious relative to economic growth, other studies found no causal 
relationships (Jeording, 1986. Chowdhury, 1991; Madden & Haslehurst, 1995). 
Both demand side and supply side models use ordinary least squares or ordinary ridge 
regression or a three-stage least squares estimation. For empirical study, it is very important 
to use appropriate data. There are three alternative methods for defence-growth empirical 
cstimations: they are tirne series or longitudinal data, cross scctional data at a point of time 
or pooled tirne series and cross sectional data (G-Ltiarati 1992). When a study focuses on 
only one country. time scrics data are most appropriate (Sandler & Hartley 1995). 
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This Chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, Benoit's (1973.1978) original contributions 
are critically analysed (section 2.2), then supply side (Feder type) models and existing 
studies are reviewed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 is devoted to demand and supply side 
(Deger type) models. In section 2.5, the studies using Granger causality are reviewed. 
After the conclusions from the literature review (section 2.6). section 2.7 discusses data 
problems and provides the data sources used in this thesis. Finally, section 2.8. concludes 
the Chapter. 
2.2. Benoit (1973 & 1978) 
The first comprehensive and pioneering study of defeiice-growth relationships came from 
Benoit in 1973. He used a large sample ot'44 less developed countries(LDCs) between 
1950 and 1965. There were also some specific country studies such as India, Mexico, South 
Korea, Argentina, Israel and United Arab Republic but the main country study was India. 
He showed that defence spending has a surprising positive effect on econon-fic growth. 
Benoit's 1978 paper supported these arguments. He considered the direction of Granger 
causality (between economic growth and defence speridhig) in his work and found that 
causation goes from defence to growth. He considered foreign aid but ignored labour. The 
very irnportant point from the study is that if government reduced the defence budget, then 
the money may not always go to investment: instead consumption or social wages may 
increase. For this reason, the opportunity cost of defence spending can be very low (Benoit 
1978). Benoit calculated that if the share of defence in GDP increased one per cent, civilian 
orowth will hicrease 0-25 per cem, therefore the net effect of defence spending is positive 
and deIcnce helps growth (Benoit 1973). 
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Benoit's statistical method and his correlation analysis have been criticised by many 
scholars. The equation was: 
g=ao+alm+a, Z (2.1) 
In this model g denotes growth rates, rn shows the defence burden (M/Y) and Z is a vector 
of other exogenous variables and a, is positive coefficient and often significant which 
represents a positive effect of defence spending on economic growth. However, according 
to Deger(1986), only two direct effects (aggregate demand stimulation and spin-oft) of 
defence spending were considered, the indirect effects were ignored. If negative resource 
allocation effects were considered, the results might have reversed because the defence 
sector diverts resources away from other sectors to defence (Deger, 1986). Deger and 
Smith( 1986) found that defence spending stirnulated growth, and this is the positive direct 
effect; on the other side, the higher defence spending reduces savings rates then reduces 
investment then growth and this is negative indirect eflect. The net effect is argued to be 
negative based on Deger's empirical findings (Deger 1986). 
Benoit's works was also criticised by Smith cspecially his esth-nation method and sample 
countries. The sample of 44 LDCs was at very different stages of development, from 
Turkey and Spain to Burma and Ceylon, and also the rate of growth of GDP is an 
insignificant indicator of the ratc of development. The most serious weakness with Benoit's 
study was the statistical method used. He did not use an explicit theoretical economic 
model (Si-nith 1980). Another important criticism carne from Ball's (1983) descriptive 
paper. He asserted that Benoit used an imperfect method to study defence-growth 
relationships (Ball 1983). Frederikson and Looney extcnded Benoit's work in 1983. They 
used the sai-ne sýiniple ofcountries and the sarric time period. . but the sample countries were 
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divided into two groups as relatively poor countries and others. They found a negativc 
defence effect for poor countries and positive for relatively rich countries, and they showed 
that Benoit's sample was inadequate (Frederikson & Looney 1983). When Benoit's sample 
and the time period are examined, it can be seen, Benoit's estimates of correlation 
coefficient for defence spending and growth were fragile (Grobar & Porter 1983). In spite 
of some weaknesses, Benoit's work remains a starting point for defence-growth 
relationships. The next section reviews the literature on supply-side models. 
2.3. Supply Side (Feder Type) Studies' 
Feder (1983) developed a model to analyse the impact of the export sector on economic 
growth. Feder's model divides the economy into two sectors. One is an advanced sector 
export (X) and the other is a domesticafly oriented sector (non-export sector). There are 
positive externalities from an advanced sector to the rest of the economy. Ram (1986), and 
Biswas and Ram (1986) firstly applied this model to the study of defence spending and 
economic growth in a cross-section of 58 LDC's over the period 1960-1977. Since then 
many other scholars have employed the Feder model for defence-growth association 
(Atesoglu and Mueller, 1990, Alexander, 1990,1995-, Huang and Mintz, 1990; 1991; 
Adams, Behrman and Boldin. 199 1; Ward et al. 199 1; Ward and Davis, 1992; Biswas, 1993; 
Muefler and Atesoglu, 1993; Ward, Davis and Chan, 1993; DeRouen, 1994; Macnair et al. 
1995, Mintz and Stevanson, 1995-, Ward, Davis and Lofdahl, 1995). 
The modcl will bc cxtensn-cly cxplaincd in Chapter 4 
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Firstly, it is assumed that the economy consists of two sectors namely, a civilian sector (C) 
and a defence sector (M). There are externalities from a defence sector to civilian sector. 
From the production function the main inputs of the sectors are capital (K) and labour (L). 
Subscripts refer to each sector: 
M=M(K 
in 
L 
in) (2.2) 
C=C(KC, L,, Al') (2.3) 
The main point hi this model is that it allows externalities from sector "M" to sector "C" and 
it considers factor productivity differentials. This type of model offers much for the 
empirical study of defence-growth relationships (Deger and Sen, 1995). It considers 
externalities between sectors and may explain both the size effect of defence expenditure 
and the externality effect as well as factor productivity differentials. At the same tirne, the 
model needs relatively less data which are generally a major problem for many developing 
countries. The other advantage of this model is that it describes the supply constraints 
which are fi-nportant for developing countries such as Turkey. Skilled worker and 
investment are a major constraint for developing countries. The next section reviews some 
important supply side modeIS2. 
Bi, s, wasand Rain (1986) paper was the first comprehensive paper analysing defence-growth 
relationships using Feder type supply side model. The purpose of the paper was to decide 
whether defence sectors generate any externalities to the civilian sector and whether relative 
productivity differs significantly across defence and civilian sectors. The Feder model 
extended two sectors (defence and civilian) using data for the period 1960-70 and 1970-77 
The other important supply sidc (Feder type) studi I ies are provided in Appendix 2,1. 
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with a large sample of LDCs and the sample countries were separated into low income and 
middle income countries, because they thought that the effect of defence spending depended 
on a country's income. In contrast to the Ram(1986) study, the government sector was 
replaced with the defence sector. It is assumed there are two sectors in the economy: they 
are the defence (M) and the civilian sectors (C). It is further assumed there are only two 
inputs for each sector, labour(L) and capital(K). Marginal productivity of labour and capital 
may differ across the two sectors and there is an externality effect from the defence sector 
to the civilian sector. For two sectors the production equations are: C =C(L, K, M) and 
M= M(Lý,,, K. ) where the lowercase subscripts (c, m) show sectoral inputs. Total labour 
and capital inputs are: 
L, + L11, (2.4) 
K=K, + Kfn (2.5) 
The fmal forms of the model: 
ý=(x I 
+P(ý) + +C 
in) I*M (2.6) yy 
With separate externahty effects: 
ý= (Y. 
I 
+P(ý) +6-0 (2.7) 
1+6 
Where, the dot represents rate of growth for labour, output and defence burden, IN is ratio 
ofinvestment to the total output, M/Y is ratio of defence spending to the total output. a is 
the elasticity of output with respect to UY and P is the same for labour. Cm shows the 
externality et tI ect of det'ciicc output on the civilian sector and 6 denotes the relative factor 
productivity dillcmice between the two sectors. Using the second equation, the externality 
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effect can be estimated separately. After the estimation, they concluded that defence 
spending has no effect on growth. In the words of Biswas and Ram, "militai3, expenditures 
neither help nor hurt economic growth in the LDCs to (mY significant extent "(Biswas and 
Ram 1986 pp: 370). The results did not show significant factor productivity differences 
across the defence and civilian sectors and externahty effects, because the study used a large 
sample and the sample countries were not homogeneous. Even though they divided the 
countries into low income and middle income, the countries still might have large 
differences, so giving possibly misleading results (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Empirical Results of Biswas and Ram (1986) Study 
Variables IN Aý (M/Y) Aý R2 
Full sample 0.1 g** 1.15** 0.55 -0.01 0.45 
1960 (4.39) (4.03) (1.03) (-0.44) 
1970 Low income 19* 1.95** 0.69 0.05 0.52 
LDCs (1.85) (2.96) (1.10) (0.06) 
Middle income 0.15** 0.96** -3.41 -0.01 0.38] 
LDCs (2.79) (3.00) (-0.79) (-0. ()1) 
Full sample 0.21** (). 94** 0.78 0.02 0.48 
1960 (4.61) (2.97) (1.04) (0.87) 
1970 Low income 0.02 2.96** 0.53 -0.01 0.36 
LDC'Q Cs (0.17) (2.49) (1.17) (0.06) 
Middle income 0.27** 0.71** 2.78 0.05 0.51 
LDCs (4.79) (2.23) (0.55) (1.46) 
Note: The dot represents rate of growth for labour, output and defence burden, IN is ratio of investment to 
the total output, M/Y is ratio of defence spending to the total output. 6 denotes the relative factor 
productivity difference between two sectors. t statistics are in parentheses. 
Significant at the 10% level 
Significant at the 517c level I 
A lexandei's (1990) paper Nvas the most elaborate representation of the Feder-Ram model 
with tour sectors, namely, a defence sector, a non-defence sector, an export sector and a 
private sector (Sandler & Hartley 1995). The author assumed that the sectors are mutual-ly 
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"exclusive" and "exhaustive" with respect to output. Factor productivity varies across 
sectors. The government sector provides positive externalities for all other smors. The 
sectors G (government sector. X (export sector) and D (defence sector) A generate 
externality effects directly on N (rest ofthe economy) and G also generates externality 
effects on D and X. The production function can be written as: 
G=G(K,,,, L9) (2.8) 
D=D(Kd, L d, G) (2.9) 
X=X(K,, L) (2.10) 
N=N(KII, Ln, G, D, X) 
where lower cases indicate sector inputs (eg, K, indicates capital employed in export 
sector). Total output Y is: 
Y=G+X+D+N (2.12) 
and the statistical form of the equation is: 
a113 
(ý G 
-4 
)ý X-5 15 D 
(2.13) 
LGYxYDD 
Where ft is the real econornic growth rate, BY is nivestment ratio, ilL is labour force 
growth rate, ((ý/G)(G/r is government sector growth rate which is multiplied by 
governi-nent/GDP ratio: (, ý/X)(X/r is an export growth rate which is multiplied by 
export/GDP ratio-, and (, 61D)(DID) is defence spendinL, growth rate which is multiplied by 
the defence burden. The i-csults showed that government and export sector variables have 
a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth but the effect for the 
def I ciice variable was insigmflicam (see Table 2.2). Therefore. Alexander concluded that the 
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effect of defence spending is neutral on the rest of the economy. Also, the externality effect 
ofthe defence sector was not significant. On the other hand, the non-defence pubhc sector 
can provide positive externalities for the other three sectors. The study was criticised by 
Ram(1995) because the model does not include any external effect of defence on exports 
or of exports on defence or of defence on the government sector (Ram 1995). Macnair et 
al. (1995) also criticised Alexander's work under five criteria. It is best in their ownwords, 
"... first he never established the stationarity o .f 
the macroeconomic aggregates due to 
limited degrees of freedom, second Alexander did not test among alternatives pooling 
techniques to ascertain the most appropriate errorstructure, third he did not accountfor 
any allies defence spillins that could have an impact on the suppýv side, fourth Alexander 
pooled over a rather dii, erse group of dei, eloped nations. Fifth his results that investment 
was a negative and nisignificant influem-e on growth is, counter-i . 17till . tive and against most 
theroticalparadigins... " (Macnair et. al. 1995, pp: 848). 
Table 2.2. Empirical Results of Alexander (1990) Study 
IN ýIL ((ý/G)(G/r (, ft)(X/r (I5/D)(D/r DW 
Coefficient -0.05 0.90** 0.31* 0.32*** -0.37 1.79 
t -0.97 4.08 2.00 10.07 -0.77 
statistics 
Where kly is real economic growth rate. BY is investment ratio, ýIL is labour force growth rate 
(61G)(Gllý is government sector orrowth rate is multiplied by aovernment/GDP ratio, (61G)(GlY) is 17, C I-- 
an export growth rate is multiplied by export/GDP ratio and (I)ID) (DID) is defence spending growth rate 
is multiplied by defence burden 
Significant at the 10% level tý, Significant at the 5% level 
Sionificant at the 117c Ic,, -cl Z- 
Hit(ing (ind Mint, -, (1990) cxammed deI'cncc- growth relationships using US data t'()r the 
period of 1952-88. Thcy mainly focusscd on the multi -co Ilinearity problem. To avoid that 
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problem, the authors employed ridge regression estirnation method in the model. It 
included three sectors (defence, public and civilian sectors). Using the ridge regression 
method improved the interpretation of results. However, their findings showed defence 
spending has no significant effect on economic growth (see Table 2.3). 
Table 2.3. Empirical Results of Huang and Mintz (1990) Study 
IN ýIL NkY km Aqjusted 
R2 
OLS Coefficient 0.46 0.80* 1.50* 0.32 0.68 
estimates 
standard 0.32 0.33 0.58 0.23 
errors 
ORR Coefficient 0.51** 0.70** 1.36** 0.32 0.64 
estirnates 
standard 0.19 0.19 0.53 0.21 
errors I II 
Where BY is investment ratio, bL is labour force growth rate, NklY is non-defence government sector 
GDP ratio, kY is defence sector GDP ratio. 
Significant at the 5% level 
** The estimate to standard error ratio exceeds 2.50 
Ward, Davis, Penubarti, Rajmira, and Cochran (1991) paper is case study of defence- 
growth relationships for India using tirne series data for 1950-87 with two sector model. 
India is one of the a few countries in developing worlds that produces most of its own 
military equipment. However, the production is mostly undertaken by the government. 
India spends around 3.5 per cent of its GNP on defence. The authors analysed Indian 
defence-growth relationships under the Feder-Ram model. It includes two sectors as (C) 
civilian sector and (G) government sector: 
C: -- F(Kc, L,., G) (2.14) 
G=G(K,,, L (2.15) 
Where K is capital and L is labour and lower case refer to the civilian and government 
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sectors, respectively. Iii the above equation G shows externalities on the civilian sector. 
The f-mal form of the model was: 
ý= 
(X 
0 
+(x 
1 
I+ß 
Yi+ öm 
-0 
?n) 
ü+OM my+ 811 
- -0 n) lý +0nN +e L I+öm G l+5 n 
In this equation, a, is constant and aj is investment share, the third part of the equation 
denotes the changes in labour, fourth part is the size effect of defence spending, the fifth part 
is the size effect of non-defence government spending and final part is the externality effect 
of non-defence spending. The model provides the identification of size effects, externality 
effect and the relative marginal productivity of defence and non-defence government 
spending prograrns. The results of the empirical casc study were a positive impact of 
defence spending on growth, a negative impact of labour, a positive size effect of defence 
spending, a negative the size effect of non-government spending and a negative externality 
effect for defence spending (equation 2.16). The factor productivity effect for defence 
spending was negative. This is an fi-nportant case study from the developing country (see 
Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4. Empirical Results of Ward et al. (1991) Study 
Parameter Estimate Parabolic 
error 
1 0.19 0.00 
(YIL)ý -0.12 0.01 
Aý (size) 1.04 0.33 
(kS) Y (externality) -0.88 0.04 
1ý (size) -3.21 0.86 
(]ýIS)Y (externality) 0.77 0.01 
Where I is investment function. (YIL)L denotes the changes 
in labour, Aý is the size effect of defence spending. 4nd 
(kS)Y is the externality effect of defence spending. N is 
the size effect of non-defence government spending and 
(]ýIS) Y is the externality effect of non-defence spending. 
Ward and Davis (1992) analysed econornic growth and defence spending using US data 
fI or 1945-90. Th-ne series estirnation method was employed on the three sector Feder-Ram 
model. They did some sh-nulations predicting future US defence expenditure. The three 
sector model included civilian, Lovernment and defence sectors. The model considers 
externality and productivity effects. The government sector spreads externalities to the 
civilian sector. Ward and Davis growth equation is: 
++ 
6111 
-om 
m 
+0 
in 
m+ 
09 G+o n. 
N 
(2.17) 
YYL 1+6111 yG 1+6 
9YG 
Y represents national income, I is investment, L is labour. 0 is externality of government (G) 
and civilian (C) sector on growth and the factor productivity differential is 6. The model 
was applied to the US. The results of the OLS estimates of equation showed that defence 
spending has negative size effect on GNP but, on the other hand, defence spending has a 
positive externality effect. OveraH, the effect of defence spending is negative on economic 
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growth because the size of the positive externalities of defence spending is very smaH (see 
Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5. Empirical Results of Ward and Davis (1992) Study 
Size effect of Externality effects of 
Investment Labour 
Defence Non-defence Defence Non-defence 
Coefficient 69 0.63* -2.97* 6.99** 0.73** -1.27** 
t statistics 2.20 2.05 -2.40 4.69 2.99 -4.40 
Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
Mueller and Atesoglu (1993) discussed defence spending and economic growth under the 
effect of technological change. The research methodology is based on the multi-sectoral 
neoclassical production function approach. The study includes two sectors (defence and 
civilian) with technological aspects. Single equation esth-nates derived that defence sector 
provides externalities to the civilian sector. Using US data the study covers 1948-90. It is 
assumed that the civiban sector may benefit from favourable spillovers from the defence 
sector like technological inventions. The aggregate production functions are: 
D =A (t). F(Ldl K d) (2.18) 
C=B(t), G(Lc, K,., D) (2.19) 
In the equation, D represents defence sector output, C is civilian output and A(t) and B(t) 
give Hicks neutral technical change in the respective sectors. F and G are the marginal 
product of labour and capital in two sectors. L and K are labour input and capital input 
sectors, respectively. Then total output (Q) will be Q=D+C. Technical change of the 
defence sector may not be the sarne as in the civilian sector. Howeverý it is assumed that 
they are proportional to each other according to A(t)/B(t)= I -(p. where (p is the technological 
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change proportionality factor. The final form of estimation equation is: 
dQ A, 
I- k QL 
dK 
+ F-d 
dD 
+0?,. 
D 
KDQ 
(2.20) 
where dQ/Q, dK/K and dL/L are economic growth, capital growth and employment growth, 
respectively; 0 is a constant and k is the average rate of technological progress. The 
elasticities(F-i, F-k, Ed, ) are: 
E, =e)ýtGl 
L 
(2.21) 
Q 
F, k=e 
?, t Gk (2.22) 
d= 
(0+6' ? -tG d) 
D 
(2.23) 
Q 
where e" represents technological change function. 
With consideration of technological change, the empirical results showed that defence 
spending has a significant positive effect on the economic growth. On the other hand, the 
externality effect of defence spending on economic growth was insignificant. Positive effect 
occurs due to difference in marg1nal productivity of labour and capital in civilian and defence 
sectors (5: p, -O) and the differences of technological change ((p3, -O) in the two sectors may 
create positive effects (see Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.6. Empirical Results of Atesoglu and Mueller (1993) Study 
Investment Labour Defence size Defence 
externality 
R2 DW 
Coefficient 0.65** (). 37** 
1 
1.08** 
11 -0.03 1 
0.80 
1 
1.89 
___j 
t statistics 7.44 
1 
3.11 
1 
3.93 
1 
-1.05 
1 
Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
Macnair, Murdoch, Pi and Sandler (1995) paper employed multiple observations in a 
pooled cross section, th-ne series for 10 NATO countries. They exclude the export sector 
because they assumed an export sector is not so different from other sectors for developed 
countries. The study, of course, considered externalitles which arise from the non-defence 
government sector and defence sector and also defence spill-ins from allies to civiliari 
sectors. The production function used is: 
N=N(K,,, L,, ) (2.24) 
D=D(Kd, Ld, N, 13) (2.25) 
C=C(K,,, LC, N, D, D) (2.26) 
where, N denotes non-defence government sector output, D is defence sector, 15 is defence 
spilling frorn a nation's allies and C is civilian output. Defence spiH-in is measured as the 
Sum ot I its affies real defence spending so that total output will be Y=N+D+C. The study 
was very comprehensive ii-i that they employed a variety of error component specifications 
that included fixed effects, one way random effects and two way random effects. The results 
of the study showed that defence spending has a positive impact on economic growth. On 
the other hand, defence spill-m had a small negative influence (see Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.7. Empirical Results of Macnair et al. (1995) Study 
Investment Labour Defence Non- Defence Aqjusted 
defence spillins R2 
Coefficient 0.14** 0.40 0.64** 0.58* -0.04** 0.13 
t statistics 6.22 1.07 3.39 1.94 -2.75 
Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
Overall evaluation: The bulk of the supply side studies mainly showed that defence had no 
significant ii-npact on economic growth or a smafl positive ii-npact. These findings are 
consistent despite the different sample size, different time periods and different estimating 
procedures. When the externality effect is considered. the majority of studies found positive 
externalities from defence. The main advantage of this model is that it describes the supply 
constraints which are irnportant for developing countries such as Turkey. The findings of 
these studies are surnmarised in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8. Summary of Previous Studies Using Feder Models 
Author(s) Sample Period Method Effect of Sign 
Biswas & 1960-70 &1970- Two sectors, defence size (0) 
Ram (1986) 77,58 LDCs OLS externality (0) 
Alexander 1974-1985 Four sectors, defence size (0) 
(199()) 9 DCs OLS externality (? ) 
Huang & 1952-1988 Three sectors defence size (0) 
Mintz (1990) US OLS & ORR externality (? ) 
Ward et al. 1950-1987 Three sectors defence size 
(1991) India NLS externality 
Ward & 1945-1990 Three sectors defence size 
Davis (1992) US OLS externality W 
Mueller & 
l 
1948-1990 
us 
Two sectors with 
i l t h l 
defence size W 
u Atesog 
(1993) 
ca ec no og 
changc, OLS externality 
Maciiair et 195 1-1988,10 Three sectors, defence size 
al. (1995) NATO countries pooled externality 
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2.4. Demand and Supply Side (Deger Type) Studies 
Defence spending may have growth promoting effects through supply side factors (such as 
technology spin-off, positive externalities from an infrastructure, hurnan capital etc. ). Also 
defence spending may affect economic growth (positive or negative) through demand side 
actors (such as the crowding-out of investment, exports, health spending or infrastructural 
u-nprovement, etc. ). Therefore, when one analyses defence-growth relationships, both 
supply side and demand side factors of economic growth should be considered. Supply side 
models tend to have positive impact of defence spending on economic growth, while 
demand side factors tend to have negative effects through crowding out of investment. To 
obtain more accurate answers, investigation of defence-growth relationships should include 
both demand side and supply side influences (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). 
In the defence-growth literature, a few studies comprised demand and supply factors of 
economic growth. They all esth-nate very similar multi-equation models and hypothesised 
possible positive direct effect of defence spending on growth through Keynesian demand 
stfillulation and other spill-off effects, and negative indirect effect through reducing savings 
or investment. They all include either three or four equations as growth, savings or 
investment ratio, trade balance ratio and defence burden using either three stage least 
squares (3SLS) or two stage least squares (2SLS) method. 
Deger and Sen (1983), Deger and Smith (1983)and Deger (1986a, 1986b) estu-nated 
det I ence growth relationships by 3SLS on data for 50 LDCs over the period 1965-1973. 
Although the four studics used the same samples and the same sample period, their empirical 
models were sh&, htly dflTerem. Other thart these studies, Lebovlc and Ishaq (1987). Scheetz 
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0 99 1) and Roux (1996) employed multi-equation models with different sample and sample 
period and slightly different equations. I 0ý, 
"UP, ý, srTy 
"IRK 
-ARY_ 
Deger and Sen (1983) sfl'nultaneo us equation model is described by the following equations: 
GDP growth =aO vj(Investment/GDP)V2(Defence spendinglGDP) + 
a3(GDP) -W4(PoPulation growth) -fa, 5(Net foreign (2.27) 
capital transfers) 
Investment/GDP ---bo *b, (GDP growth) -fb2(Change on GDP)+ 
b3(Defence spendinglGDP) + (2.28) 
b4(Net foreign capital transfers) 
Deftnce spendinglGDP =cO +c, (GDP) -ý'C2 (Per capita income at the PPP 
exchange rate minus PCI at the official (2.29) 
rate) -ýc., (Population) -ýC4(0'1 producer 
duninzy) +c., (War dummy) 
Defence spending may divert resources available for capital formation thus lower growth 
and an increase in defence burden may decrease (or increase) the amount of saving and also 
defence spending may have modernisation and spin-off effects. Therefore, the growth 
equation 2.27 includes investment shares (from any standard growth model), defence 
burdens (representing resource allocation and spin-off effects) and capital inflow from 
abroad but it does not represent humaii capital. Equation 2.28 for investment includes 
growth (due to sh-nultaneity), increments In output (accelerator), foreign capital and defence 
burden representing mobilisation effect. An increase in defence spending may decrease (or 
increase) the amount of investable resources. In the final equation 2.29, the defence burden 
is determined as a function ofincome and population (due to public goods nature of defence 
spending). In the equation, the difference between per capita income at purchasing power 
parity and official rates (INTEG) attempts to measure the degree of integration ofeconomic 
-25- 
Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature and the Data 
activity from the rest of the world. Deger and Sen (1983) sample of 50 countries include 
oil producer countries and some countries were at war. Therefore, the equation includes 
oil producer and war dummy variables. They concluded that defence spending has positive 
direct and negative indirect effects (through investment) and the overaH effects of defence 
spending were esth-nated to be negative (see Table 2.9). 
Table 2.9. Empirical Results of Deger and Sen (1983) Study 
AY/Y (Growth equation) IN (Investment equation) M[Y (Defence equation 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
Constant -9.63 (-1.50) Constant 14.17 (10.08) Constant 3.69 (5.59) 
IN 0.83 (1.84) AY[Y 0.54(2.75) Y 0.18(3.25) 
M[Y 0.20(0.98) AY 0.03(4.42) INTEG 0.30 (-2.82) 
y -0.13 (-0.76) M[Y -0.35 (-2.75) P 0.01 (0.37) 
AP/P 0.39(0.63 0.33 (3.83 1 4.99(5.19) 
FC -0.28 (-2.09) D2 13.33 (15.63) 
t statistics in parenthesis 
AY/Y: Average an annual growth rate of real GDP; I/Y: Investment shares in GDP; M/Y: Defence burden; 
Y: Income (GDP)-, AY: Increments in national income; AP/P: Growth rate of population; FC: Net foreign 
capital transfers; INTEG: The difference between per capita income measured at PPP and official exchange 
rate values; P: population; DI: Dummy variable for oil producing countries with balance of payments 
surplus; D2: Dummy variable of war economies 
Deger and Sen (1983) study is important because it analysed the two sides (demand and 
supply) and also employed relatively sophisticated econometric tests. Therefore, it avoided 
the problem of simultaneity bias. However, it has some weaknesses that the theoretical 
derivation of the models is not always clear and some variables seem ad hoc (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995). Population growth is not a very good proxy for labour productivity. The 
cstirnation techniques are \, cry sensitive to specification error. The other shortcoming from 
this paper is that durnmy variables in the equation are very crude proxies to represent an 
cxternal threat. A cross section analysis ot'defcnce growth relationship with multi-equation 
models provides limited evidciice, becausc, very crude proxies are inevitable and data 
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become less rebable due to very different economies of countries. The fifty countries used 
in these estimations are not homogenous. 
Deger and Smith (1983) develop an econometric model to test for the effect of defence 
spending on economic growth. They employed the f6flowing sirnultaneous equation model: 
GDP growth =aO -tal(SavinglGDP) _W2(Defence spendinglGDP) + 
a3(Population growth) -W4(Net external capital 
flowlGDP) -ýa,, (1970 per capita income at official 
exchange rate) -W6(Agricultural output growth) 
SavinglGDP ---bo +b, (GDP growth) *b2(Per capita GDP growth) 
b3(Deftnee spendinglGDP) -. fb4(Net foreign capital 
flowslGDP) --t-b flation rate) ., 
(In 
Deftnce spendinglGDP =cO -ýc, (PCI) -ýC2(Per capita income at the 
PPP exchange rate minus PCI at 
the official rate) -ýC3(Pqpulation) 'ýC4(0'1 
producer dummy) -fc, (War dummy) 
(2.30) 
(2.31) 
(2.32) 
They suggested that the econometric model should include growth, saving (not investment) 
and defence equations. In the growth equations (2.30), they added agricultural output 
growth. It reflects structural change in an economy. Population growth represents the 
labour force in the equation. The savIng equation (2.31) contains GDP growth. due to 
sh-nultaneity, per capita GDP growth, defence spending. foreign capital and inflation rates. 
Defence equation (2.32) is ah-nost the same as the previous model but income (GDP) is 
replaced by PCI to represent effect of' population growth on income. INTEG is for 
international intcgration ofthe cconomy. As the economy becomes more open to world 
market and relations. the dUerence between per capita hicome (PCI) and purchasing power 
parity (PPP) reduccs. The iicoatlvc cocificient suggest that a country tends to spend more ltý 
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on defence (Deger, 1986a). Defence is security related so the war dummy and oil producers 
dummies are included. Deger and Smith (1983) found very similar results. Defence 
spending has a small positive effect on growth through modernisation and larger negative 
effects through savings, but the estimated net effect is negative. Moreover, unlike Deger 
and Sen (1983), positive direct effect of defence spending on economic growth is 
statistically significant in this estfi-nation (Table 2.10). 
Table 2.10. Empirical Results of Deger and Smith (1983) Study 
AY/Y (Growth equation S/Y (Saving equation) M/Y (Defence equation) 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
Constant -8.93 (-2.43) Constant 14.54 (9.70) Constant 3.98 (4.53) 
Sly 0.93 (3.78) MN -0.43 (-3.16) PCI 0.19(2.61) 
M/Y 0.35 (2.77) AYIY 0.48(l. 92) INTEG -0.30 (-2.09) 
AP/P 0.49 (-1.08) APCI/PCI 0.37(4.55) P -0.02 (-4.29) 
FC/Y 0.59 (2.89) FC/Y -0.67 (-7.63) D1 4.67(3.65) 
PCI -0.26 (-2.44) INF 0.07 (-0.03) D2 11.31 (10.83) 
AAG/AG 0.16(l. 42) 
IR21 0.22 
R2 
1 0.86 R21 0.78 
t statistics in parentheses 
AY/Y: Average an annual growth rate of real GDP. S/Y: National saving ratio; M/Y: Defence burden; PCI: 
1970 per capita income at official exchange rates; APCI/PCI: Per capita GDP growth; AAG/AG: Average 
annual growth rate of agricultural product; AP/P: Growth rate of population; FC/Y: Net foreign capital 
transfers share in GDP; INF: Rate of change of a-aregate price level per annum; INTEG: The difference I- Z:: ý 17, ý between per capita income measured at PPP and official exchange rate values; P: population; DI: Dummy ltý 
variable for oil producing countries with balance of payments surplus; D2: Dummy variable of war 
economics 
The above two studies are very similar. They use the same 50 sample countries and the 
same time period, but their choiccs of variables are rather different. Deger and Smith (1983) 
added more variables into the equations and instead of investment/GNP ratio, they employed 
saving/GNP ratio for their second equation to assess cf'l'ccts of defence spending on saving. 
Per capita income and agricultural grovoli Nvere included in the growth equation, vvhilst 
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inflation rates and per capita GDP growth were added to the saving equation. The 
economic basis for adding agricultural growth is to represent structural change in an 
economy. 
Deger (1986a) estimates three structural equations. The model consists of: 
GDP growth =aO -fal(SavinglGDP) _W2(Defence spendinglGDP) + 
a3(] 970 per capita income at official exchange (2.33) 
rate) -ia4(Net external capital flowlGDP) 
SavinglGDP ---bo -ýb, (GDP growth) +b2(Per capita 
b3(Deftnce spendinglGDP) -ýb4(Net 
flowslGDP) 4, (Inflation rate) 
GDP growth)+ 
foreign capital (2.33) 
Defence spendinglGDP =cO -i-cl(Government spendinglGDP) "ýC2(Per 
capita GDP) -ýC3(Per capita GDP at official (2.34) 
exchange rate minus PPP) --ýCO'l producer 
dummy) -ý-C^ar dummy) 
Deger (1986a) explained that defence spending may affect growth through aggregate 
dernand stimulation, spill-off, allocation of resources away from potential investment and 
creation of new sources. Spfi-i-off and aggregate demand stimulation are represented by the 
growth equation (2.33). The equation also includes saving ratios. Foreign capital inflows 
are included because ofeffects of external factors on the economy. Population is a proxy 
for labour force. Per capita income represents relative wealth of the sample countries. The 
predicted sign of this analysis is some positive effect on growth and negative effects on 
Savings. 
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Savings equation (2.34) represents resource creation and aflocation effect of the defence 
sector. In this equation, the coefficient of defence explains how defence spending inllLlCnce 
savings. For the life cycle effects, GDP growth is added in to equation (2.34). The equation 
also included the inflation rate to take account of inflationary effects on resource creation. 
Defence equation (2.35) is determined after extensive experimentation. It includes two 
dummies for oil producer countries and economies in war. Government spending, per capita 
income is included because of the public good nature of defence. Per capita GDP at official 
exchange rate minus per capita income at purchasing power parity (INTEG) are added to 
measure variations in economic structure and for a particular country reflects the degree of 
integration with the international econorny. 
The main difference of Deger (I 986a) study from previous two studies is that in the growth 
equation, population growth and agricultural growth are excluded and in the defence 
equation, population is excluded but government spending is added. The empirical results 
of this study are shown in Table (2.11). The study concluded that defence spending 
stil-nulates growth through spin-off and aggregate demand effects. However, it retards 
cconomic growth because investable resources decrease when defence spending increases. 
Overall, the net effect of defence spending is negative. The results are as expected. 
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Table 2.11. Empirical Results of Deger (1986a) Study 
AY/Y (Growth equation S/Y (Saving equation) M/Y (Defence equation) 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient N'ariables Coefficient 
Constant -7.47 (-2.24) Constant 13.73 (9.26) Constant 1.19 (, 12 3) 
Sly 0.79(3.91) AY/Y 0.61(2.46) AGS/GS 0.12 (2.39) 
M/Y 0.25(2,46) APCI/PCI 0.03(4.36) PCI 0.16(2.82) 
PCI -0.19 (-2.21) M/Y -0.39 (-3.06) D1 4.00(3.34) 
FC[Y 0.47(2.72) INF -0.86 (-0.34) D2 11.54 (10.38) 
- FC[Y -0.64 (-7.60) 
] 
INTEG -0.28 (-2.53) 
R2 0.30 1R2 0.8 6 1R2 0.86 
t statistics in parentheses 
AY/Y: Average annual growth rate of real GDP; S/Y: National saving ratio; M/Y: Defence burden; PCI: 
1970 per capita income at official exchange rates; APCI/PCI: Per capita GDP growth; FC/Y: Net foreign 
capital transfers share in GDP; INF: Rate of' chanLle of aagregate price level per annum; AGS/GS: 
Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP; 
fNTEG: The difference between per capita income 
measured at PPP and official exchange rate values; DI: Dummy variable for oil producing countries with 
balance of payments surplus; D2: Dummy variable of war economics 
Second study of Deger (1986b) used four equations rather than three. She isolates the 
balance of trade in the model as another endogenous equation, because the economies 
became more open and foreign trade and net capital flow from abroad became more 
fi-nportant in the economy. 
The model is (Deger 1986b): 
GDP growth =aO -v, (SavinglGDP) -ýa2(Defence spendinglGDP) + 
a. /Balance oftrade) -V4(1970 per capita income (2.36) 
at official exchange rate)-fa5(Agricultural growth) 
SaviitglGDP ---bo -ýb, (Deftnce spendinglGDP) -ýb 2(1970 per capita 
income at official rate *GDP growth) + (2.37) 
b_; (Balance of trade) +b 4(hiflation rate) 
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Balance of tradelGDP =cO -fC, (Defence spendinglGDP) 'ýC2(GDP 
growth) _fC3(Inflation rate) -ýCO'l (2.38) 
producer dummy) +C5(War dummy) 
Defence spendinglGDP =do -*dl(1970 Per capita income at official 
exchange rate) -q2(Per capita income -PPP) + (2.39) ý3(Governnzent spending growth) --fd4(PoPulation) + 
ý, (Oil producer dummy) -. td6(War duninzy) 
Although Deger (1986b) second study seems very similar to previous studies it includes four 
equations rather than three. The fourth equation is balance of trade. It is expected to 
represent foreign capital inflows and effects of defence spending on balance of payments. 
The predicted sign for balance of trade is negative. The equation contains the defence 
burden as an exogenous variable. The other variables used are GDP growth, Inflation rate 
and two dummies. The dummies are the same as in the defence equation (oil producer and 
war dummies). She expected that GDP growth affects balance of trade negatively if the 
country follows irnport substituting strategies and positively, if the country follows export 
promoting strategies. Inflation is included in the equation (2.38) because LDCs generally 
have a fixed exchange rate. Therefore, the inflation rate will distort the relative price 
structure with the rest of the world. The defence burden variable is predicted to be negative 
because higher arms imports may divert resource available for civilian import which are 
growth promoting. However, this effect might be positive. Sophisticated imported 
weapons might lead to learnmg-by-doing as wefl as adopting the technology to domestic 
LISCS (training ot'personnel to maintain high tech weapons) 
be higher for LDC's. 
These positive effects should 
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Defence equation (2.39) is based on its public good nature. Almost all defence expenditures 
came from government budget and it is predominantly public good. Its macroeconomic 
effects are related to government spending. Therefore. determinants of defence expenditure 
could be per capita income, the government budget or level of population (Deger, 1986b). 
Deger (1986b) also added to her defence equation country specific dummies (eg. dummy 
for oil producer economies and dummy for war economies). Per capita income mmus 
purchasing power parity (INTEG) shows international aspect of economy. Since national 
income per capita measured at an official exchange rate can vary significantly from that 
measured at purchasing power parity. The difference between the two is defined as an index 
measuring the degree of integration that the domestic economy has achieved with the rest 
of the world. The predicted sign of this variable is negative. It nnplies that when an 
economy becomes more open, it spends more on defence through armaments (Deger, 
1986b; Deger and Sen, 1983). The results are shown in Table 2.12. Although saving, 
balance of trade and defence equations have an acceptable R', the growth equation has a 
low R 2. It suggests that the equation does not represciA growth adequately. 
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Table 2.12. Empirical Results of Deger (1986b) Study 
AY/Y 
(Growth equation) 
S/Y 
(Saving equation) 
B/Y (Balance 
of trade equation) 
NI/Y 
(Defence equation) 
Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient 
Cons. -4.2 (-1.56) Cons. 12.5 (6.91) Cons. -2.33 (-0.86) Cons. 1.47 (1.52) 
Sly 0.58(3.37) M[Y -0.56 (-3.72) M[Y -2.45 (-2.88) NTEG -0.25 (2.52) 
M[Y 0.29(2.5) AY[Y 0.74(2.42) AY/Y 1.22(3.08) D1 4.02(3.42) 
B/Y -0.15 (-1.75) APCI/PCI 0.04(3.92) INF 0.16(0.03) D2 11.2(10.2) 
PCI -0,14 (-1.75) B/Y 0,32(4.22) DI 41.5(7.08) AGS/GS 0.16(3.07) 
AAG/AG 0.19(l. 85) INIF -1.75 (456) D2 23.6(0.92) P 0.01 (1.32) 
PCI 0.15(2.80) 
R2 0132 1 R2 0.78 R2 0.67 R2 0.87 
t statistics in parentheses 
AY/Y: Average annual growth rate of real GDP; S/Y: National saving ratio; M/Y: Defence burden; PCI: 
1970 per capita income at official exchange ratcs; APCI/PCI: Per capita GDP growth; B/Y: Net foreign 
capital transfers share in GDP; INF: Rate of change of aggregate price level per annum; AGS/GS: 
Government expenditure as a proportion of GDP; INTEG: The difference between per capita income 
measured at PPP and official exchange rate values; DI: Dummy variable for oil producing countries with 
balance of payments' surplus, D2: Durnmy variable of war economies; P: Population; AAG/AG: Growth of 
agricultural product; INF: Inflation rate 
The above four studies used cross section data for fifty LDCs for the 1965-1973 period. 
A three-stage least squares (3SLS) estirnation is employed. The equations show a 
simultaneity problem and there is high covariance among equations (Deger 1986a, 1986b). 
The studies found that defence spending shows positive effect on growth through spin-off 
and aggregate demand effect, but they show negative effects on saving and hence 
investment. However, the size ofthe negative effect is higher than the positive direct effect. 
Therefore, they conclude that the net effect from defence spending to the economy is 
negative. 
Lebovic and Ish(iq (1987) develop an empirical model of defence- growth relationships. 
They employed three equations with a sample ol'20 Middle-Eastern countries for the period 
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of 1973-1982. They used two-stage least squares(2SLS) method. Thýs empirical model is 
similar to various Deger models. However, they added export growth into the growth 
equation and the endogeiious defence equation included a security needs index (SNI) which 
is calculated by the authors and considers military capabilities of other nations weighted by 
their geographical distance from that nation. This index is also sensitive to the existence of 
power centres. Power centres are defined as countries' relative capability, their strength as 
compared to their neighbours. It considers size of armed forces and the geographical 
distance between their capital cities (Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987 -, 113). Three different proxies 
were employed for defence variable, namely, defence spendmg/GDP, arm iMports/total 
imports and troops/population (Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987). They found that defence 
spending was negatively correlated to economic growth. Their empirical model is shown 
below (equations 2.40,2.41,2.42 and 2.42): 
GDP growth =aO --fa, (Investment/GDP) _V2(Deftnce spending/GDP) + (2.40) 
a3(Population growth) -fa4(Export growth) 
In vestnzent/GDP ---bo -ýb /Defence spending1GDP)*b2(Net capital (2.41) inflows abroad/GDP) -ýb3(GDP growth) 
Defence spendinglGDP =cO -ýc (Security needs index) -ýC2(Non -defence 
government spendinglGDP) + (2.42) 
C3(PoPulation) -ýC4(GDP growth) 
The result of their study is as expected. Defence spending is strongly related to nations' 
basic external security needs. Although they conclude that the negative effect of defence 
on growth, the empirical results generally have low t statistics and the defence coefficient 
is insignificant ýi the growth cqUation (Table 2.13). 
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Table 2.13. Empirical Results of Lebovic Ishaq (1987) Study 
AY/Y (Growth equation) IN (Investment equation) M/Y (Defence equation) 
Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient Variables Coefficient 
Constant 5.57 Constant 0.25 Constant 2.99 
IN -2.88 (0.23) M/Y 0.01(3.42) SNI 0.60 (13.10) 
M[Y -0.19 (0.45) FC[Y 0.10(2.74) NGS/Y 0.39(1.99) 
AP/P 0.47(0.79 AY 0.00(1,30) P 0.02(l. 77) 
AEX/EX 0.36(l. 73) AY[Y -0.01 (0.86) 
t statistics in parentheses 
AY/Y: Average annual growth rate of real GDP; I/Y: Investment share in GDP; M/Y: Defence burden; 
AP/P: Population growth rate; FC/Y: Net foreign capital transfers share in GDP-, AEX/EX: Growth rate of 
merchandise exports; ANGS/GS: Non-defence government expenditure as a proportion of GDP; AY: 
Absolute change in GDP from one year to another; SNI: Security needs index; P: Population. 
Scheetz (1991) study used a model which is modified 1'rom Deger (1986a) and Deger and 
Smith (1983). The study analysed Chile, Argentina, Peru and Paraguay for the period of 
1969-1987. He both employed pooled cross-sectional time series estimation and time series 
estirnation. His model includes four equations using 3SLS estirnation. The findings of this 
study are that both effects of defence spending (spin-off and aggregate demand effects and 
crowding-out of investment) are negative. 
His four equation model was: 
GDP growth =aO -iaj(Saving1GDP)'ýa2(Defence spendinglGDP) + 
a3(Balance of trade) -. fa4(Agricultural growth) + (2.43) 
a', (Government spending growth) 
SavinglGDP =bO -ibl(Dejence vpendinglGDP) -. ýb2 (GDP growth) + 
b. /Inflation rate) 44(Government spending/GDP) + (2.44) 
b5(Level of per capita income) + 
b, (Lagged balance of tradelGDP) 
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Balance of tradelGDP =cO -ýc, (Defence spendinglGDP) 'ý, C2(Level of 
per capita income)-ýCAagged balance (2.45) 
of trade) *C4(Inflation rate) 'ýCflnternational 
comparisons project index) 
Defence spendinglGDP =do -fd/Government vpendinglGDP) + 
d2(Dummy for military dictatorship) + (2.46) 
dý, (Dummy for threat) -,, d4(Lagged 
defence spendinglGDP) 
The model is modified frorn Deger (1986a) and Deger and Si-nith (1983). In the growth 
equation (2.43) growth of government expenditure is included because of the dominant role 
of government in the sample countries and he excluded the population growth rate because 
of insignificant results. Saving equation (2.44) is very close to the Deger model. However, 
Scheetz added a government expenditure variable (net of defence spending). Balance of 
trade equation (2.45) is different from Deger's equation. He discovered that lagged foreign 
accounts variable gave very well results because of inertial effects of both the trade and the 
debt interests. Furthermore, Scheetz (199 1) added a per capita income variable in order to 
capture country relative wealth effects in foreign accounts. 
Like Deger, Scheetz determined defence equation (2.46) after extensive experimentation. 
However, his equation is radically different from Deger's equation. Due to poor statistical 
rcsults, he did not use population. There are two dummy variables in Scheetz (1991) 
cquation (2.46). one is for military dictatorship and the other is for a threat to capture 
tonsion brought about by an interstate military crisis or internal security problems. 
Morcovcr. laggcd dcfence spendirig, is included m the equation to capture the inertial nature 
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ol'defence spending (Scheetz, 199 1). This equation is more like standard models of demand 
for military expenditure. The results are shown in Table 2.14. Defence spending has a 
negative effect on the growth, the saving and the balance of trade equations. Unlike other 
previous studies, no positive effect of defence is found, but again the R2 for the growth 
equation is very low. 
Table 2.14. Empirical Results of Scheetz (1991) Study 
AY/Y 
(Growth equation) 
Sty 
(Saving equation) 
BIY (Balance 
of trade equation) 
M/Y 
(Defence equation) 
Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient 
Sly 0.22(3.10) Cons. 0.14(6.44) M/Y -0.49 (-2.40) NGS/Y 0.07(5.24) 
M/Y -0.53 (-1.95) AY[Y 0.32(2.06) PCI -0.01 (-3.12) F 0.07(3.76) 
B/Y -0.25 (-1,62) M/Y -0.56 (-1.25) (B/Y)-, 0.45(4.47) TENS 0.01(3.68) 
AA Ar'. IAC' AG/AG 0.15(4.02) INF 0.01(2.81) INF 0.01 (1.87) (M/Y)-, 0.57(7.75) 
AGSIY 0.08(2.06) AGS/Y -0.26 (-3.71) D75 0.04(l. 58) 
- PC177 0.01(4,95) - 
- (B/Y)-, 0.21 (2.08 - - 
R2 0.26 R2 0.51 0.53 
LRI 
081 
t statistics in paratheses 
AY/Y: Average annual growth rate of real GDP; S/Y: National saving ratio; M/Y: Defence burden; PCI: 
Level of per capita income measured in current US$ official exchange rates; PC177: Level of per capita 
income, in constant US$ of 1977 official exchange rates; B/Y: Net foreign capital transfers share in GDP; 
INF: Rate of chan (Ye of aggf egate price level per annum; AGS/Y: Government expenditure as a proportion 
of GDP; ANGS/NGS: Non-defence government expenditure as a proportion of GDP; P: Population; 
AAG/AG: Growth of agricultural product; INF: Inflation rate; (B/Y)-,: Lagged B/Y; (M/Y)-,: Lagged M/Y; 
D75: International comparisons index using 1975 base year data-, F: Dummy variable for years when a 
democratic government wrote the budget, one for years when a military dictatorship decided; TENS: 
Dummy variable, zero for peace. one for tension from imminent external defence threat of internal guerilla 
problem. 
Roux (1996) empiricafly tested for the fi-npact of defence spending on South Africa's 
econornic growth between 1960 and 1990. The model includes four equations similar to 
Deger (1986a, 1986b) and Scheetz (1991). He added some exogenous variables m his 
equations which Nverc different from others. They are LIS$/South African Rand exchange 
ratcs, annual percentage changc in the Rand gold price in balance of trade equation. 
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The change in the real US$/Rand exchange rate is included to account for the effect on 
exports and imports of a change in the international purchasing power of the domestic 
currency. The gold price is added to reflect the h-nportaiice of this commodity in a county's 
export performance. In the saving equation, a real prime overdraft rate is taken to exert an 
influence on savings decisions. In the defence equation, lagged defence spending is added 
to capture its inertial nature, whereby defence spending In any particular year partly reflects 
the commitments incurred in a previous year (Roux, 1996). The model he used is shown 
in equations (2.47,2.48,2.49 and 2.50): 
GDP growth =aO vI(SavinglGDP) -v 2 (Defence spendinglGDP) -W3 (Balance (2.47) 
of' tradelGDP) -V4(Governnient spending growth) 
SavinglGDP ---bo 4 /Defence spending1GDP)+b2(GDP growth) 
43(Per capita income) +b4(Balance of trade) + (2.48) 
b., (Inflation rate) +b6(Non -military government 
expenditure +b7(Prime overdrat rate) 
Balance of tradelGDP =cO -i-cl(Deftnce spendinglGDP) 'ýC2(GDP 
growth) -ýC3(Change of $lRand exchange (2.49) 
rate) -ý-C4(Change of Rand/Gold price + 
c,, (Financial sanctions dummy) 
Defence spendinglGDP =do -. ýd, (Per capita income) -q2(Non -military 
government spendinglGDP) -fdý, (War dummy) + (2.50) 
d4(Lagged defence spendinglGDP) 
After the analysis, he found that there is no relationship between gross domestic savings rate 
and defence spending, but the balance of trade is negatively correlated to defence 
expenditure for South Africa between 1960-1990. The empirical results are depicted In 
Table 2.15. Howcvcr. in the growth equation. the defence burden is negative and 
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statisticafly significant. 
Table 2.15. Empirical Results of Roux (1996) Study 
AY/Y 
(Growth equation) 
S/Y 
(Saving equation) 
B/Y (Balance 
of trade equation) 
M/y 
(Defence equation) 
Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient Variab. Coefficient 
Cons. 15.48 (3.35) Cons. 5.11 (0.58) Cons. 9.71 (1.87) Cons. 1.77 (1.83) 
NGS[Y -0.87 (-3.74) AY/Y 0.58(l. 19) Ayly -1.91 (-2.70) (M[Y)-, 0.72 (8.35) 
M[Y -1.51 (-2.63) M/Y -0.07 (-0.08) M/Y -1.69 (-1.44) PCI 0.01 (-1.00) 
B/Y -0.23 (-3.13) (Sly)., 0.35 (1.93) (B/Y)-, 1.03 (5.88) D 0.54(2.93) 
Sly 0.54(3.18) PRI -0.23 (1.54) USG 0.64(2.18) 
- NGSN 0.45(l. 21) 
R2 0.64 R2 0.49 1 2 0.751 R2 OfJ 
t statistics in parentheses 
AY/Y: Average annual growth rate of real GDP, S/Y: National saving ratio; M/Y: Defence burden; PCI: 
Real per capita income; B/Y: Current account balance share in GDP; ANGS/NGS: Non-defence government 
expenditure as a proportion ofGDP; USG: Economic growth rate of USA; PRI: Real prime overdraft rate; 
D: Dummy variable for the effects of war (or threat of war) it took value of one for the years between 1973 
and 1987 and zero elsewhere; (S/Y)-,: Lagged S/Y; (B/Y)-,: Lagged B/Y, (M/Y)-,: Lagged M/Y; ý C, 
The findings of these studies are surnmarised in Table 2.16. Despite the fact that defence 
has positive effect on growth in all Deger studies, the effect of defence on saving is negative 
and the net effect is also negative because the negative effect of defence on saving is much 
bigger. The other studies also suggest a negative effect of defence on saving and on growth. 
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Table 2.16. Summary of Previous Studies Using SEMs 
Author(s) Sample Period Method Effect of Defence on 
Deger & Sen 3SLS three equation Growth + 
(1983) Saving 
Net 
Deger & 50 LDCs 3SLS three equation Growth + 
Srnith (1983) Investment 
1965-1973 Net 
Deger 3SLS three equation Growth + 
(1986a) Saving 
Net 
Deger 3SLS four equation Growth + 
(1986b) Saving 
Balance of Trade 
Net 
Lebovic & 20 Middle East Count. 2SLS three equation Growth 
Ishaq (1987) 1973-1982 Saving 
Scheetz Chile, Argentina, 3SLS four equation Growth 
(1991) Paraguay, Peru Saving 
1969-1987 Balance of Trade 
Roux(1996) South Africa four equation Growth 
1960-1990 Saving 
Balance of Trade 
2.5. Causal Analysis of Defence Expenditure and Economic Growth 
This section provides a brief review of the dctence-growth literature which used Granger 
causality tests to analyse defence-growth relationships and the exogenity of these two 
variables. Eight important empirical studies are reviewed. The earlier study of Jeording 
(1986) analysed exogenity of defence and growth variables with sample of 57 LDCs. The 
defence variable was expressed as share of defence spending in GNP. Jeording (1986) 
concluded that defence spending is not an strong exogenous variable relative to economic 
growth. Chowdhury (1991) applied this procedure for 55 LDCs. His test results showed 
a lack of consistency across different countries. While there was no causal relationship for 
30 countries, a causal relationship was evident for the remaining 25 countries. These 25 
countries have relatiNvIN, high dcfcnce burdens and much of them experienced a war or 
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conflict during the term'. However. in no cases did he find defence spending helps 
economic growth. Then. he concluded that the relationships between defence spending and 
economic growth cannot be generalised across the countries (Chowdhury. 199 1 ). Although 
Kusi (1994) found no caLisal relationships for 62 countries out of 77, the remaining 15 
countries showed a causal relationships. In seven countries, defence spending Granger 
causes economic growth. However, hi contrast to Chowdhury (1991), in no cases did 
defence spending help economic growth. These 15 countries have similarities with 
Chowdhury's. They have a high defence burden and experience of war 4. Furthermore, 
Frederikson (199 1) study for causal relationship between defence spending and economic 
growth showed a feedback relationship. It irnplies that neither economic growth nor 
defence spending can be considered exogenous, so tht OLS estimations arc inconsistent. 
On the other hand, in recent years, four different studies used a single country to analyse 
defence-growth relationships by Granger causality test. Chen (1993), using Chinese data 
between 1950-1991, Madden and Haslehurst (1995), using Australian quarterly data 
between 1959-3 and 1993-2 and Kollias (1997) LISMg Turkish data between 1954 and 1993 
tI ound no causal relationships between defence expenditure and economic growth for these 
countries. In contrast to the above three studies, Assery ( 1996) t'Ound that defence spending 
Granger causes economic growth for Iraq between 1950 and 1980. 
Causal relationships of 25 countries in Chowdhury (1991). Defence spending causes economic growth: 
na, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Araentina, Iran. Israel. Jordan. South Korea, Nnw I 
Thailand, Uruguay. Venezucla. Economic growth cause defencc spending: Chilli, Ghana, Haiti, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia. Tunisia. Uganda. Feedback: Kenva. Indonesia. E(Yypt. 
Causal relationships ot'15 countries in Kusi (1994). Defence spending causes economic growth: Pakistan, 
Indonesia. Malaysia- Algeria. Malawi. Brazil. Econoi-nic groxth cause defence spending: Israel. Jordan, 
Oman. Saudi Arabia. Bangladesh. Burundi. Congo. Feedback: Kuwait 
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The results so far suggests that exogenity of the defence variable is not a clear issue. In 
some cases, OLS estimation of usual single equation growth models with defence 
expenditure might be inconsistent (Chowdhury, 1991). However, this test should be 
analysed with caution, because, the Granger causality test is very sensitive to the sample 
period, the number of observations, data frequency, choice of lag length, structural changes 
over the period, stationary of variables and cointegration across the variables (Ram, 1995). 
Moreover, as Ram (1995) pointed out using bivariate causality tests can suffer from omitted 
variables, because the defence variable is generally used with other regressions in growth 
equations. 
2.6. Conclusions 
Over the last twenty years, defence-growth association have been heavily investigated. The 
bulk of defence-growth studies can be classified as demand side and supply side, developed 
countries and LDCs, considering externality in the models and the Granger causality tests. 
Although the majority of dernand side models uncovered a negative effect of defence 
spending on economic growth, supply side models usually have positive effect of defence 
spending or have no significant effects on growth. On the demand side, except Benoit (1973 
& 1978), Stewart (1991) and Landau (1994), all studies found negative effects. On the 
supply side, only Ward and Davis (1993) found a negative effect of defence spending on 
growth. The classification of developed countries and LDCs did not show a clear result, 
because the findings of negative and positive effects ot'defence spending are nearly equal. 
When we consider externality Mects. most ofthe studies found positive externality effect 
or no externality cffcct of dcfence spending-, only Macnair et al. (1995) study found small 
ne(-Tativc cxternafity cffcct. Furthermore, some of the studies applied purely Granger 
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causality tests which were Chowdhury (199 1). Jeording (1986) and Madden and Haslehurst 
(1995). According to Jeording's findings causality runs from growth to defence. It shows 
that defence spending is a dependent variable on growth. These results break findings of all 
studies because the studies explicitly or implicitly assumed defence spending is independent 
variable. On the other hand, for over half of the sample no causality was found by 
Chowdhury (1991) and also no causality was found by the Madden and Haslehurst(1995) 
study. A summary of the literature is presented in Table 2.17. 
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2.7. DATA 
2.7.1. Data Problems 
Rehable data are crucial elements of econometric studies. However, rehable data are a 
major problem when studying LDCs. Not do only defence expenditure data have problems 
but also general economic data may not be reliable. Series usually do not group for time 
series data, and deflators are not very exact due to high inflation. It makes for high residuals 
and low R2 (Scheetz, 199 1). Turkey has been hving with high inflation for long time. This 
is one econometric difficulty when studying Turkey. However, there is no other possibihty 
f or empiricafly discussing its defence-growth associations. 
Most of the defence-growth studies rely on cross-section analysis and their sample periods 
are relatively short. There is a lack of empirical evidence from single country using time 
series estirnation. A country such as Turkey, from developing world with a high defence 
burden might help to explain these relationships. The major problem in the econometric 
study is data availability and its reliability. This problem is even bigger in the cross-nation 
analysis because of problems of comparability (Cohen and Ward, 1996: Ch. 21). Scheetz 
(1996) showed that for a given US $, level of defence spending. expenditure levels between 
one international sources and another can frequently differ by as much as 300% (Scheetz, 
1996: Ch. 22). Blackaby and OhIsen (1987) analysed the problem of defence spending data 
and they showed that ACDA and SIPRI data differ significantly in pricing and presentation. 
Their finding is that out of the 150 countries in the World, only about 25 countries have a 
"good" statistical series for defence speiiding and eveii 25 countries' series are not very 
accurate (Blackaby and Ohlscn. 1987). However, NATO figures are relatively reliable. 
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Fontanel (1987) mentioned limitations of exchange rates when comparative information 
about defence spending is expressed in US $. This limitations make ACDA data less reliable 
for Turkey. Fontanel (1987) indicated four important problems which seriously undermine 
the credibility of defence spending data. They are: 
a) The velý, large domestic sector that is not connected iiith international trade and 
broadly independent of exchange rate trends. 
b) Changes in interest rate differentials and sudden capital movements attribute to 
international specifications. 
c) The fact that some exchange rates are set arbitrarily mostly by countries with 
planned economies but also by other countries that exercise a more or less strict 
control overforeign exchange. 
d) The poor credibility of official exchange rate to adjust prices in different 
currenciesforpurposes of international comparisons because they do not reflect the 
currencies international purchasing power" (Fowaiiel, 1987: 29-30). 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is not an answer for cross-nation study of defence economy. 
Since the pattern of defencc spending and in particular the pattern of relative prices in a 
defence sector can be very different from that of other kinds of expenditure. This is 
particularly the case when there is any form of conscription by which military manpower is 
obtaiiied at very low rates of pay (Blackaby, 1987). Smith (1996) suggests that in the case 
ot'defence spending US ACDA and SIPRI data are better than other sources. 
Defence expenditure data are not usually very accurate for a number of reasons such as: 
significant amounts ot' security expciiditure iicver cnter the accounts or budgets of 
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developing countries, problems of conversions, extra budgetary accounts, highly budget 
categories, military assistance and foreign exchange manipulation. These make cross-nation 
studies more inaccurate. Although single country analysis does not solve all the abow data 
problems of defence spending, it has potential for better explanations. 
2.7.2. Data Sources 
There are a few main data sources for defence expenditure with its own characteristics. The 
military expenditure data are as follows. Military Balance (MB) is published by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies. It is useful for compact information for a 
particular country and for a particular year (Deger, 1986). However, when time series data 
or historical data are needed, the, data are rather madcquate. Some of the defence 
expenditure data are estimated and theii not updated. 
The IMF publish defence expenditure data in Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 
(GFS). The data are taken directly frorn the government submission, and its definition of 
defence expenditure is very narrow. It includes only shares of Ministry of National Defence 
in general budget for Turkey. The data are rarely used in econometric studies (Candemir, 
1995). 
The other comprehensive military data source is US Arms Control and Disarmaments 
Agency (ACDA). Its pubhcation of World Military Expenditures and Arms Tramsfers 
(WMEAT) does not give local currency figures. It gives only constant and current US 
doflar figures. The base year ofconstam doflar series changes in every yearbook. Each 
book provides data I'Or 10 wars. It is difficult to construct a long enough time series data 
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set. Furthermore, converting national currency to US $ involves a long complicated 
procedure with national and US GDP deflators, and exchange rates. Therefore, national 
currency in value term are not directly obtainable from ACDA figures. Despite the fact that 
the ACDA figures are very useful for cross sectional studies, they are limited for time series 
analysis. 
Turkey's own records are another data source for the study. Recently, defence expenditure 
in the general government budget was published from 1924-1996 by the Ministry of Finance. 
The data are same as with IMF-GFS data, so it has the same problems. It is very narrow. 
It does not include many of'defence related expenditures such as Defence Industry Support 
Fund (DISF). In recent years, the fund has transferred considerable amounts of money to 
the defence industry. 
The Stockhoh-n International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also publishes defence 
expenditure data and it uses open sources when calculating defence expenditure data. The 
NATO definition is used as a guideline for all countries. It supplies very reliable data for 
time series analysis and publishes military expenditure data for its member countries. For 
the NATO countries, the NATO and SIPRI figures are same. Table (2.18) and Figure (2.1) 
show comparative military expenditure trends among different data sources. ACDA data 
are not included because they use US$ and not national currency, and converting to national 
currency is not easy due to its long procedures. However, its value for Turkey is not so 
different from SIPRI or NATO data. ACDA also uses NATO definitions of defence 
cxperiditure for Turkey. For these reasons, this study uses SIPRI data (or NATO data) 
for military expenditure. 
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Table 2.18. Turkish Defence Expenditure among Different Data Sources 
Years IISS(l) NATO/SIPRI (2) GFS/MOD (3) Turkey Total (4) 
1981 2142 2080 1539 1937 
1982 1645 2319 1278 1641 
1983 1825 2289 1514 1953 
1984 1615 2223 1458 1909 
1985 1558 2236 1358 1808 
1986 1648 2493 1493 1988 
1987 1728 2477 1454 2042 
1988 1710 2232 1318 1907 
1989 1303 2404 1515 2234 
1990 1670 2953 1696 2611 
1991 1986 3165 1844 2984 
1992 2275 3440 2078 3388 
1993 2424 3796 -1135 2984 
Sources: IISS, Military Balance (various years), NATO Review (various years), NIFKI 
yearbook 1995, IMF-GFS (various years), Ministry of National Defence Turkey (1993,1995) 
Values are with 1987 Constant Turkish Billion Liras. 
Notations: 
1. These data were taken from IISS Military Balance (various years) 
2. These data are from NATO publications (NATO Review) and SIPRI yearbooks. They 
have exactly the same values for Turkey. 
3. Turkish Ministry of Defence budget figures and also IMF, Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbooks publishes same data for defence expenditure. 
4. Turkey's total security defence and spending. They were taken from Ministry of 
Finance Turkey (1993,1995). It include ministry of defence budget, gendarmerie 
force budget, coast guard budget, security forces budget and ministry of interior 
budcyet fiaures. 
In Table (2.18) and Figure (2.1). IISS and GFS/MOD values show lower trends because 
their defence expenditure definitions are very narrow. Data for Turkey were taken from the 
Ministry of Finance ii-i Turkey. They include total security and defence expenditures (i. e. 
Ministry of Defence budget, gendarmerie force budget. coast guard budget, security forces 
budget and Ministry of Interior budget figures). but exclude some ý-nportant components 
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of defence spending. The SIPRI and NATO (they are same for Turkey) I, ioures better 
explain Turkish defence expenditures, since they are a more accurate measure ofall defence 
items. For these reasons, the study applied SIPRI or NATO data. 
Figure 2.1 Trends of Turkish Defence Expenditure among Different Data Sources 
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2.7.2.1. The Turkish Data 
The data for defence expenditure in Chapters 4 and 5 are taken from SIPRI yearbooks but 
for the causal analysis in Chapter 5, the data for delOnce burden and economic growth 
between 1924-1996 came from Ministry of DcfCnce, Turkey; and the disaggregated detence 
clata in Chapter 7 are takcii fi-om variOLIS 1SSLICS of' NATO Review. Other than rnflitary 
expenditure, in Chapter 4, the study nceds gross national product (GNP), gross fixed 
investi-ncrit, cdLicational cxpciiditurc and labOUr forcc data. These data are pubfished by 
IMF Internatiomil Finance Statistics (IFS), the Or-ganisation for Economic Developi-ncnt and 
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Cooperation (OECD), State Institute of Statistics (SIS) Turkey and Ministry of Finance 
Turkey. Although the International Labour Office (ILO) publishes labour force data. 
sufficient data are not available for Turkey. Therefore, labour force data are obtained from 
OECD Labour Force Statistics from 1960 to 1994. The data between 1955-1959 are not 
available from OECD nor SIS Turkey, so it is constructed from population using a labour 
fI orce/population ratio. Population data were taken from SIS Turkey. GNP and gross fixed 
investment data are pubfished by IMF/IFS, OECD, and SIS Turkey but IMF/IFS data are 
used where possible, because of its reliability. 
Human capital is difficult to measure. As a proxy the study used several data sets, such as 
the share of educational expenditure in the government budget. Educational expenditure in 
the government budget is obviously an imperfect measure because not all spending on 
education is intended to yield productive human capital (eg. philosophy, religion and 
literature: Mankiw et al. 1992). Moreover, primary school enrollment/population ratio, 
secondary school enrolh-nent/population ratio, high school enroHment/population ratio, 
primary school enrolh-nent/labour force ratio primary school enrollment/labour force ratio, 
secondary school enrolb-nent/labour force ratio. high school enrollment/labour force ratio, 
armed forces/labour force and an armed forces/labour force ratio are considered as 
alternative proxies. The data for the human capital are taken from the Ministry of Finance, 
SIS Turkey and NATO. respectiVely. 
The data for the study arc from 1955 to 1996. Before 1949, SIPRI mihtary data are not 
a\, ailable and gross fiXed invcstinent data are available from 1948 and accurate human 
capital data from 1954. All financial datý' wcrc milhons of Turkish Liras in current prices 
-- 
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which are deflated to miffions of 1985 Turkish Liras using both IMF/IFS GNP dellator and 
GNP deflators ol'SIS Turkey. The IMF/IFS deflator was only available from 1960. For 
earlier years, the GNP deflator of SIS Turkey is used. Due to a long period of high inflation 
fI or Turkey, deflators are not exact. To obtain the most accurate data, OECD, SPO (State 
Planning Organisation, Turkey) and United Nations data are considered 5. 
The data used in Chapter 5 (different from data sources of Chapter 4) are taken from the 
tI ollowing sources. Balance of trade and government consumption was taken from various 
IMF/IFS yearbooks. Inflation and exchange rate data came frorn various publications of SIS 
Turkey. Share of Greek defence spending in GDP and average NATO defence burden of 
members of NATO data were taken from various SIPRI yearbooks. Share of variables for 
GRE and NATO are not very accurate proxies for this estimation. Sandler and Hartley 
(1995) suggest that defence expenditure for spill-in and threat should consist of the level of 
defence expenditures not per capita defence expenditures nor the share of defence 
expenditures in GNP (Sandler and Hartley, 1995; 60-6 1). However, converting into a 
common currency using exchange rate might make the variables less representative. GRE 
and NATO variables needed to be converted Turkish currency, but the high level of inflation 
and fixed exchange rate until 1980 makes these conversion meaningless'. All financial data 
were deflated to 1985 million Turkish liras using GNP deflators of IMF/IFS and SIS 
TurkeY7. 
A more detailed account of data set are given in the Appendix 4.1. 
The series are convated to Turkish currency but it did not givc significant results. 
The data series used for estimation arc presented in die Appendix 5.1. 
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2.7.2.2. The Greek Data 
Greece provides comparative material, enabbirig tests of the robustness of the results for 
Turkey. The data used for Greece came from two main sources. First, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (IFS) Yearbooks (various issues). 
Second, the SIPRI yearbooks. GNP (gross national products ), GNP deflator, investment, 
saving (it is calculated from national accounts), a balance of trade (exports of goods and 
services minus imports of goods and service in the national accounts), inflation rates 
government consumptimi, export and population data were taken from IMF/IFS yearbooks. 
Defence expenditure data carne from various SIPRI yearbooks. For alternative estimations, 
lirnited labour force data were taken frorn OECD historical statistics. 
All financial data were deflated to 1990 billion Greek Drachmas using GNP deflators of 
IMF/IFS'. Share of Turkish defence spendmg m GDP and average NATO defence burdens 
of members of NATO data were taken from various SIPRI yearbooks. Although share of 
variables for TUR and NATO are not very accurate proxies for this estimation, but there are 
no other possible proxies. Converting into a common CUrrency usIng the exchange rate may 
give inaccurate values due to a long period of fixed exchange rate policy. For disaggregated 
defence expenditure in Chapter 7, the data are taken from various issues of NATO Review. 
2.8. Summary and Conclusions 
This Chapter has reviewed the empirical literature on defence-growth relationships and data 
and data problems. From the literature, it is difficult to say whether defence spending has 
The data scrics uscd for estimation are presentcd In dic Appendix 6.4 
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a negative effect or a positive effect on economic growth. The relationship between defence 
spending and economic growth is still a controversial issue. More research needs to be done 
in t is area. Furthermore, data also needs special attention. The above studies showed that 
the effects of defence spending differ among countries. Cross-sectional studies give limited 
evidence for the defence-growth trade-off. This study focuses on Turkey, with Greece 
included to provide a comparative study. Turkey spends a higher proportion of their GDP 
to defence. Turkey has registered a high economic growth during the last two decades. 
Defence spending should have an important effect on Turkish economic growth. This study 
then hypothesised that Turkish defence spending should have a positive irnpact on Turkish 
economic growth. After reviewing the Turkish econorny, defence expenditure and defence 
industry, the next Chapters wifl empiricafly analyse the effect of Turkish defence spending 
on its economic growth. The empirical work follows the literature review in examining the 
applicability of supply side models (Feder), and of demand and supply side models (Deger) 
to test hypotheses about the defence-growth relationship for Turkey. A similar study of 
Greece is used to assess the reliability and robustness of the results for Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TURKISH DEFENCE EXPENDITURE, ARMED 
FORCES AND DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the Turkish armed forces, its new developing 
Turkish defence industry and its modernisation, and the trend of Turkish defence 
expenditure. The period of study covers the last four decades (1950-1996) which have seen 
important developments iii defence related issues as well as in Turkish economic growth. 
Also, a brief history of the Turkish republic era is presented. A distinguishing feature of 
Turkey is its relatively high defence burden compared with other European NATO 
states. 
Turkey is an important country iii the region with a population of over 60 million people, 
containing a land area of 779.000 square miles and with geo-strategic position. Turkey is 
located between Europe and Middle East as well as sharing a boundary with the former 
Soviet Union (now Georgia and Armenia), Iran, Iraq Syria, Greece and Bulgaria. Although 
Turkey has a high defencc burden, the level is modest when it is compared with its 
neighbouring countries. Turkey is a member NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 
and OECD (Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation), and it has relatively 
powerful rnifitary forces. Turkish armed forces ranked seventh in the world and it has the 
largest armed force in NATO Europe. Economically. Turkey has relatively low level of 
economic development in comparison \v th the westem i dustrialised countries. However. 
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Turkey has achieved high rates of economic growth during the republic era and it has a 
developed industrial sector. After 1980, Turkey turned to export-based growth and the 
Turkish economy registered high economic growth between 1980-1993. 
The rest of this Chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2.1 provides the background to the 
Turkish development process. Section 3.2.2 gives general macroeconomic indicators for 
Turkey. Section 3.2.3 presents Turkish defence expenditure, its trends and irnportance in 
Turkish economy. In section 3.2.4 Turkish armed forces are analysed. Turkish defence 
industry and its modernisation are considered in section 3.2.5. Section 3.3 surnmarises the 
main findings and draws sorne conclusions. 
3.2. Turkish Defence Expenditure, Armed Forces and Defence Industry 
3.2.1. Background 
In order to understand the current economic situation of Turkey, it is useful to look at the 
country's recent history. After World War 1, the Ottoman Empire lost control of its 
territory and the new republic ol'Turkey was established in 1923. Turkey initiated a series 
of radical changes in its social, political and economic systems. The undisputed leader of 
this transformation was Ataturk. He was the first president after the country became a 
republic in 1923. Ataturk influericed Turkey's development until he died in 1938. From the 
establishment of a republic, Turkey pursued a policy of industrialisation within a closed 
economy (inward looknig econornic strategy) and reliance on government intervention until 
1980. After the military takeover in September 1980. Turkey has been following an 
outward lookfiw, cconomic strategy. The Turkish development period can be divided into 
a number of sub-pci-iods. namcly. 1923-1939,1939-1945,1945-1950,1950-1960,1960- 
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1980 and after 1980. 
From 1923 to 1939, the Turkish econorny focussed on investment in heavy industries and 
capital intensive industrial projects. This was called the Industrial Planning Term. It was 
influenced by the Soviet Union. In this period a high economic growth rate was achieved 
(an average 6.5 % per annurn for 1924-1939. The period 1939-1945 was World War 11 
years. The Turkish economy was affected through being involved in the war. 1945-1950 
was the transitional five years from mono-party to democracy. Between 1939-1950, the 
annual growth rate of Turkish economy had been very low, even negative, the only 
exception was 1946 with 31.9 "/'( growth rate. The next period (1950-1960) was a period 
ofinflation and of rapid growth m Turkish exports and agricultural production. There was 
a short term hberahsation attempt between 1950-1953. The inward-oriented approach was 
tI ormalised under the first two five-year plans (1963-1972). In the 1960's and early 1970's, 
the Turkish economy experienced import substituting industrialisation. In 1974, the oil 
price shock and military intervention in Cyprus had affected Turkish development, then in 
the late 1970s, the Turkish economy faced crisis. The econornic crisis was accompanied 
by political crisis. By 1980, a dramatic change had begun in the Turkish economy. In the 
previous year, the real gross national product had fallen for the first time in a decade and the 
annual inflation rate had been about 116 '-7(,. Although the new government of 1980 had 
initiated a major prograrn of cconomic reforms, the reforms had been carried out after the 
military coup. The substantial change ol'Turkish development after 1980 was that it turned 
to export-based growth. The Turkish economy registered high growth rates between 1980 
and 1993 ( an annual awi-age of 5.2 17(). tý 
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3.2.2. Econon-fic Indicators 
Turkey's general economic trends should be outlined so providing the economic backgrowid 
for this study. Table 3.1 shows general macro economic variables. The data are shown on 
the Table 3.1 with ten year intervals between 1950 and 1980, then between 1980 and 1990 
with 5 years intervals and annual data after 1990. Population has a high growth rate. 
Between 1950-1994, Turkey's population increased three-fold at an average of 2.4-7(-, per 
annum. The inflation rate was very high especially after the late 1970s although there was 
a decreasing trend between 1981 and 1984. The unemployment rate shows little variation 
over the years, but, in 1970, the rate peaked at 1217(. The growth rate of GNP (Gross 
National Product) betweeii 1950-1994 was aii average of 5.4 17c annually. Although the 
average rate is rather high, there were dramatic fluctuation in the growth rates. There was 
also an increasing trend of per capita GNP, although 1994 showed a decline which was due 
to an economic stabilisation programme starting in April 1994. The investment/GNP ratio 
also shows a slight upward trend during the period. Central government budget shares in 
a gross national product suggest a major expansion of government activity in the economy 
after 1980. The remaining data are an export share in GNP. The export sector grew rapidly 
after 1980 with exports becoming an important sector iii the economy after 1980. 
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Table 3.1. Main Econo"c Indicators of Turkey (1950-1996) 
Indicators 1950 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1994 1995 1996 
Population 20.8 27.5 35.3 44.4 50.3 56.1 61.2 62.2 63.2 
(million) 
Annual Inflation -9.4 5.0 8.3 101.6 44.9 60.3 106.3 89.1 80.4 
rate (%) 
Unemployment - 0.1 12.0 7.8 6.9 8.3 8.4 7.2 6.3 
rate (%) I 
Annual real 11.4 10.9 7.0 -1.2 5.1 9.1 -7.4 8.0 7.1 
growth rate of 
GNP* (%) I 
Per capita GNP 242 522 539 1539 1204 2687 2161 2788 2944 
(US $ current) 
Per-capita GNP 520.4 724.5 775.9 1144.8 1272.0 1508.0 1503.1 1606 1691.9 
(1987 thousand 
Turkish Liras ) I 
Investment/ 10.4 13.1 20.9 16.7 22.5 25.7 24.5 24.0 25.0 
GNP (%) 
Central Gov. 13.8 11.5 16.7 21.6 19. ý 12.2 24.6 21.7 26.3 
Budget. /GNP 
M 
Export/GNP 7.1 3.4 4.4 5.0 14.9 11.9 13.6 12.6 12.5 
* Calculated using 1985 constant Turkish Liras 
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys Turkey and OECD Labour Force Statistics, IMF/IFS, Ministry of 
Finance Turkey, SIS (1996), Ozmucur (1996), SPO (1997) 
3.2.3. Turkish Defence Expenditure 
Turkish defence expenditure has been around 4.8 % of GNP over the last four decades and 
an average of 21.7 % of central government outlays goes to defence spending. Typically, 
Turkey has allocated a considerably higher percentage of its GNP to defence expenditure. 
At the same tirne Turkey's growth rate (1950-1994) has been around 5.4 ý'(- per annum. 
Turkey was a mernber of NATO from 1952. Often, the defence burden in Turkey has been 
(Treater than the NATO avcragc. although it has a relatively low stage of development. 1ý - 
Table 3.2 shows indicators of Turkish defence expenditure between 1950 and 1994 with 
annual data. The growth rate ol'i-nilitary expenditure has averaged 6.2 l7c, per annum, whfle 
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the growth rate of GNP has averaged 5.4 1-7( per annum. Table 3.2 also shows the long term 
defence burden and ME/CGB (military expenditure/central government budget): they are 
an average of 4.7 % and 21.7 % per annum, respectively. There are other sources of 
military expenditure outside the central government budget in recent years. The most 
irnportant one is the Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF). The DISF has had 
considerable amount of its own budget since 1986 which was part of the central government 
budget before that year. Therefore, the share of military expenditure in the central 
government in Table 3.2 does not include the DISF budget. It shows a decline in the ratio 
after 1986. Figure 3.1 shows long term Turkish economic growth and its defence burden. 
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Table 3.2 Selected Indicators of Turkish Defence Expenditure 
Years AME 
(%) 
AGNP ME/ 
GNP 
NMI 
CGB 
Years ANIE AGNP ME/ 
GNP (%) 
ME/ 
CGB 
1950 7.3 9.4 5.9 27.0 1973 2.0 4.9 3.9 20.7 
1951 11.1 12.8 5.3 27.2 1974 -2.6 3.3 3.7 21.8 
1952 4.5 11.9 5.1 26.5 1975 69.6 8.1 5.6 20.1 
1953 11.0 11.2 4.9 31.0 1976 13.7 9.0 6.0 19.2 
1954 8.0 -3.0 5.5 34.8 1977 -2.1 3.0 5.7 17.2 
1955 9.5 7.9 5.1 37.8 1978 -6.6 1.2 5.1 1 ý. o 
1956 -3.3 3.2 4.8 31.2 1979 -18.1 -0.5 4.2 15.3 
1957 -2.3 7.8 4.2 29.1 1980 -2.5 -2.8 4.1 19.0 
1958 -5.9 4.5 3.8 30.9 1981 19.8 4.8 4.8 17.9 
1959 28.2 4.1 4.5 29.5 1982 12.5 3.1 5.1 18.0 
1960 -6.6 3.4 4.7 27.1 1983 -3.1 4.2 4.8 16.3 
1961 12.8 2.0 5.1 22.1 1984 -3.9 7.1 4.4 16.1 
1962 -6.0 6.2 4.9 28.8 1985 6.9 4.3 4.4 15.4 
1963 5.9 9.7 4.7 25.6 1986 15.5 6.8 4.7 17.9 
1964 -4.6 4.1 4.9 24.8 1987 -4.2 9.8 4.2 16.0 
1965 11.0 3.1 5.0 24.1 1988 -7.6 1.5 3.8 15.1 
1966 4.6 12.0 4.4 23.1 1989 13.7 1.6 4.2 17.1 
1967 2.2 4.2 4.5 22.1 1990 25.4 9.4 4.8 17.9 
1968 12.3 4.1 4.6 22.9 1991 7.2 0.4 5.2 16.8 
1969 -5.9 4.3 4.3 20.2 1992 9.4 6.4 5.3 18.5 
1970 5.1 4.4 4.2 18.2 1993 13.1 7.6 5.4 13.2 
1971 15.1 7.0 4.4 19.1 1994 -8.4 -5.1 5.2 15.0 
1972 1.7 9.2 1 
4.1 19.2 1995 1.1 8.0 8.0 17.4 
1996 6.9 7.1 7.1 17.6 
Sources: SIS (1994). Ministry of Finance (1993,1995), SIPRI yearbooks, US ACDA, SPO, (1997), 
NATO Review. Spring 1998. 
1 Notes: 
-ME: Military expenditure with 1987 constant Turkish billion liras 
-AME: Growth rate ofmilitary expenditure 
-AGNP: Real growth rate ot'gross national product 
-ME/GNP: Share of military expenditure in the GNP 
-ME/CGB: Share of military cxpcnditure in the central gm, crnment budget 
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Figure 3.1. Trends of Turkish Defence Burden and Economic Growth 
0) 15(7 
4' 
-10 
1 
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1996 
........... EconoMlc growfli - Defence burden source: SIPRI, /MF/IFS, NATO Review 
Sources: SIPRI, IMF/IFS. NATO Review 
When the Turkish burden is compared with NATO, the burden is always higher than other 
European NATO countries. However, when NATO includes North America, the results are 
rather diflCrent due to a large US del'ciice burden (Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2). The other 
perspective ot'defence expciiditure is its share In the central government budget. The ratio 
is much higher than in NATO countries. On the other hand, the per capita military 
cxpcnditurc ot'Turkcy is vcry low whcn compared to NATO countries (Table 3.3). 
-66- 
Chavter 3. Turkish DefMce Lx penditure, Armed Forces and Defence Industn' 
Table 3.3 Defence Burden for Turkey and NATO 
ME/GNP(%) ME/CGB (c7c) PCME 
Year T NE NAI T NE NAI T NE NA 
1981 1 5.0 3.5 4.3 20.0 8.7 13.7 1381 13760 16260 
1982 5.3 3.5 4.7 21.6 8.6 14.7 1411 13770 15950 
1983 5.0 3.6 4.8 19.9 8.6 14.3 1427 13940 16270 
1984 4.5 3.5 4.7 17.6 8.4 14.4 1473 14200 16840 
1985 4.6 3.5 4.8 17.9 8.3 14.6 1518 14500 17200 
1986 4.9 3.4 4.8 22.5 8.1 14.7 1600 14830 17560 
1987 4.4 3.3 4.7 19.4 8.2 14.6 1682 15170 17950 
1988 1 3.9 3.1 4.4 17.7 8.0 14.2 1702 15660 18520 
1989 4.4 3.1 4.3 18.4 7.8 13.8 1692 16060 18910 
1990 5.0 3.0 4.1 20.3 7.7 13.2 1819 16370 19080 
1991 5.4 2.9 3.8 17.9 7.2 11.5 1790 15810 18490 
1992 3.8 2.7 3.7 18.9 6.5 11.2 2618 18350 21310 
1993 3.9 2.7 3.5 15.8 6.1 10.6 2775 18160 21320 
1994 4.0 2.5 1 3.3 17.4 5.9 10.0 2597 19530 21790 
1995 4.0 2.7 
1 
3.0 17.6 5.6 9.4 2714 18830 22090 
Source: US ACDA 1994,1996 
Notes: 
- ME/GNP represents share of military expenditures in gross national product 
-ME/CGB is share of military expenditure in central government budget 
-PCME is per capita military expenditure with 1991 constant US $ 
-T represents Turkey 
-NE represents NATO Europe 
-NA represents all NATO 
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Figure 3.2. Comparative Defence Burden and Defence Spending 
Share in Central Government Budget for Turkey and NATO (1995) 
M Sourc*: US ACDA, 1996 
2D 
Fl 7.6]_ 
15- 
10- 9.41 
- F5. 6] 
5- all 14 1 4 
73 2 . 
1414 
'14,414 C) 
ME/GNP ME/CGB 
TURKEY NATO EUROPE NATO ALL 
Source: US ACDA 
Another aspect of the deICncc budget is its distribution among personnel, equipment, 
infrastructure and other expenditures. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of military 
expenditure by category. An average ol'501,7r of defence expenditure per annum goes to 
personnel cxpenditure( 1990-1994); 23.71/ý( to equipmcnt; 3% to mfrastructures; 22.5% to 
other operational expenditures. The important point is that half of the Turkish defence 
expenditure goes to personnel expend1tUres. This ratio is not so different from other NATO 
nations. 
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Table 3.4 Distribution of Turkish Defence Expenditure by Category 
Years Personnel 
Expenditure 
(%) 
Equipment 
Expenditure 
Infrastructure 
Expenditure (c7c) 
Other 
Operational 
Expenditure (c7c ) 
Average 1975-1979 47.6 19.2 7.3 23.7 
Average 1980-1984 45.3 9.1 13.2 30.1 
Average 1985-1989 37.1 18.2 5.4 38.4 
Average 1990-1994 50.1 23.7 3.0 22.5 
1991 48.5 22.7 2.8 26.0 
1992 48.7 24.8 3.5 23.0 
1993 54.5 22.9 2.9 19.7 
1994 51.0 29.3 2.6 17.1 
1995 50.9 29.7 2.5 16.9 
1996 46.2 30.8 3.0 19.9 
Source: NATO Review January 1996, Spring 1998 
3.2.3. The Turkish Armed Forces 
It has been clairned that the Turkish armed forces are the best organised, best disciplined and 
largest surviving establishment in the country (Birand, 199 1; Chletsos & Koflias, 1995) . 
Turkey has one of the largest armed forces in the world. It ranked seventh in 1991 (US 
ACDA 1994), and it is the largest armed force in NATO Europe (811,000; 1994). Military 
aI nd civilian personnel in the army as a percentage of the labour force is about 4.2 17, r (1990- 
1994), and the rate is always well above the NATO average (2.2% : Table 3.5). Turkey 
supplies (an annual averagc for 1990-1994) 2317c, of the Europe NATO armed forces and 
1417c ofthe total NATO military personnel. Despite the fact that NATO countries began to 
decrease the sizc of their armies. there has not been such a decline in the Turkish army. The 
Turkish army always has been large from the establishment of the republic. Military service 
is compulsory and its length has been changing from time to tirne. In 1995, military service 
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was 18 months. There was a short term intention of 15 months n-filitary service a few years 
ago but due to the increasing threat from the separatist Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) and 
the dispute with Greece, the period was extended to 18 months. Candidates for military 
service are all 20-year-old men. Due to the high growth of population, the number of 
candidates increases from time to time. In 1973-1974, in 1988-1989 and in 1992-1993, the 
size of the army was decreased by shortening the duration of military service for a specific 
period of time. 
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 393,000 (345,000 conscripts) 
military personnel were in land forces, 57,000 (29,000 conscripts) were in air forces; while 
54,000 (37,000 conscripts) were in the navy. Besides, there are gendarmerie and national 
guard (70,000). Conscripts comprise 82% of all personnel in Turkey, and there is a low 
share of volunteers in the army JISS Military Balance 1994). The share of volunteers are 
much higher in the air forces and the navy, because, these two forces need more skifled 
personnel and the skilled personnel are mostly available from volunteers. 
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Table 3.5 Military Personnel in Turkey and NATO 
E- 1975 1980 1 1985 1 1990 1 1993 1 1994 1 1995 1 1996ý 
Military Personnel 
Turkey (000) 584 717 814 769 686 811 805 818 
NATO (Europe)(000) - 3504 3603 3510 2994 3082 3010 2976 
NATO (Total)(000) - 5636 5930 5778 4885 4871 4700 4617 
Turkey/NATO - 20.5 22.6 21.9 22.9 26.3 26.7 27.4 Europe(%) 
Turk / 12.7 1.37 13.3 14.0 16.6 17.1 17.7 F NATO total 
Military and Civilian Personnel 
I I 
as % of Labour Forces 
Turkey 3.8 4.5 4.8 4.1 3.7 4.2 4.0 3.9 
NATO (Europe) - 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 
NATO (total) 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Source: NATO Review, January 1996 
The Turkish armed forces with major weapons can be listed as below. The figures for 1994 
are (IISS Military Balance 1994/1995): 
4,919 Main battle tanks 
3,360 Armoured vehicle 
2,397 ArtiBery systems 
21 Frigate and destroyers 
15 Submarines 
555 Combat aircraft 
It can be seen from abovc that the Turkish armed forces are supported with substantial 
conventional weapons. Turkey has always been among the countries which have a large 
number of military personnel and because of contHILIcd internal and external threats, a 
reduction is not expected in the near futurc. 
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9 
3.2.5. The Turkish Defence Industry and its Modernisation 
This section surveys Turkish defence industry during the republic era. The republic started 
domestic production of various defence weapons and equipments with the support of the 
state. There were some military facilities in Turkey before the republic. These were 
reorganised under the General Directorate of Military Factories (Askeri Fabrikalar Umum 
Mudurlugu) immediately after the war of independence in 1921. Then, the factories were 
transformed into a state enterprise known as the General Directorate of Mechanical and 
Chemical Industry (Makina Kimya Endustrisi MKE) in 1950 (Akgul, 1988). The General 
Directorate is now one of the largest defence industry establishments in Turkey. There was 
dramatic advancements M the field of aeronautics (Erdem, 1991). The Kayseri Aircraft 
Factory opened in 1932 and it produced Curtis Hawk fighters with American co-operation 
and other aircraft factories were established in Istanbul and Ankara (Akgul, 1988). 
However, World War 11 broke out. 
There was an increasing flow of American military aid to Turkey when Turkey entered 
NATO in 1952 after the Korean war (Table 3.6). The USA supplied all kinds of war 
material, including M-47 and M-48 tanks, M- 113 APCs, guns, howitzers, ships and 
transport aircraft (Akgul, 1988). It caused a recession in the Turkish defence industry. 
Therefore, the defence industry field had not shown any improvement. After 1960, unport 
substitution policy affected the defence industry but this policy became more important after 
thr- Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974. The USA fi-nposed an arms embargo on Turkey9 
and the most irnportant coriseqUences of that embargo was that Turkey planned to expand 
The embargo cndcd in 1979 
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its defence industry (Ayres, 1983). The main goal of arm production in Turkey was import 
substitution of military equipment, hence military independence. 
Table 3.6. US Military Assistance to Turkey 
Year (1) (2) (2/1) Year (1) (2) (2/1) 
1950 489 378 77.20 1970 1221 387 31.69 
1951 504 540 107.00 1971 1436 436 30.34 
1952 530 588 110.43 1972 1509 438 29.00 
1953 585 510 87.99 1973 1600 449 28.04 
1954 598 1045 174.95 1974 1793 322 17.96 
1955 638 69 10.80 1975 2870 162 5.66 
1956 588 574 97.58 1976 3295 181 5.49 
1957 548 267 48.78 1977 3172 170 5.35) 
1958 533 440 82.71 1978 2906 221 7.62 
1959 633 593 93.65 1979 2578 205 7.94 
1960 698 381 54.54 1980 2442 208 8.53 
1961 786 418 53.16 1981 3014 229 7.60 
1962 822 512 62.32 1982 3296 344 10.44 
1963 860 491 57.07 1983 3083 333 10.81 
1964 920 323 35.05 1984 2997 570 19.01 
1965 964 384 39.82 1985 3178 539 16.97 
1966 968 379 39.15 1986 3572 465 13.01 
1967 1042 463 44.45 1987 3411 358 10.49 
1968 1166 408 35.02 1988 2975 344 11.56 
1969 1128 403 35.70 1989 2826 335 11.85 
Sources: Avramides (1995) 
Notes: 
0 (1) Real value of Turkish military expenditures in $US. constant 1980 prices 
0 (2) Real value of US military assistance to Turkey in millions SU at 1980 prices 
0 (2/1) The percentage ratio ofreal military aid to real Turkish defence expenditure 
In the late 1970s. the national defericc industry was ýiccelerated and various foundations 
xvciv established to support the defence industry ( e(,,,. Air Force Foundation, Land Force 
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Foundation and Navy Foundation)" aiid substantial funds flowed to those foundations. 
With the help of such foundations, groups such as Aselsan (Military Electronic Industry). 
Aspilsan (Military Battery Industry), Isbir (Generators for military), were established but 
their industrial activities remained at a lirnited level (Erdem, 1991). The end of the 1970s, 
economic instability in Turkey slowed down the h-nprovement of the national defence 
industry until the military take-over of 12 September 1980. Immediately after the military 
take-over, a comprehensive defence industry modernisation plan was prepared, including 
the plan to produce Turkey's own aircraft. Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF) was 
established to provide continuous and stable financial support for arms production. Revenue 
of this fund was mainly composed of taxes levied on alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, on the 
interest income of depositors and corporation taxes. Table 3.7 shows that there were 
irnportant differences between revenue and expenditures because in 1988 and 1989,30%, 
in 1990,50% and in 1991 30% of the fund's revenue was transferred to the general budget 
under the prime minister's assent. 
These funds wcre merged in 1987 under die mune ot'die Turkish Armed Forces Foundations 
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Table 3.7. Defence Industry Support Fund Expenditures and Revenues 
Current Prices (billion TL) Constant Prices (1987 billion TL) 
Years Revenue Expenditure Revenue Expenditurc 
1986 179.5 40.5 241.6 56.2 
1987 360.8 69.3 360.8 69.3 
1988 677.4 378.0 390.1 217.6 
1989 1,463.2 615.8 896.2 377.2 
1990 2,456.6 2,133.8 1,532.5 1,331.1 
1991 1,595.8 2,551.7 961.3 1,537.1 
1992 7,930.0 6,895.0 4,662.0 4,053.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance (1993). SIS (1994) 
Furthermore, the Defence Industries Development and Administration (DIDA) was 
established in 1985 and it was restructured as the Under Secretariat for Defence Industry 
(UDI) within the Ministry ot'National Defence in 1989. This new independent body for the 
development of Turkish defence industry monitors the implementation of decisions taken 
by the Defence Industry Supreme Board of Co-ordination and the Defence Industry 
Executive Committee. The major fmance of the UDI is DISF. Some UDI projects are 
depicted in Table 3.8, showing examples of local production in air and land systems (see 
also Table 3.9). 
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Table 3.8. UDI Projects in Turkey 
Project Local Producer Licenser Date of 
Contract 
Armoured infantry fighting 
vehicle prcject 
NUROL FMC (USA) 1989 
F- 16 Electronic warfare proj ect KAVALA, MIKES LORAL (USA) 1989 
HF-SSB Radio communications 
systems project 
HAS, CIHAN, ELIT MARCONI (UK) 1990 
Basic trainer aircraft Turkish Aerospace Industry AGUSTA (Italy) 1990 
Multiple launch rocket system 
(MLRS) 
ENKA, MKEK LTV (USA) 1990 
Mobile radar complex preject HEMA electronics AYDIN (USA) 
THOMSONS (France) 
1990 
Light transfer aircraft project Turkish Aerospace Industry CASA (Spain) 1990 
Helicopter project SIKORSKY (USA) 1992 
Unmanned air vehicles Turkish Aerospace Industry 
11 
AAI (USA) General 
Atomics (USA) 
1992 
Source: Senesen (1993) 
Notes: 
-Nurol, Kavala, Mikes, Has, Cihan, Elit, Enka and Hema are private companies 
-Turkish Aerospace Industry (TAI) is state Joint venture 
-MKEK is state enterprise 
Some military projects of UDI are under negotiation and they include low level defence 
systems, 35 mm anti craft fire control systems, MCM vessels, coast guard vessels, advanced 
technology, industrial park and aviation centre, and airport construction (Senesen, 1993; 
Erdem, 199 1). 
At I ter 1985, a large number of firms entered the defence industries and new partnerships with 
I oreign companies were established. Growing interest in arms production in Turkey can be 
observed from the increasing nurnber ot*the arms producers. There were eight firms among 
the largest 100 industrial establishments in 1994 and 30 firms among the largest 500 firms 
(Ozmucur, 1996). The private sector has been encouraged to invest in defence industries. 
The leading arms producers companies are shown in Table 3.9 and the major sectors are 
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described below. 
Table 3.9. Leading Arms Producers in Turkey 
Company Year 
founded 
Ownership Major activity 
Aselsan 1976 Armed forces military communications, electronics for F-16s 
Asil Celik 1974 S tate barrel and bullet steel production 
Coskunoz 1973 Private hydraulic and mech. presses, automotive space 
parts 
FMC-NUROL 1992 Joint venture armoured (combat) infantry fighting vehicles 
ISBIR Electric 1977 Armed Forces diesel (Tenerators for military purposes 
MARCONI (MKAS) 1988 Joint venture HF-SSB radio communications 
Mercedes Benz 1967 Joint venture tactical vehicles 
MKEK 1950 State artillery. small arms ammunition, anti tank 
rocket launchers, machine guns 
MKEK-Av Fisek 1930 S tate ammunition 
MKEK- Barutsan 1989 S tate explosives, propellants 
NUROL 1982 Joint venture enclosed weapon systems 
Otokar 1963 Joint venture Land Rover chassis, diesel engines 
Petlas 1976 Armed forces tyres 
Roketsan 1989 Joint venture propellants and rocket motors 
SGS-Profilo 1988 Joint venture mobile telephones 
STFA-Savoronik 1986 Joint venture fire control and secure systems 
Tusas TAI 1984 Joint venture F-16 aircraft 
Tusas TEI 1985 Joint venture F- I 10 engine components for F- 16 
Teletas 1984 S tate communications, electronics 
Testas 1976 Private electronic components 
Manas 1976 Joint venture heavy trucks for military purposes 
Taskizak Naval Yard 1941 Navy shipbuilding 
Golcuk Naval Yard 1924 Navy shipbuilding 
Sourccs: Butzokas (1992). Karasapan (1987). Ozmucur (1996). Senesen (1993) 
77- 
Chanter 
. 3. Turkish DefMce Lx ence Industi2, penditure, Armed Forces and Def 
3.2.5.1. The Aerospace Industry 
The rapid development M the aerospace industry occurred after the military government 
decided to modernise the Turkish defence industry in the early 1980s. It aimed to produce 
F- 16 fighter aircraft for the Turkish air force and for export. For this reason, Tusas 
Aerospace Industry Inc. (TAI) was established as a joint venture with US General Dynamics 
(now Lockheed) (42 %) and US General Electric (7 Tusas has a 49 % share with the 
remaining 2% held by the Turkish armed forces foundation. TAI was the organisational 
model for subsequent arms production in Turkey (Senesen, 1993). TAI completed the initial 
production order of 152 F-16 aircraft and started to produce a second production order for 
80 F- 16 aircraft. Another development M this sector was Tusas Engine Industries (TEI) 
which was established to produce engines for F- 16s in January 1985 (Senesen, 1993). This 
is also a joint venture with General Electric (49%) and Tusas (49%) and a smaller share 
holder, namely, the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation. The first export sale of two F-16 
aircraft from Turkey was realised in 1994 to Egypt. Although Turkey has attempted to 
export F- 16 fighter to Lebanon, Kuwait, Malaysia and the Philippines, no exports had been 
achieved by 1995 (Senesen, 1995); but exports are unlikely without a government subsidy, 
because of high costs (Candemir, 1995). In recent years, a contract was signed to produce 
light transport aircraft and trainers in col-laboration with CASA of Spain and Agusto of Italy, 
respectively (Senesen, 1993). 
3.2.5.2 The shipbuilding Industry 
The shipbuilding niclustry is not new in Turkey. There are two important naval yards, 
namely, the Taskizak Naval Yard and the Golcuk Naval Yard. The Taskizak Yard was 
founded in 1455 and built the first submarine for the Ottoman navy iii 1886, but after World 
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War Iý it ceased and then reactivated as a naval yard in 194 1. The Yard now employs 4000 
people and builds landing ships, patrol boats and transports of up to 10,000 tons. The 
Golcuk Yard was founded in 1924 and it builds ships up to 30,000 tons including frigates 
and submarines and employs 6,000 people (Karasapan 1987). Both Yards are owned by the 
Turkish Navy. Before the coRaboration with German shipyards, the Turkish navy received 
second hand US warships, but, after the late 1970s, Turkey's warships were German 
designed (mainly Blohm & Voss, HDW and Uirssen Werft) and built either at the Taskizak 
or Golcuk Naval Yard with technical assistance from the parent yards in Germany. The 
Turkish Navy also bought frigate, submarines and fast attack craft (FAC) from Germany 
(Senesen, 1993). 
3.2.5.3. The Information Technology and the Electronics Industry 
In the area of hiformatioii technology and the electronics industry, the most important 
development was the establishment of Military Electronic Industry Inc. in 1975 (Aselsan). 
The Armed Forces Foundation owns most of the shares. It employs about 300 people and 
produces tactical communication equipment, encryption equipment, scrambler and digital 
message devices with licences from Philips (the Netherlands), Litton (USA) and Teledyne. 
It also produces some of the F- 16 aircraft electronic equipments. Aselsan ranks 77th among 
the largest 100 firms hi Turkey. The other two firms in this area are Teletas 
(I communications) and the Turkish Electronic Industry (Testas). The state owned Teletas 
produces communications products. Testas was established in 1976 to produce electronic 
components and related equipments (Karasapan, 1987). 
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3.2.5.5. Ordnance, Explosive, Ammunition and Weapons Industry 
Ordnance, explosive, ammunition and weapons are mainly manufactured by the Machinery 
and Chemical Industries Establishment (MKEK) founded in 1950. It is a state-oxned 
enterprise. MKEK has now 20 factories and 20,000 employees. Their production is varied. 
Mainly it produces small arms, ammunition, ordnance for the air force, air to ground rockets 
under the US licence, 105 mi-n tank guns under licence from the Royal Ordnance Factories 
(UK), 20 mrn automatic weapons, and 35 mrn guns with the licence from Oerlikon 
(Switzerland). It also has a gas mask factory which has been modernised. In 1990, MKEK 
started to produce a modern artillery rocket system, namely. MLRS (US). Some of the 
ammunition products of MKEK are exported mainly to NATO allies (Karasapan, 1987). 
Although the Turkish authorities are committed to modernising the oldest state enterprise 
there has been little development in this area (Senesen 1993). Turkey has attempted to 
develop and modernise its military vehicles and tanks. To produce tactical vehicles, 
Turkey's largest cooperation Koc established a plant called OTOKAR under licence from 
Land Rover (UK), and German MAN corporation opened a factory with Ercan Holding 
which produces heavy trucks for the army. Also, a joint venture of Turk Mercedes 
manufactures a range of wheeled military vehicles. The other development is Turkey's M- 
47 tanks converted into recovery and bridge laying vehicles and M-48 tanks have been 
modernised (Karasapan, 1987). FMC-NUROL has produced armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles. The employment 111 the sector is not clearly known, because, many of the arms 
firms produce civilian goods at the same time. However, the trade union in the military 
sector (Harb-1s) has 41.500 members. Table 3.1 (). shows the main arms firms and their 
employment. Although the Table is not very comprehensive due to lack of data. it gives 
solljo employment data. 
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Table 3.10. Main Arms Firms and Their Employment 
Firms Employment 
MKE (20 factories) 20,000 
Golcuk Shipyard 6,000 
Taskizak Shipyard 4,000 
Aselsan (military electronics industy) 3,000 
TAI (F-16 fighter aircraft) 2,300 
MAN (military truck) 1,500 
Ibrahim Ors (small military equipment) 300 
Total 37ý 
Sources: Akgul (1988). Karasapan (1987). Senesen (1993) 
In spite of the rapid development in the Turkish defence industry in the past decade, Turkey 
still imports most of its military equipment and its exports are very low (Table 3.11). 
Therefore, the costs of arm fi-nports are nnportant burdens on the Turkish economy. One 
third of Turkey's defence budgct is aflocated for arms fi-nports (US, ACDA). 
-81- 
Chmiter 3. Turkish DeOice Expenditure, Armed Forces and Deknce Industa 
Table 3.11. Turkey's Arm Imports and Exports 
Year Al AE Al/ TI (%) AE/TE (t7c) BAT 
("Ilion US$) 
1985 685 164 4.4 1.5 -521 
1986 934 0 6.3 0.0 -934 
1987 1553 13 8.5 0.1 -1540 
1988 1373 12 7.7 0.1 -1361 
1989 1438 24 7.6 0.2 -1414 
1990 1379 11 5.4 0.1 -1368 
1991 1326 33 5.7 0.2 -1293 
1992 1076 1) 1) 4.4 0.1 -1.054 
1993 1258 21 4.1 0.1 -1237 
1994 1128 31 4.7 0.2 -1097 
1995 700 60 2.0 0.3 -640 
Source: US ACDA 1994 
CAI is Arm Imports (Constant 1995 million US $) 
CAE is Arm Exports (Constant 1995 million US $) 
CAIM is Arm Imports/ Total Imports (17() 
CAE/TE is Arm Exports/ Total Exports (17c) 
OBAT is Balance of Arms Trade (Arms Exports- Arms Imports; Constant 1995 million US$) 
In conclusion, despite the fact that there have not been any important development in the 
Turkish defence industry until 1980, considerable development occurred in the 1980s. 
There are several arguments for and against the defence industry and its modernisation. 
Ayres (1983) pointed out that Turkish arms productiori attempts are not so different from 
an imports substitution policy. He argued that arms production in Turkey might be more 
expensive than importing the complete system and export potential would be very limited. 
Military dependence is maintained due to licenced production (Ayres, 1983). Critics claim 
that the official expected spillover effects from the defence industry are over-estimated (such 
as technology transfer. quality control and technical manpower and management, 
accelerated growth of Turkish cconomy, and the creation ofnew employment potential: 
Erdem. 199 1). Bartzokas (1992) mentioned that the modernisation plan was only partly 
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successful in Turkey in the aerospace industry and some technology has transferred. The 
planned participation of local firms was achieved (Bartzokas, 1992). In the Turkish defence 
industry, the level of research and development activities seems very low (Senesen. 1993). 
Innovation will be limited. Although there are some disadvantages of Turkey's defence 
industry, the industry will be an important part of the Turkish industrial sector and 
production. However, it is too early to expect large volumes of exports during the early 
stages of arms industry development. 
3.3. Summary and Conclusions 
This Chapter has studied the Turkish economy, Turkish defence expenditure, Turkish 
armed forces and Turkish defence industry and its rnodernisation. It showed that the 
military sector is h-nportant in the Turkish economy. The main findings can be summarised 
as foHows. 
Firstly, during the republic era, Turkey pursued a policy of industrialisation within a closed 
economy and reliance on government hitervention, but after 1980, Turkish development 
turned to export-based growth. In macroeconomic aspects, Turkey between 1950-1994, 
experienced high population growth, high inflation and rnodest unemployment. The growth 
rate of Turkish economy has shown dramatic fluctuations over time, although the average 
rate is rather high. While the share of investment in GNP presents a slight increasing trend, 
the share of central government budget ill GNP and the share of exports in GNP exhibited 
a rmkjor expansion during the period. 
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Secondly, Turkey has allocated a considerably higher percentage of its GNP to defence 
expenditure and also its share of defence spending in the central government budget is very 
high. At the same time, the annual growth rate of Turkish economy between 1950-1994 
averaged 5.4 %. 
Thirdly, Turkey has one of the largest armed forces in the world and the size of army does 
not show any decreasing trends although many countries have started to decrease the size 
of their armies. In Turkey, mihtary service is compulsory and the share of conscripts in the 
army is very high. The Turkish army is not only very large but also it is supported with 
substantial conventional weapons. 
Finally, as one of the major arms u-nporters, Turkey started to build its own deficrice industry 
after 1980. The main goal for estabbshing its defence industry was import substitution of 
military equipment, hence, military independence. However, military dependence is 
maintained due to licenced production. Turkey now produces its own fighter aircraft (F- 
16), and also the shipbuilding and military electronics industries have developed 
considerably. Many local firms started to produce military equipment. However, there is 
no evidence so far to support the defence industry creating lower arms imports and a large 
volume of exports. 
This Chapter has provided background material on the economy and the mflitary-industrial 
complex ofTurkey. The following Chapters address the central research question of the 
relationship (if any) bet\,,,, ccii dctence spending and growth in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEFENCE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIPS USING 
A SUPPLY SIDE (FEDER TYPE) MODEL: 
TIME SERIES EVIDENCE FOR TURKEY 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous two Chapters surveyed the empirical defence-growth literature. the Turkish 
economy and its defence econorny. This Chapter analyses the nature of the connection 
between economic growth and defence spending in Turkey. There are several reasons for 
choosing a case study ol'Turkey. First, Turkey consistently allocated substantially high 
budgets to its defence sector as compared with other NATO countries. Second, Turkey's 
growth rate of GNP during the republic era is considerably high. Third, Turkey started to 
produce its own military equipment after 1980. Finally, Turkey has one of the largest armies 
in the world. The irnpact of defence spending on economic growth has been StUdied 
recently with a Feder type externality model bya number of scholars. Among others, Ward 
a al. (1991), Ward and Davis (1992) and Ward et al. (1993) have examined a single 
country from the developing world. The studies showed that more single country analysis 
was needed. The remainder of this thesis contributes to reducing this deficiency through a 
country study of Turkey. 
This Chapter presents empirical thne series analysis 1'()r Turkey between 1955 and 1994 
usint-, OLS (ordinary least scluarcs) estimation. The relationship bet", cen Turkish defence 
expenditure and economic growth is estimated with an augmented Feder model with the 
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addition of human capital and lags introduced into the Feder model. The evidence shows 
that there is a positive effect ofdefence spending on economic growth for Turkey whfle 
externalities from the defence sector to the rest of economy are negative, and the addition 
of human capital into the Feder model Unproved the empirical results. 
The remainder of the Chapter is organised as follows. Section (4.2) briefly discusses the 
cost and benefits of defence expenditure. Section (4.3) Justifies estirnation of the defence- 
growth relationships for Turkey. Section (4.4) provides an augmented Feder type model 
and also theoretical expectations of the model are given. Section (4.5) is devoted to 
empirical analysis with two parts. The first part (4.5.1) describes specifications of 
estimation and variables, and in the second part, the results of the estimations are discussed 
(4.5.2). FinaRy, section (4.6) surnmarizes the main finding of this Chapter and draws some 
conclusions. 
4.2. The Costs and Benefits of Defence Spending 
Defence expenditures have both costs and benefits to the economy. The costs of defence 
expenditure are mainly emphasised as opportunity costs. Ram (1993) outlined the 
opportunity costs of defence spending under the eight headings. They are: 
(i) the diversion of research from alternative uses. 
(fi) reductions in private consumption, 
(iii) reductions in private and public spending and investment: 
(lv) the dIversion of public expenditure from education and health-, 
(v) reductions ill public research and devc1opmcnt outlays: 
(vi) adwi-sc effects on the balance ofpayment position of LDCs-, 
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(vii) the diversion ofskifled manpower from civilian use. 
Defence spending also has negative externalities on economic growth, such as adverse 
effects on the environment together with inflationary finance, waste and inefficiency from 
defence procurement policy (Ram, 1993; Sandler and Hartley, 1995). Deger (1986) 
tI ocussed on the negative resource allocation effect. According to Deger (1986) and Deger 
and Smith (1983), private investment is the primary determinant of future economic growth 
and increased defence spending entails higher taxes and government borrowing in the capital 
market and it causes lower investment. In their study they concluded that " the negative 
effect of military expenditure on saving (investment) outweighs the positive modernisation 
and technological effect on the growth rate" (Deger and Smith, 1983: 352). Crowding out 
of investment is also argued by other scholars (Lim, 1983; Fami et al. 1984; Lebovic and 
Ishaq, 1987). Lebovic and Ishaq (1987) emphasised some negative effects of defence 
spending, such as balance of payments difficulties; increased defence spending may create 
inflation; the pricing system can be damaged by defence procurement and skifled workers 
inay shift from the civiliari sector to the defence sector (Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987). Although 
Smith (1980) found a roughly one to one trade-off between a country's defence 
expenditures and investment for developed countries, Rasler and Thompson (1988) showed 
that this trade-off can substantiaBy differ for different countries, because the countries may 
have different security concerns and different military- industrial complexes. The 
productivity of a defencc scctor may also differ between countries. 
On the other hand, defcncc spending has potential benefits. Defence activities may have a 
g (7 IIIIILIC11CC. The positivc efiCct ot' dcfence expenditure was firstly and growth promoting Lý Z7 
widely cxplaincd by Benoit ( 1973). Education, nutrition, training, infrastructure and other 
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human capital augmented activities induce externalities. The immediate direct impact of a 
rise in defence spending is likely to be Iiigher demand, production and employment (Chan, 
1985). Atesoglu and Muefler (1990) surnmarised the benefits of defence spending as 
spillovers of technological advance and skilled labour. They are available due to 
government spending on defence sector research and training (Atesoglu and Mueller. 1990). 
In general, the benefits of defence spending can be summarised as follows: 
(i) If countries are experiencing under- emplo yrnent, defence expenditures may have 
a stirnulative effect. For these stirnulative benefits, the economy should be In 
disequilibrium (Sandler and Hartley. 1995). 
(ý) Some of the defence expenditure goes to infrastructures. It can enhance economic 
growth. Many roads, bridges, mapping services, communications networks, airports, 
waterworks, dams are built for military purposes, but many of these are used for 
civilian purposes as well. These create positive impacts and are important benefits of 
defence outlays for the rest of economy. Mainly LDC's can experience these benefits 
(Ram, 1993). 
(iii) Countries can experience direct and indirect technological effects from the 
defence sector. Defence sectors spend a considerable amount of money for research 
and development (R&D). Many of the technological achievements of the military may 
be used for civihan purposes, but these benefits are more likely to apply to arms 
producl-lig countries. 
(1ý) Human capital ls another area where there is a substantial positive externality of' 
defence spending on the rcst ofthe cconomy. The orgallisation of hteracy courses. 
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the treatment of civilians in military hospitals, skill and training and nutrition are other 
contributions ofthe military to the economy (Sandler and Hartley. 1995). 
(v) Defence expenditure can indirectly support growth by providing Internal and 
external security. 
(vi) Direct use of military for civilian purposes can enhance economic growth: for 
example the use of army personnel and equipment M special situations caused by 
natural disasters like earthquakes, famines, fires and floods (Ram, 1993). 
In conclusion, defence outlays can be growth promoting or growth inhibiting. The net 
ii-npact of defence spending is dependcm on the magnitude of costs and benefits of the 
defence sector. Therefore, the effect ol'defence spending is an empirical issue rather than 
a theoretical issue (Alexander, 1990). A number Of StUdies mostly using Neo-classical or 
Keynesian models have investigated clefence-growth relationships (see Chapter 2). 
4.3. Why Single Country Analysis? 
It is important to emphasise the need for single country analysis. The vast majority of 
StUdies have employed cross-sectional type methodologies using the Feder model. Despite 
the fact that cross-sectional analysis is useful for comparative analysis, the implicit restriction 
ofidentical parameters for the sample coLintries is unreasonable and therefore. it is difficult 
to interpret the estirnatcs (Ram, 1995). In the literature there Is lack ofcountry studles. To 
find robust evidence for defence-growth association, cross country studies should be 
supported with individual country studies (Ram, 1995). Cross country studies provide 
limited cvidence for dcl'cncc growth association for the foflowing reasons: 
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(a) Countries differ. In Benoit's (1973) work, the sample countries were at 
different stages of development, from Turkey and Spain to Burma and Ceylon. 
It is obvious that the reactions to military expenditure may vary across these 
countries. While some countries have a negative effect of defence expenditure, 
the others may have positive effect (or no effect), since the countries may not 
have common structural characteristics (Deger, 1986). Frederikson and Looney 
(1983) tried to sort out this problem by dividing Benoit's sample as resource- 
constrained and reso urce- abundant countries. In the Deger (1986) study, the 
countries were divided into four quartiles (countries with low growth, medium 
low growth, medium high growth and high growth) while Biswas and Ram 
(1986) distinguished betweeii low income countries and high income countries. 
Single country analysis avoids these kinds of problems and gives relatively 
reliable results. 
b) It is important to find whether a change in defence expenditures causes 
a change in economic growth, and if so, how that change in defence 
expenditure causes a change in economic growth. For this cause-effect 
relationship, cross sectional methodology gives little evidence. For example, 
findings of positive relationship between defence spending and economic 
growth cannot explain whether high economic growth causes high defence 
spending or high defence spending causes high economic growth. Also cross 
sectional analysis cannot provide knowledge that the observed change in 
economic grov,, th is partly contributed by current level of defence spending as 
opposed to the laggcd effect ol'previous lc%, cls in this spending (Chan, 1985). 
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c) Choosing cross country sampleperiods needs careful attention due to very 
different econoinic situations. While some of the sample countries are in 11 
recession, the others may be in high levels of growth (Ram, 1995). It is difficult 
to find countries at the same time in the same economic coiljuncture. Although 
th-ne series studies might have sh-nilar problems, choosing a sample period for 
a single country is rather less problematic. 
d) The Feder model considers both externality effect and direct effect of 
defence spending. However, the externality effect can be seen after a lag and 
it may vary across the sample countries. Therefore, cross section methodology 
gives Iii-nited evidence for this kind of model (Deger and Sen, 1995). 
e) Cross section data with Feder type model assumed that labour elasticity, 
the marginal product of capital in the civilian sector, the marginal external 
effect of defence on the rest of economy and defen ce- civilian sector relative 
factor productivity differences are identical across the sample countries 
(Rant, 1995). There is a strong presumption that these parameters may differ 
across the countries. Even if the selected sample countries are at the same stage 
of development, labour productivity may differ significantly, although the rate 
of return to capital is rather sirnilar (Ram, 1995). 
Each countty has its own currency unit. When one wants to estimate effect 
L, with Feder model using cross sectional methodology, of dcfence speridiii 1 
converting national currencies to common currency is needed. In order to do 
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this, US $ is generafly used as a common currency using exchange rate and 
sornetirnes both exchange rate and GNP deflators. but exchange rates cannot 
reflect average price levels among countries. In LDCs, exchange rate IS usually 
fixed or overesth-nated. Therefore, the rate is not altered quickly (Deger, 1986). 
The other method for common unit is purchasing power parity (PPP). Deger 
(1986; p. 51) showed that PPP also might not provide suitable data for the 
analysis. The problem of converting to a common unit is higher problem when 
one studying LDCs than in the developed world (Deger, 1986). 
Although the previous section outlined some advantages of single country analysis, time 
series analysis also has sorne shortcomings. Firstly, it is generally difficult to find accurate 
and long enough data. Second, a maJor problem is the business cycle of a country's 
economy. Thirdly, it is not easy to generalise the results. The results are usually country 
specific not in general. Fourthly, many of the series may be non-stationary. Finally, 
structural breaks and changes over tirne makes estimation difficult. However, due to lack 
of' individual country studies and some shortcomings from cross-sectional studies, time 
series analysis for a single country should be fruitful. The Turkish case will provide 
evidence for defence-growth relationships. This study is different from other similar studies 
in that: 
(i) Defence-growth relationship is tested for Turkey using Feder type model and also 
the study uses more recent and reliable data. Unlike previous studies, the study uses 
labour forcc data instcad of the proxy of population. 
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(ii) The study helps to reduce the lack of country studies on defence-growth 
relationships, and it is important to identify robust results in this controversial area. 
(iii) Human capital is incorporated into the Feder model. 
(iv) Lags are introduced into the Feder model with a lagged dependent variable and 
a lagged human capital variable. 
4.4. The Externality Model 
Feder (1983) developed a model to analyse the impact of the export sector on economic 
growth. Feder's model divides the economy into two sectors. One is an advanced sector 
(export, X) and the other is a dornesticafly oriented sector (non-export sector). There are 
positive externafities from aii advanced sector to the rest of the economy. Ram (1986), and 
Biswas and Ram (1986) firstly applied this model to the study of defence spending in a 
cross-section of 58 LDC's over the period 1960-1977-, since then many other scholars have 
employed the Feder model for defence-growth association (Atesoglu and Mueller, 1990; 
Alexander, 1990,1995 -, Huang and Mintz, 1990; 199 1, Adams, Behrman and Boldin, 199 1; 
Ward et al. 199 1; Ward and Davis, 1992 -, Biswas, 1993 -. MueHer and Atesoglu, 1993; Ward, 
Davis and Chan, 1993: DeRouen, 1994. Macnair et al. 1995: Mintz and Stevanson, 1995; 
Ward, Davis and Lofdahl, 1995). The model in this study was extracted from Ward et al. 
(1991). 
Firstly, it is assumed that the economy consists of two sectors namely, a base sector (B) and 
a mutually exclusive and exhaustive sector (E). There are externalities from exclusive and 
an exhaustive sector to base sector. Frorn the production function the main inputs of the 
scctors are capital (K) and labour (L). Subscripts refer to each sector: 
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E=E(K e LP) 
B=B(Kb, Lb, E) (4.2) 
The main point in this model is that it considers externalities from sector "E" to sector "B" 
and it considers factor productivity differentials. The main weakness of Feder type model 
is that it assumes that the production function only consists of physical capital and labour. 
The model implicitly assumed there is no human capital. Physical capital is important In the 
production function but human capital is crucial, since an increase in the human capital 
causes higher output. Kendrick (1976) estirnates that over half of the total US capital stock 
in 1969 was human capital (Mankiw et al. 1992). Therefore, estimation of economic 
growth without human capital might lead to incorrect conclusions. Human capital includes 
native ability and talent as well as education and acquired skills. In other words, human 
capital is the value of the income-earning potential embodied in individuals. Human capital 
is produced through formal education and training through skill acquisition, certification 
and job experience either on-or off-the-Job. Raising the level of human capital requires 
investment in the form of teachers, libraries and student time and buildings. The average 
worker in the industrialised countries is much more productive than the average worker m 
the developing countries, because they have far more education and training (Dorbousche 
and Fischer, 1990). As an example, although Germany's and Japan's physical capital stocks 
were ah-nost destroyed durnig the Second World War, they have recovered rapidly in part 
because they retained highly educated and skilled populations (Abel and Bernanke, 1992). 
Recent research on economic growth has emphasised that human capital is at least as 
important as physical capital III explaining economic growth and the growth rate is positively 
related to hurnan capital (Barro. 1991). Mankiw et al. (1992) showed that hurnan capital 
is an ornitted variable in growth models, and inclusion ofhurnan capital provided improved 
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empirical results even though irnperfect proxies have to be used for human capital (Mankiw 
et al. (1992). Azerides and Dranen (1990) argued that no country was able to gro w quickly 
during the post-war period without a highly literate labour force. Addition of human capital 
to the Feder model will provide a better explanation of economic growth as well as 
reflecting the economic fi-npact of the defence sector (e. g. via training of military personnel). 
When human capital is incorporated into the Feder model, the production function will be 
Y=f(K, L, H) and the sectors wfl] be: 
E=E(K,, L,, H e) 
B=B(K b, Lb, H bl E) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
where H represents hurnart capital. When equatimi (A4.3) and (A4.4) are totally 
differentiated we obtain: 
fi= OB kb, OB ýb+ aB ýb+ OB (4.5) OK b aL b aH b OE 
OEk Mi OE H (4.6) OK OL OH 
ee 
where subscripts denotes sectors, a "dot" shows the ti-fne derivative (B=dB/dt) anda is 
partial differentiation. 
To sunplify let: 
Bk ---=OB1OKb (4.7) 
B, =OBIaL b (4.8) 
h -,, --OBIOH b (4.9) 
Be =OBIOE (4.10) 
E --: OEIOK k 
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E, =OEIOL e (4.12) 
E,,: --aElaH e (4.13) 
Thus: 
1ý=E A, +E, Le +E h H, (4.14) 
fi=B A +B I'b+B, 
ft 
b +B et 
(4.15) 
From Feder (1983), Ram (1986) and Biswas and Rain (1986) factor productivity differential 
is 6, then: 
Ek EI Eh 
Bk BI Bli 
When it is arranged: 
Ek:::::: Bk(l +6) (4.17) 
EI=Bl(l +6) 
Ell =Bll(l +6) (4.19) 
Equation (4.14) can be rewritten using equation (4.17), (4.18) and (4.19): 
t=B 
k( 
I+ 6), ýe +BI(I +')ýe+Bh(l +6), ýe (4.20) 
fi=B 
kk b+Bjýb+B li, 
ýb+B 
e Lý 
Since: 
Y=B+E (4.22) 
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ý= fi 4 (4.23) 
Y is total output and a dot over it denotes its time derivative 
Thus: 
k=Bk, kb+B 
l'b +B Iftb +B,, ý+(l +')Bkke+(' +')Bl'e+(' +')BIft, (4.24) 
Expanding to: 
k=Bkkb+B 
14 +B Iftb +B e'ý+'Bkke+Bkke 
+'Bl'e +Blill +'Bh'ýe +Bh, ýe (4.25) 
k=BA+Bjý 
b +B h 
fi 
b +B kke +Blie+Bllfie +B e 
t+6B 
k 
ke+6Bi 
e +6B, Ifi e 
(4.26) 
ý=Bk(kb +ke) +Bl(ýb +ýe) +Bl, (Iýb +ýe) +6(B 
A +Bjýe 411'ýe) +BJý (4.27) 
To sh-nphfy: 
k=, ='kb+ke (4.28) 
ý=ý 4(1 (4.29) 
1ý = Iýb +, 
ý 
e 
(4.30) 
where L is total labour input H is human capital and I is investment, then: 
Y=B k I+B, L+B,, H+6(B kKe +B, Le+B hH e) +B, E (4.31) 
From equation (4.16) we can get: 
Bk k (4.32) 
(1+6) 
El 
(4.33) 
(1+6) 
BI, 
Ell 
(4.34) 
(1+6) 
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Ek 
'k 
Ej 
_ýh 
* BkI, +Bjý e +B, ft(, =- e 1+6H e 
(4.35) 
1+6 1+6 , 
E kKe+E, L, +E,, H e (4.36) 
1+6 
EkK(, +EL, +E, iH e (4.37) 
: 
Lý 
(4.38) 
1+6 
Then the equation wifl be: 
Y=B k I+B, L+B h H+-6 -14BElý (4.39) 1+6 
6 Y=BJ+B, ý+BIIIý+ -+B Lý (4.40) 
( 
1+6 1) 
Assuming that Bk is a constant a to be esth-nated and marginal productivity in each sector 
is proportional to total output per skilled worker B, =P(Y/L) and Bh is a constant y to be 
estimated then: 
Y. -6 ý=Ctj+p 
L 
L+yH+ 
1 +6 
+B e) (4.41) 
and also assumed Be is constant and sector "E" affects the sector "B" with a constant 
elasticity. The equation will be: 
=0 (4.42) 
BV=O BY (4.43) 
EY 
from equation (4.222) xvc know that: 
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I 
B=Y-E (4.44) 
B=Y_E 
(4.45) yyy 
B=I_E 
(4.46) 
yy 
then: 
(El 
EY 
r) 
(4.47) 
O(El)ý 
(4.48) 
ElY 
0 O(E/r 
(4.49) 
ElY ElY 
0-0 
(4.50) 
ElY 
When equation (4.50) is put into the equation (4.41): 
y0- 
Y=al+P-L+7Iý+ 0 Lý (4.51) 
L(1 +6 ElY 
) 
y-ö- 
ý=ctI+ß L+7Ü+ 0) ü+0 'lý (4.52) EIY 
1+6 
0) ý+o 
Ey 
(4.53) 
This shows two sector model, if we accept exclusive and an exhaustive sector as military 
sector, the equation will be: 
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y-6- Aý ý=&+p L+71ý +- 0) Vi+O 
mY 
(4.54) 
L 1+6 
When equation is divided to Y (for growth rate of output): 
aI +ßL+YÜ+ 
8 
-0 
ü+üü 
(4.55) YYLY( l+8 
)YM 
and from equation (4.41): 
+pL+YH +(-+B in) 
4ý 
(4.56) 
YYLy 1+6 y 
The final form of the extended Feder i-nodel is shown in equation (4.55)and (4.56). It is 
different from other previous studies In that human capital is isolated in the model. On the 
right side, the third parameter yH of the equation is expected to show the effect of Y) 
human capital on economic growth. However, empirical evidence needs to prove the 
reliability of this model. M these equations (4.55.4.56), growth of productivity is a 
HL function of physical capital (x- and human capital 7 changesinlabour ; the YY 
total effect of defence expenditure -+B the size effect of defence spending 1+6 in Y) 
M 
1+6 
0 
Y) ' and 
the externality effect of defence spending 0 
M) 
Furthermore, 
equation (4.55) may show the relative marginal productivity of defence spending (6) on 
cconomic growth, as compared to the rest of the economy. 
4.5. Predictions 
The f6flowing sLX predictions were derived from the model: 
Prediction 1: (x)O 
Investment (accumulation of' capital) should have a positive effect on Turkish 
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economic growth. Turkey achieved a high economic growth rate between 1955 and 
1994. Investment should be one of the important components of the Turkish 
economic growth. It is well known that the accumulation of capital is a crucial 
element of growth. However, 6-nmishing returns imply that growth cannot go on 
foreverjust by adding to the capital stock (Barro and Grilh, 1994). There is no reason 
to expect that all investment will pay off in either the short term or long term. It is a 
possible drain as well as a boost to economic productivity. However, for developing 
countries, the effect should be positive and there is evidence that private investment 
has a greater h-npact on economic growth than public investment (Khan and Reinhard, 
1991). Instead of aggregate investment, disaggregated investment might better 
explain the effect of investment on the Turkish economic growth. The study predicted 
that Turkish econornic growth has benefited greatly from its investment. 
Prediction 2: P)O 
The labour force is expected to have a strong positive relationship on Turkish 
economic growth. Turkey has achieved considerably higher rate of economic growth 
between 1955 and 1994. The labour force should have contributed to Turkish 
economic growth over that period during which there has been a major shift of 
economic activity from agriculture into the industrial sector and services. 
Prediction 3: 0) 
In the Turkish economic growth, accumulation of human capital should have positive 
effect. Aftcr the 1950s, there has been a rapid educational improvement. The growth 
ofthe Turkish economy might be positively influenced by the improvement in human 
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capital. 
Prediction 4: 
- 
6 
+C )0 and 
6, 
-0 )o 
( 
1+6 m)( 1+6 
) 
The size effect and total effect of defence spending is assumed to have a positive 
impact on economic growth. In the literature, the effect of defence spending seems 
ambiguous. Ward et al. (1991) and Ward et al. (1993) found a positive impact of 
defence for India and Taiwan, respectively (see Chapter 2). Turkey's defence 
expenditure is predicted to have positive effect ori Turkish economic growth. 
Prediction 5: 0<0 
The study offers no expectations about whether externalities from the defence sector 
to rest of the economy are negative or positive. It should have some negative fi-npacts 
because Turkey is a major arm fi-nporter country and it does not have a very 
substantial military-industrial complex, so that there should be some adverse effect on 
the balance of payments. Inflationary finance of defence and inefficient defence 
procurement policy due to mostly one buyer and one seller might be other negative 
externalities from defence sector. Although Turkey is a major arm importer country, 
adverse effect on balance of payment should not be very high because Turkey has 
benefited from a high proportion of military assistance from US until recent years. 
However, the niflationary effect of defence spending and inefficient defence 
procurement policy may apply for Turkey. On the other hand, positive externalities 
t rom the defence sector to rest of Turkish econorny can be as follows: an 
infrastructure such as roads. ports, and communications channels, and human capital 
through education and training of individuals by the military. These effects should be 
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high in Turkey, since ah-nost every man benefited from compulsory military service. 
Technological training given during military service turns conscripts into qualified 
(and disciplined) personnel able to contribute to the development of the country. 
Furthermore, organisation of literacy courses, the production of medical drugs in the 
military plant, the treatment of civilians in military hospitals and mappings service can 
be cited as other contributions of defence to the Turkish economy (Benoit, 1973; 
1978). 
Prediction 6: 6(0 
It is expected that the civilian sector is likely to be more productive than the defence 
sector. The civilian sector mostly applies competitive market disciplines and hence, 
it is likely to be more efficient. Defence procurement policy is generafly inefficient 
(e. g. cost-plus contracts; preferential purchasing. monopolies). 
4.6. Empirical Tests and Results 
4.6.1. Specifications" 
For this study, with original Feder model, two more augn-nented model are employed on the 
Turkish data. The econometric form of models used are: 
(i) Two sector Feder model (total effect): 
AY I AL 6 AM 
=c(o+Ial + +C +F (4.57) yyL 1+6 y 
The data problems and data soui-ccs arc explained in Chapter 2 and detailed data are given in Appendix 4.1. 
-103- 
Chanter 4- Defence-Growth Relationships using a Supply Side (Feder Type) Model 
With separate externality effect and factor productivity differentials of defence 
expenditure: 
AY=U 
+U 
I 
+ß 
AL 
+ö _O 
AM 
+0 
AM 
+ F- (4.58) y0 ly L( 1+8 
)YM 
(ii) with human capital (total effect): 
AY I AL HI 6 AM 
y =Oto+al YIL +_( y 
+(1+6 +C ... 
)y 
+E (4.59) 
With separate externality effect and factor productivity differentials of defence 
expenditure: 
AY I AL HI 
y =(Xo+al Y 
+P 
L 
+7 
y 
ö 
-0 
AM 
+0 
AM ( 
I+ö 
)ym (4.60) 
The variables used in the estimation were measured as follows: 
AY/Y (growth): Dependent variable of the model is measured as the annual rate of 
growth of output. In order to do this, the difference between current value of the real 
GNP and previous year real GNP is divided by the previous years real GNP. 
AUL (labour force): growth rate of labour force. Turkey's employed labour force is 
used. The growth rate is calculated as explained above. 
IN (Mvesti-nent): Investment to GNP ratio. Real gross fixed capital of Turkey is 
related to previous ycar's real GNP. 
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HI/Y (human capital): The current years real educational expenditure is divided by the 
previous year's real GNP. It is difficult to measure human capital. As a proxy. 
educational expenditure in the general budget was used. Each year's expenditure is 
used to reflect investment in human capital. 
AM/Y (defence size and total effect): The difference of real military expenditure 
between current and previous years are divided by the previous year real GNP. 
AMIM (defence externality): Real growth rate of defence expenditure. It is calculated 
as in the above variables. 
In the equations 4.57 and 4.59, the total effect of defence spending can be esth-nated and 
equations 4.58 and 4.60 provide both effects of defence size and defence externality. Owing 
to multicollinearity concerns in equations 4.58 and 4.60, initiafly, equations 4.57 and 4.59 
are estimated. 
4.6.2. Estimation Results 
Table (4.1) presents empirical results from the estimation of equation (4.57) using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) esth-nation. In this estimation, labour force and defence variables give 
statistically significant results and both are positive, but, the coefficient of investment is 
statistically insignificant. The next section wil-I criticafly analyse the insignificant coefficient 
01 nivestment. Although DW test statistics is acceptable, the R2 
is very low for time series 
analysis. More estimations will foHow to ii-nprove the R2. 
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Table 4.1 Estimates of Equation (4.57) 
Dependent variable: Economic growth 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0.36 
Investment 0.21 0.97 
Labour force 1.09** 2.30 
Defence total 4.66** 3.25 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.39 R20.36 
RSS 0.0852 DW 1.96 
F stat. (3,36) 7.7354 probability: 0.0004 
Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Serial Correlation j2 (2) 0.76829 probability: 0.6810 
Normality X2 (2) 3.763 probability: 0.1524 
Heterosce das ti city Y2 (6) 2.3481 probability: 0.8851 
X2 (9) Functional form 3.7006 
1 
probability: 0.9300 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
means significant at I percent level 
The estu-nation with a separate externality effect and factor productivity differential is shown 
in the Table 4.2 (estfi-nates of equation 4.58). The results are similar to Table 4.1. 
However, although the size effect of defence spending is positive, the externality effect of 
defence spending is negative and they are statistically significant. The coefficient of the 
defence size variable became very high after regresshig the separate size and externahty 
effects of defence spending. It occurred because therc is very high coflinearity between two 
defence variables. However. this regression stifl explains the positive size and negative 
cxternahty effect of defence spending. In this estimation, it is also possible to calculate the 
factor productivity diffbrential among scctors which is negative (6= - 1.042). It means that 
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the civilian sector is more productive than the defence sector, probably. because defence is 
less subýject to market disciplines. In Table (4.2), agaEri the coefficient of investment is 
insignificant. It is surprising that the country has achieved a high growth without a 
contribution from investment. Therefore, the investment variable needs more consideration. 
The problem will be considered later, but even at this stage, the insignificance of investment 
raises doubts about the empirical results and leads to concern over dynamic specification 
problems (hence the need to explore whether the results are robust over different dynamic 
structures). The R' is still low for this esth-nation but it is higher than previous estimation. 
Inclusion of the defence externality variable h-nproved the "fit" a little. 
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Table 4.2 Estimates of Equation (4.58) 
Dependent variable: Econoniic growth 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0.32 
Investment 0.18 0.93 
Labour force 1.2 2** 2.72 
Defence size 25.52*** 2.93 
Defence externality -0.86** -2.43 
Factor productivity 
Differential 
-1.042 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.48 p20.44 
RSS 0.0730 DW 1.98 
F stat. (4,35) 8.0592 probability: 0.0001 
Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Serial Correlation x2 (2) 0.059876 probability : 0.9705 
Normality X2 (2) 3.1081 probability: 0.2114 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (8) 2.5649 probability: 0.9586 
Functional form j2 (14) 6.2226 
1 
probability: 0.9606 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
means significant at I percent level 
In Tables (4.3) and (4.4), siiýnilar results are presented with the addition of human capital 
into the Feder model using equation (4.59) and equation (4.60), respectively. It is not easy 
to proxy human capital. One empirical study used the secondary school enrollment rate 
multiplied by the working age population (Mai-Lkiw et al. 1992). Another study employed 
the secondary school enrollment/population ratio (Ghatak et al. 1994). Barro and Martin 
(1995) used different measures for hurnan capital such as educational attainment. life 
expectancy. public spending on education, primary schooliýng and secondary schooling. t7 
They concluded that human capital has a direct impact on econornic growth (Barro and 
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12 
Martin, 1995). This study used several proxies. Other than shares of educational 
expenditure in the central government budget, primary school enrollment/population ratio. 
secondary school enrolb-nent/population ratio, high school enroUment/population ratio. 
primary school enrolb-nent/labour force ratio primary school enrolh-nent/labour force ratio, 
secondary school enrolb-nent/labour force ratio, high school enroflment/labour force ratio, 
armed f orces/labour force and armed forces/labour force ratios were regressed, but they did 
not provide accurate results. Educational expenditure in the government budget gave better 
results for explaining human capital-growth relationships as wefl as defence-growth 
relationships, because it has a better series and it is financial data. These data are more 
consistent with the Feder model. Therefore, the study preferred using the share of 
educational expenditure in the central government budget. 12 The empirical results are 
presented in Tables 4.3. and 4.4. 
The regression results ot'different proxies ot'human capital arc given in Appendix 4.3 (Table A4.3.4) 
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Table 4.3 Estimates of Equation (4.59) 
Dependent variable: Econornic growth 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.02 -0.44 
Investment 0.20 0.93 
Labour force 1.10** 2.28 
Human capital 0.14 0.25 
Defence size 4.61*** 3.12 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.39 p20.34 
RSS 0.0851 DW 1.95 
F stat. (4,35) 5.6672 Probability: 0.0013 
Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Serial Correlation )? (2) 0.95705 probability: 0.6197 
Normality X" (2) 3.849 probability: 0.1459 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (8) 3.6678 probability: 0.8858 
Functional form X2 (14) 9.0283 probability: 0.8292 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
*** means significant at I percent level 
The addition of human capital did not ii-nprove the esth-nation results. In the Table (4.3) and 
(4.4), human capital and investment variables are statistically insignificant, while labour and 
defence variables are statistically significant. The sign of labour and defence size are 
positive but the defence externality effect is negative, and the factor productivity differential 
is again negative. 
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Table 4.4. Estimates of Equation (4.60) 
Dependent variable: Economic growth 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.02 -0.37 
Investment 0.18 0.84 
Labour force 1. -) -), k * 2.68 
Human capital 0.11 0.20 
Defence size 25.43 *** 2.87 
Defence externality -0.86** -21.3 8 
Factor productivity differential -1.052 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.48 R2 0.46 
RSS 0.0729 DW 1.97 
F stat. (5,34) 6.2789 probability: 0.0003 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
*** means significant at I percent level 
The results shown in Tables (4.2) to (4.4) were surprising. While labour and defence 
variables are as predicted, the investment and human capital variable are statistically 
insignificant. It is surprising that a developing country Eke Turkey with a relatively high 
growth rate has not benefited from its physical and human capital. Turkey would not 
achieve a high economic growth without the help of investment (physical capital) and /or 
human capital. Data on investment might be a problem. Therefore, the investment variable 
was proxied by tour different data sets but all data sets gave sirnilar insignificant results". 
Also, different proxies are employed for the human capital variable, but they did not give 
Rearession results is provided in Appciidix 4.3 (Table A4.3.1) C- 
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significant results". Data seems not problematic, because all different data sets showed 
similar results. 
The growing literature on time series analysis emphasises that many of the macroeconomic 
variables might be non-stationary. Non-stationary data causes the standard test statistics to 
be seriously biased and misleading. It is called spurious regressions. Non-stationary th-ne 
series are frequently transformed for stationary by differencing. Although Feder model is 
a form of growth model, it does not always imply stationarity of the variables. Therefore, 
it IS worth testing the data for stationarity. The investigation of stationarity in a th-nc series 
is closely related to the tests for "unit roots". The procedures Involve various sets of tests. 
Firstly, each series is tested for a unit root using au-gmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
(Charernza and Deadman, 1992, Doornik and Hendry, 1995). The ADF test is based on a 
regression of the first difference of the series against a constant. The results of the ADF test 
are presented in Table (4.5). There is no evidence of unit root in the dependent variable. 
It rneans cointegration analysis is not applicable. However, the investment and human 
capital variable were non-stationary and they become stationary after differencing while the 
defence and labour variables are stationary. However, for the OLS estimation, not only the 
human capital and investment variables are differenced but also all variables are differenced 
once and some observations are lost 
Unit roots (Table 4.5). 
Atter differencing variables, there were no signs of 
Rc,, I-cs, sioll rcsults is providcd in Appendix 4. ') (Table A4.3.4) 
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Table 4.5. Unit Root Tests in Levels and First Differences (1955-1994) 
Unit Root in x, Unit Root in Ax, 
Variable (x) 
DF ADF DF ADF 
Growth (AY[Y) -8.265** -4.022* 14.08** -7.388** 
Investment (I/Y) -2.449 -1.817 -7.461** -4.839** 
Labour(AL/L) -5.391 ** -3.503 -10.25** -6.099** 
Human capital (AHI/Y) -2.652 -2.07 -7.466** -4.416** 
Defence size and total 
effect (AM[Y) 
-5.844** -4.885** -8.904** -6.065** 
Defence externality 
(AM/M) 
-6.096*"- -4.921 -9.36** -6.375 
Critical values 1% -4.209 -4.216 -3.612 -3.617 
5% -2.938 -3.531 -2.94 -2.942 
The reported values are obtained from PC-Give 8.0 version by Doornik and Hendry, 199_ýý. vor caicuiatea 
values intercept and trends are included in both DF and ADF equations for levels and intercept include for 
first differences. 
'where x represents level of variables and Ax represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 5% 
* significant at I% 
Differencing all the variables means that they are not the same variables anymore. 
Independent variable become a change of growth rather than growth and also the 
explanatory variable of investment growth became change of investment growth, and so on. 
However, questions arise as to whether the model is still able to explain defence-growth 
relationships and whether the firs difference model is the best dynamic form.. 
After differencing variables, the same estirnation procedures used equations (4.57), (4.58), 
(4.59), (4.60). Table 4.6 shows esth-nates of equation (4.57) with first differencing of 
variables. It can be seen from the Table that all variables (investment, labour, and defence) 
bccarne statistically significant and positivcly related to cconomic growth. The effect of the 
del ence scctor remained su-nilar and also the coefficient of labour remained similar. 
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Although R2 is not very low for this estimation, DW test result indicates a possible auto- 
correlation. For more robust results, further analysis is needed. 
Table 4.6 Estimates of Equation (4.57) with First Differences of Variables 
Dependent variable: Econornic growth (1st diL) 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0.30 
Investment (Ist dif. ) 1.10*** 3.12 
Labour force (I st dil'. ) 0.95** 22.0 31 
Defence Total (I st dif. ) 4.57*** 3.25 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.59 R20.57 
RSS 0.1340 DW 2.52 
F stat. (3,35) 17.144 probability: 0.0000 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level I 
means significant at I percent level 
Estirnation of equation (4.58) with first differencing of variables is shown in Table (4.7). 
The variables, investment, labour, defence size, defence externality, are statistically 
significant and except for defence externality, other variables are positively correlated to 
economic growth. Furthermore, the factor productivity differential is negative (6= - 1.05 1). 
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Table 4.7 Estimates of Equation (4-58) with First Differences of Variables 
Dependent variable: Econon-dc growth (1st dif. ) 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0,22 
Investment (Ist dif. ) 0.86** 2.42 
Labour force (1st dif. ) 1.07** 2.37 
Defence size (Ist dif. ) 21.21 2.56 
Defence externality (Ist dif. ) -0.65** -2.04 
Factor productivity 
Differential 
-1.051 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.64 2 0.60 
RSS 0.1194 DW 2.43 
F stat. (4,34) 15.059 Probability: 0.0000 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
means significant at I percent level 
The addition of human capital to first differencing estimation is shown in Tables (4.8) and 
Table (4.9). Human capital showed statistically significant effect on economic growth when 
it is differenced and it is positively related to economic growth. 
In Table (4.8), the coefficient of investment is positive and significant. Coefficients of 
labour force and human capital are also positive and significant. Moreover, the defence 
variable is positively correlated to Turkish economic growth and it is significant at least at 
the 5 17-c level. 
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Table 4.8 Estimates of Equation (4.59) 
with First Differences of The Variables 
Dependent variable: Econon-de growth (1st dif. ) (1956-1994) 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0.45 
Investment (Ist dif. ) 1.08*** 3.2-1 
Labour force (Ist d1f. ) 0.86* 1.92 
Human capital (Ist dif. ) 2.06** 2.09 
Defence total (Ist dif. ) 3.71 2.64 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.64 R2 0.61 
RSS 0.1186 DW 2.84 
F stat. (4,34) 15.21 Probability: 0.0000 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
means significant at I percent level 
Turning to Table (4.9), all the estimated coefficients have expected signs and are significant. 
As expected, defence size has positive effect on economic growth while the externality 
effect of defence spending is negative. Factor productivity differentials show negative signs 
and it irnphes that the rest of economy is more productive than the defence sector. It is as 
expected because the defence sector is less subýject to market disciplines. Thus, the 
differenced esth-nation of four equations irnproved the results and test statistics. 
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Table 4.9. Estimates of Equation (4.60) 
with First Differences of the Variables 
Dependent variable: Economic growth (1st dif. ) (1956-1994) 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0.37 
Investment (I st dif. ) 0.86** 2.54 
Labour force (I st dif. ) 0.98** 
1 
2.26 
Human capital (I st dif. ) 1.94** 2.06 
Defence size (I st dif. ) 19.40** 2.44 
Defence externality 0 st dif. ) -0.61** -2.02 
Factor productivity Differential -1.056 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.68 R20.64 
RSS 0.1057 DW 2.66 
F stat. (5,33) 14.047 Probability: 0,0000 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
means significant at I percent level 
15 
Realistic formulations of economic relations often require the insertion of lagged values of 
the variables. For instance, a rise in economic growth is likely to have an effect on human 
capital, which is distributed over a number of time periods. Therefore, it is worth 
considering the lag structure of the model. To do this, three lags are given to all the 
variables, including the dependent variable. The next step was to omit insignificant lags 
individually", then only the first lag of the human capital and the first lag of the dependent 
is variable showed statistical-ly significant results. It is expected that a lag of human capital' 
significant and positively related to economic growth, because the effect of human capital 
is not irnmediatc: it takes time. On the other hand, the regression results with lags (Table 
The same procedurc ernplo. vc(i to levcl variables and the results are givcn in Appendix 4.3 (Table A4.3.3) 
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4.10) also indicates that lagged dependent variable or in other words, the previous year's 
economic growth is another explanatory variable for Turkey's economic growth and it 
reflects inertia. It means that the previous year's economic growth is negatively correlated 
to economic growth. This occurs because when a country achieves a high economic 
growth, it reaches a higher GDP or output. To achieve an increase to a higher output 
becomes more difficult than previously. It explains why developed countries have a 
relatively low rate of economic growth compared with developing countries, because they 
have a higher output level relative to developing countries. This is known as the catch-up 
hypothesis (Abromovitz, 1986-, Baumol, 1986). It claiý-ns that poor countries tend to grow 
faster than rich countries. Through the international diffusion of knowledge and technology, 
low productivity and low-income countries have the opportunity to adopt the techniques of 
the leader and hence catch-up with the higher productivity countries (Abromovitz, 1986; 
Baurnol, 1986; Taskin & Zafi-n, 1997). Moreover, the result also irnplies that the lagged 
dependent variable will help economic growth (if the coefficient of this variable is negative) 
when lagged year's economic growth was negative (cg Y, =(x-PY, -,, 
if Y,, takes negative 
value, it causes an increase on Yt which explains how negative economic growth accelerates 
cconornic growth). Although this variable has the highest t statistics in the regression, its 
coet I ticient is the lowest. This indicates that the effect is not very high. 
Due to high collinearity between the two defence variables, the equations (4.5 8; 4.60) which 
show separate effects of defence size and externality effects were not used for the regression 
with lags. The evidence also indicatcs that defence has a positive effect on economic 
orowth. Turning to test statistics. Durbln-Watson (DW) test is not valid for this estimation 
because of lagged dependent variable. Therefore, we reported Lagrange Multiplier serial 
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correlation test and the test statistics are acceptable. Estirnation of equation (4.59) In Table 
(4.10) reports our preferred model because it considers lags and it gives better test statistics 
like higher t statistics and high R ') and no evidence of' auto -correlation. 
Table 4.10 Estimates of Equation (4.59) with First Differences of 
The Variables and Lagged Variables 
Dependent variable: Econon-tic growth (1st dif. ) (1957-1994) 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.01 -0.96 
Lagged dependent (AY/Y)-, -0.49*** -5.00 
Investment (Ist dif. ) 1.07*** 4.18 
Labour force (Ist dif. ) 0.96*** 2.84 
Human capital (Ist dif. ) 1.78** 2.40 
Lagged human capital (FH/Y)-, 2.58*** -1.89 
Defence size (Ist dif. ) 2.07* 1.81 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R20.81 2 0.78 
RSS 0.0590 F stat. (6,31) 22.565 probability: 0.0000 
Lagrange Multiplier Test 
Serial Correlation X' (2) 2.7728 probability: 0.2500 
Normality X' (2) 1.4328 probability: 0.4885 
Heteroscedasticity X2 (12) 18.851 probability: 0.0922 
Functional form )C2 (27) 29.104 probability : 0.3559 
means significant at 10 percent level 
means significant at 5 percent level 
means significant at I percent level 
The study used first differences of all variables because of non-stationarity. However. 
growth, defence and labour variables were stationary in level (it makes cointegreation non 
applicable). Investment and human capital variables wcre non stationary in level (see DF 
test Table 4.5). Therefore, the study is re-esth-nated the equations using first difference of 
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I (, 
investment and human capital and level of the other variables". The results are very sErnilar 
(Table 4.11). Investment variable (first difference) is positive and significam but human 
capital did not give significant results. The defence size variable is positive and significant 
in A four different estirnations and defence externality is negative and significant. The 
results are consistent with general findings. Diagnostic test results are also acceptable. R 
vary between 0.49 and 0.55 and DW tests vary between 1.83 and 1.91. 
In ADF test rcsults indicate non stationarity for Labour variable as wcll. Therefore, estimation "ith first 
difference of Labour. investinent and human cýipital and level ot'growth. defence variables are represented 
in Appendix A4.3.5. 
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Table 4.11. Estimation with First Difference 
of Investment and Human Capital 
Dependent Variable: Econon-tic Growth 
Equation 
4.57 
Equation 
4.58 
Equation 
4.59 
Equation 4.60 
Constant 0.02*** 
(3.02) 
0.02*** 
(2.93) 
0.02*** 
(3.11) 
0.02*** 
(3.00) 
Investment 
(first diff. ) 
(). 70*** 
(3.14) 
0.63*** 
(2.89) 
0.68*** 
(3.09) 
0.62*** 
(2.86) 
Labour force (). 94** 
(2.25) 
1.07** 
(2.61) 
0.96** 
(2.33) 
1. ()9** 
(2.66) 
Human capital 
(first diff. ) 
0.90 
(1.27) 
0.82 
(1.17) 
Defence size 3.42** 
(2.71) 
18.12** 
(2.16) 
2.81** 
(2.10) 
16.84** 
(2.00) 
Defence externality - -0.60* 
(-1.77) 
- -0.57* 
(-1.69) 
R2 0.49 0.53 0.51 0.55 
DW 1.83 1.84 1.91 1.89 
F statistic 11.437*** 9.894*** 9.134*** 8.28 1 
t statistics in parenthesis 
significant at least 10% 
significant at least 5% 
*** significant at least I% 
4.6. Conclusions 
This Chapter has empirically investigated the relationships between Turkish defence 
expenditure and economic growth using a theoretically derived econometric model which 
is developed by Feder (1983) between 1955 and 1994. Compared to most of the empirical 
work which has been done in this area, a different approach has been taken. There are 
several important features of the data set and the estirnation technique used in this paper. 
First, I constructed a labour f0rcc data sct instead of a proxy of population. This allows us 
to obtain a clearer picture of defcnce-growth relationships. Secondly, both level and first 
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differencing of the variables are used to avoid spurious regression. Human capital and 
investment data were non-stationary and they became stationary after being first differciiccd. 
Thirdly, lags were introduced into the Feder model to investigate dcfence-growth 
relationships and it gave h-nproved results. Fourthly, incorporation of human capital into 
Feder model also improved results and showed humLin capital as positively correlated to 
Turkish economic growth with a lag. 
Finally, the evidence showed that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
defence spending and econornic growth for Turkey. The results are robust and in all the 
different regressions, the coefficients of defence spending are positive and significant. On 
the other hand, the externality effect ol'defence spending is negative. Furthermore, the 
defence sector is less productive than rest of the economy. 
The findings of our analysis are consistent with much of the related literature. Most of the 
studies with the Feder model have found a positive effect or no effect of defence spending 
on economic growth. The results reported in this Chapter supported those findings. 
However, to see the robustness and reliability of the results, the next Chapter will analyse 
delciicc-growth relationships with a demand and supply side (Deger type) model which 
represents a different theoretical perspective. 
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AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE-GROWTH 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH A DEMAND AND SUPPLY SIDE MODEL 
AND CAUSAL ANALYSIS: TIME SERIES EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
5.1. Introduction 
The primary purpose of this Chapter is to examine the liý-tk between defence expenditure and 
economic growth in Turkey using an alternative approach to that in Chapter 4. In Chapter 
4, the relationship was analysed by a supply side (Feder type) model. In this Chapter, the 
relationship is re-analysed with a demand and supply side (Deger type) model using 2SLS 
and 3SLS sh-nultaneous equation method. In Chapter 4, a positive defence growth 
relationship was found for Turkey. To test the reliability and robustness of the results, a 
different approach is used in this Chapter. Even more analysis is carried out to test for the 
robustness of the findings. These include Granger causality tests which show the exogenity 
of defence variable and collItegration analysis which show long-run and short-run solutions. 
The Chapter is organised as follows. In the first part (5.2), the defence-growth relationship 
is analysed using a dernand and supply side model. Section 5.2.1 briefly summarise the 
i-nodel and specifications. Section 5.2.2 presents empirical analysis and in section 5.2.3, 
sorne results frorn cointegratimi analysis are presented. In the second part (5.3), the 
defence-growth relationships is analysed using Granger causality tests. Granger causality, 
In5.3.1. Theoretical expectat, unit roots and choice ofla-g, len-Lth are explained in sectio ions 
are givcn in section 5.3.2. Section 5.3 C- 1 .3 
provides test results and its implicatIons. Finally, 
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conclusions are presented in section 5.4. 
5.2. Analysis of Defence-Growth Relationship with a Demand and Supply-side Model 
The relationship between defence spending and economic growth is not simple and many 
variables used for estimation might be endogenous and the impact of defence spending on 
economic growth may have direct and indirect effects. The study in this section wiH test the 
impact of defence spending on economic growth with a simultaneous equation method as 
an alternative model to Chapter 4. This analysis will also explore the robustness and 
reliability of the findings in Chapter 4. 
5.2.1. The Model and Specifications 
Deger (1986b) suggested that any econometric model of the defence-growth relationship 
should allow for the following: 
a) a direct effect of' inilitary expenditure on growth through various spin-offs 
(creation ofeffective demand and technological progress) which may on balance be 
posi ti ve; 
b) an indirect effect vio saving rates, reflecting the fact that defence spending 
reallocates saving awa ,v 
from productive investment and then hampers growth; 
further, resource inobilisation may also be affected, thus the verypropensity to save 
may change with a greater defence burden; 
c) the explicit modelling of open economy considerations: spending on military 
budgets will affect the trade balance which in turn. affects saving and growth; 
d) the endogenity (ýf nvlitalý, expenditure. This indicates a four equation 
st*iiiltltai? eoli, s-, s-i,, s-teii7, which may be necessaii, to examine the interaction of growth, 
so ving, balance (ýftrade and tnilitaiý, ýp en ding (Dege r, 1986b; 261-262). 
The above considerations fordefence-growth relationships apply to Turkey and the equation 
for balance oftrade is also an important component for Turkey because Turkey is a major 
arms importing country. This imposes a balance of payment problem on the economy. The 
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import aflocation effect of defence spending is quite important. Buying arms from abroad 
potentially reduces the capability to h-nport investment goods which may be crucial for 
growth. However, some of the military imports may help economic growth. If arms 
imports are used for consumption, the negative effect will be worse but if the military 
h-nports cause an increase in technology, it would help economic growth (e. g. production 
of F- 16 fighter aircraft in Turkey helps to increase its technology via technology transfer). 
Turkey has benefited from military aid from US and NATO. Therefore, the expected sign 
of the defence burden on balance of payments is ambiguous. 
The other consideration is that Deger's various works and other previous multi-equation 
studies mainly employed cross-sectioiial methodologies. There, are few single, country 
analysis using SEMs (eg, Roux, 1996 and Scheetz, 199 1). All previous studies used shares 
of variables in their estimation. However, Sandler and Hartley (1995) suggested that in the 
tilneseries datafor single countr. y anahs's, use of shares may not bejustified, instead real 
totals of variables can be itsed (Sandler and Hartley, 1995; 213) Therefore, this study 
employs both share variables and real totals of variables where possible. 
The bulk of the empirical studies using multi equation models are sunu-narised by Deger and 
Sen (1995) as f6flows: 
Growth equation: 
AY 
=ao+al 
S 
+a, 
M 
+a 3B +a 4 El 
yy -Y y 
(5.1) 
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Saving equation: 
S 
=bo+bl 
m 
+b 2 
AY 
+b, 
B 
+b 4E2 (5.2) yyy-y 
Balance of trade equation: 
B 
=Co +C 1m 
+C 2 
AY 
+C 
3E3 (5.3) yy 
Defence equation: 
m 
=do+dIE4 (5.4) y 
17 
Where AY/Y is the growth rate of GDP, S/Y is the saving ratio, M/Y is the share of defence 
expenditure in GDP, B/Y is the trade ofbalance share mi GDP, Ej are a set of exogenous 
variables chosen through data specifications. They emphasised that E4 depends on 
strategies, security and wealth variables. The model will be explained in the following 
section. 
The study uses the above equations. However, exogenous variables were chosen 
considering Turkey's economy and defence sector and rather than share variables, real levels 
(totals) are considered". The equations are then constructed as f6flows: 
Estimation with share vanabIcs is rcported in Appendix 5.2 
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Y=ao+als+a 2 M+a 3B +a-IL (5ý. 5) 
S=b, +b, M+b 2 Y+b 3B +b. INFRT (5.6) 
B=c, +(. lm+(. 2 
Y+c 
3 EXRT+c4')UM6O+c, DUM70 (5.7) 
M=do+d, PCI+d2DUMCYP+d 
3 DUMKUR+d4GRE-l+dNATO-, (5.8) 
Where 17: 
Y= real gross national product 
S= real gross saving 
B= real balance of trade 
M= Real defence expenditure 
L= Employed labour force 
PCI= Per capita hicome 
INFRT= Inflation rate 
EXRT= Real exchange rate 
GRE-I= Lagged Greek military expenditures as a share of GDP 
NATO-, = Lagged average share of defence burden of NATO countries (excluding 
Greece and Turkey) 
DUMKUR= Dummy variable for conflict between Kurdish separatist and Turkey. 
This dummy takes a value of one for the years 1989-1994. 
DUMCYP= Impulse dummy variable for year 1975 to absorb shock change in defence 
spending due to war between Turkey and Cyprus. 
DUM60= Impulse dummy variable for year 1960 to absorb shock change in the 
17 
Data sources and their details are i-mven in Chapter 2 and Appendix 5.1 
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exchange rate 
DUM70= Impulse dui-nmy variable for year 1970 to absorb shock change in the 
exchange rate 
Equation 5.5 includes three endogenous explanatory variables (saving, balance of trade, 
defence expenditure) and an exogenous labour force (L). Given these, it is predicted that 
saving (S) and labour force (L) are positively correlated to economic growth which is 
standard from any basic growth theoretic model (Deger and Scn, 1983; Deger and Smith, 
1983; Faini et al. 1984; Deger, 1986-, Lebovic and Ishaq, 1987; Scheetz, 1991). The sign 
tI or the coefficient of balance of trade (B) should be negative because the deficits of trade 
balance h-nply net capital inflows from abroad, which stimulate economic growth. Defence 
spending variable is assumed to have direct positive effect on economic growth through 
Keynesian aggregate demand and modernisation effect. 
In the second equation 5.6, saving (S) is assumed to be affected by defence expenditure, 
balance of trade (as a proxy of foreign savings), growth (Y) and inflation rate (INFRT). 
Benoit (1978) argued that in developing countries only a small part of any income not spent 
on defence is put into highly productive investment. Most goes into consumption and social 
investment, such as housing, which do not stfi-nulate economic growth. They are not a 
productive investment but contribute to consumer satisfaction (Benoit, 1978). Therefore, 
aii increase in defence spending may not mean an equivalent decrease in investment or vice 
versa. FoHowing life-cycle theories of consumption, savings depends on growth. Higher 
income and growth tend to (generate higher savings. Thus, the growth effect on savirig is 
predicted to be positive. The cxtcrnal sector coefficient (B) is expected to positively affect 
savings through income IIILIltlpllers and trade taxes (Scheetz, 1991). Finafly, inflati is on 
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included in the saving equation. Inflation certainly affects savings. Deger (1986b) assumed 
inflation cause forced savings and therefore it is positively correlated to savings. However. 
this is only valid when inflation is unexpected. If a country, such as Turkey, experiences 
high inflation a long time and inflatioii is expected, it makes savings less attractive. 
Therefore, the study assumed inflation should be detruriental for Turkey's savings. 
Equation (5.7) for the balance of trade contains defence expenditure (M), growth (Y), 
exchange rate (EXRT) and two impulse dummies for years of 1960 and 1970. The dummies 
are intended to absorb a shock change of exchange rates in those years. Defence 
expenditure is expected to be negatively correlated to the balance of trade. Since an 
increase in defence spending increases aggregate dernand, if there are domestic supply 
constraints, a rise may reduce exportable goods and/or may result in an increase in total 
imports. However, this effect should be small or insignificant for Turkey. It is true that 
Turkey has greatly benefited from the US and the NATO alliance military transfers. The 
burden on balance of trade equation therefore should be obviously lower. The other variable 
in the balance of trade equation is an exchange rate. The rate is included to account for the 
effects on exports and imports of a change in the international purchasing power of domestic 
currency. It is expected to have a positive impact in the balance of trade equation. Finally, 
growth should affect the trade balance. Deger (1986b) argued that the effect for countries 
tI ollowing export promoting strategies should be positive and for countries following import 
substitution industrialisation should be negative. Turkey followed import substitution 
industriahsation until 1980 then followed export promoting strategies. Therefore, its effect 
is Judged to be undeterrnmed. 
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Defence equation (5.8) is radicafly different from previous studies. For this equation, a 
standard demand for military expenditures is used. In general form, the estimating equation 
for defence expenditures is: 
Defence Spending=f(Income, Spill-ins, Threat, Prices) (5.9) 
Sandler and Hartley (1995) explained that income is a crucial determinant of military 
expenditures. There is a positive relationship between delence spending and country's GDP. 
As GDP rise, a nation has both more resource to protect and greater means to provide 
protection. In the equation (5.9), Spill-in indicates the real defence spending of affies. 
Threat is the defence spending of the rival. Prices denote the relative price of defence as 
composed with non-defence goods. However, price data are generafly not available, so 
defence price variable cannot be included in the equation. Spill-M and threat are frequently 
lagged by one year when tirne series data are used because a nation must experience the 
threat and/or spill-in before responding to it (Sandler and Hartley, 1995: 60-61). 
After consideration of above discussion, the determinants of Turkish defence expenditures 
are constructed as per capita income representing income (PCI), NATO for spill-in effect, 
the threat from Greece and two dummies for the Cyprus war and the PKK conflict. The 
NATO variable is the average defence spending (in real terms) of NATO members as a share 
of GDP (excluding Greece and Turkey) which captures the alliance effects on Turkish 
defence expenditure. This is frequently lagged one year when time series data are used 
(Sandler and Hartley, 1995). If Turkey is free-rider, the coefficient of NATO will be 
negative; on the other hand if Turkish defence planners adopt a follower mode of response, 
the coefficient will be positive. GRE is Greek military cxpenditure in GDP which captures 
the threat to Turkey. Arms race models predict that an increase in Greek defence 
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expenditure will lead to a direct response by Turkish defence spending. Turkish and Greek 
bilateral relations have rarely been smooth over a long period. Thcir disputes haý, e often 
been threatened by war. The arms race between the two countries has been supported by 
some empirical studies. Chletsos and Kolhas (1995) I'Ound that Turkish military spending 
was positively affected by Greek defence allocations. Kollias (1996) found that Greek 
defence spending is also prh-nari1y influenced by Turkish defence spending. In recent years, 
both countries have engaged in the modernisation and upgrade of their military capabilities 
(Kollias, 1996). Ozmucur (1996) and Kollias (1995) also supports an arms race between 
the two countries. Therefore, the GRE variable is included m the equation and it is expected 
that the coefficient of GRE will enter the empirical tests with a positive sign and significant. 
These two variables (NATO and GRE) are proxied as a share of defence expenditures In 
GDP, because using real values are not quite possible due to converting common currency 
problems. Two dummy variables (DUMCYP and DUMKUR) are intended to capture the 
effect of the war between Turkey and Cyprus ýit the end of 1974 and the conthct between 
Turkey and the separatist PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party). 
5.2.2. Empirical Results 
Table 5.2 reports different estu-nates of equation (5.5-5.8). However, due to non- 
stationarity, all the variables are first differenced (Table 5.1) then esth-nation is performed. 
The variables are non-stationary and they became stationary after first differencing which 
is used to assess the robustness of the results in a dynamic structure. 
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Table 5.1. Unit Root Tests in Levels and First Differences 
Unit Root in x, Unit Root in Ax, 
Variable (x) DF ADF DF ADF 
y -1.439 -0.593 -7.473** -3.612* 
S -0.779 -0.878 -5.741** -4.242** 
B -5.15 1 ** -3.597* -7.319** -7.61 ** 
m -1848 -2.674 -4.807** -4.93** 
L -1.051 -1.259 -5.197** -3.266* 
INFRT -1.861 -2.071 -4.455** -3.45* 
PCI -2.549 -1.986 -7.467** -4.229** 
EXCRAT -2.448 -2.55 -5.92** -4.699** 
GRE -1.74 -2. ()l -6.074** -4.556** 
NATO -6.005** -4.629** 11.2** -7.775** 
Critical values I% -4.209 -4.216 -4.216 -3.617 
501( -3.528 -3.531 -3.531 -2.942 
The reported values are obtained from PC-Give 8.0 version by Doornik and Hendry, 1995. For calculated 
values intercept and trends are included in both DF and ADF equations for levels and intercept include for 
first differences. 
'where x represents level of variables and Ax represents first difterences of variables. 
Y is GDP, S is gross domestic savings, M is defence expenditure, L is labour force, INFRT is inflation rate, 
PCI is per capita income, EXCRAT is real exchange rate, GRE is Greek defence burden and NATO is 
average NATO's defence burden (excluding Greece and Turkey). 
significant at 5% 
" significant at 1% 
The estirnation results from the all the three types of estimations in Table 5.2 are not very 
different (OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS). The results in three estimated regressions are in line with 
expectations. In the growth equation, the coefficient ofthe endogenous variable of saving 
and defence spendmg are statistically significant and positively correlated to Turkish 
economic growth. But the balance of trade is, as expected, negatively correlated to 
economic growth. The cxogenous variable of labour is also significant and positively related 
to economic growth. Whert the estimated results of the growth equation are compared with 
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previous findings, they seem inconclusive. In A previous studies and also in this study. the 
effects of saving on growth are found to be significantly positive. The variable for capital 
inflow from abroad, is found negative or msignificant in all the previous studies. The signs 
of defence variables differ among studies. While Deger (1986a), Scheetz (1991), Lebovic 
and Ishaq (1987) found negative and statistically significant results, Deger (1986b), Deger 
and Smith (1983) found that defence spending has a positive impact on economic growth. 
The effect seems insignificant in Deger and Sen (1983). The result for the growth equation 
in this study are consistent with Deger (1986b) and Deger and Smith (1983). It is evident 
that the effect of defence spending varies across countries, not across the models, because 
the Feder model for Turkey also showed (Chapter 4) that there is a positive relationship 
between defence and economic growth. 
In the saving equation (Table 5.2), although the coefficient of defence spending is significant 
at the OLS estirnation, the coefficient is statisticaUy insignificant for 2SLS and 3SLS. The 
study relies on 2SLS and 3SLS estimation due to SiMUltaneity. It implies that defence 
expenditure has not reaflocated saving from productive investment. Unlike various Deger 
studies, the effect of defence on saving is insignificant for Turkey. Coefficients of growth 
and balance of trade (proxy of foreign capital) are positive and statistically significant. 
Inflation shows negative and significant effect on savings. It hnplies that inflation does not 
provide forced saving for Turkey. Rather, it retards savings. 
When the results of saving equation are compared with previous similar studies, the income 
variable shows a positi\, c relatimiship in A studies. although the coefficient is insignificant 
iiiScheetz(1991)andRoux(1996). Ori the other hand, the variable for the balance of trade 
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is positive and statisticafly significant in Deger and Sen (1983), Deger (I 986a) and Scheetz 
(1991). It is negative irt Deger and Smith (1983). This study gave insignificant results for 
that variable which indicates that foreign capital inflow has no important effect on savMg for 
Turkey. More importantly, the effect of defence spending on the saving equation shows a 
significant negative effect in Deger and Sen (1983), Deger and Smith (1983), Deger (1986a: 
1986b). However, the effect is insignificant M this study and studies such as Lebovic and 
Ishaq (1987) and Roux (1996). Inflation gives a positive and significant result in Lebovic 
and Ishaq (1987). In the other similar studies, inflation is not included or gives an 
insignificant result in the saving equation, but in this study inflation seems to be negatively 
related to saving. It suggests that a very high inflation rate does not help forced savings. 
In the balance of trade equation (Table 5.2), defence expenditure shows no significant 
relationships in all three types ofestimations. This may be explained by high military aid 
t rom US and NATO afliance to Turkey or an inappropriate proxy for arm imports 
(alternative estirnations used ACDA arms irnports and the World export data but they did 
not give significant results; these results are reported in the Appendix A5.1.4). Coefficient 
of the exchange rate is, as expected, positive and significant. Two dummies gave negative 
and significant results. Since a few studies included four equations, a comparison of the 
results is not easily possible. Roux (1996) and Deger (1986b) studies included the balance 
oftrade as a fourth equation. Roux (1996) findings for the defence variable are consistent 
with this study and it is ii-isignificant. However. Deger (1986b) found that defence spending 
is negatively correlated to the balance of trade. 
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Turning to estimates of defence equation (Table 5.2). income is a major determinant of 
Turkish defence spending. The results suggest that Turkish defence spending is positively 
affected by Greek defence spending and this is in line with expectations. However, the 
NATO variable is statistically insignificant. The insignificant results might reflect an 
imperfect proxy of NATO variables because this variable enters into the equation as a share 
rather than level, but level values for the NATO variable cannot be accurately constructed. 
A positive coefficient is also obtained in the case of the two dummy variables (DUMCYP 
and DUMKUR) as expected. Increasing contlict with PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) 
causes an increase in Turkish defence expenditure. Comparison of defence equation with 
previous studies gives liý-nited evidence because each equation includes different exogenous 
variable and dummies. The most commonly used variable in the defence equation is income 
(GDP or per capita GDP). It is positive and statistically significant both in this study and 
most of the other studies (Deger and Sen, 1983; Deger and Smith, 1983; Deger, 1986a; 
1986b). On the other hand, Lebovic and Ishaq (1987) and Roux (1996) found income 
variable negatively correlated to defence expenditure. In this model, the multiplier of 
military expenditure on economic growth can be calculated as: 
Oy alb, +a 2- (0.90) *(-2.5 4) + 2.90 = 0.92. The multiplier is positive: it suggests that the aM I -alb 2 1-(0.90*0.75) 
overall effect of Turkish defence expenditure is positive. 
Overall the estirnation, the test statistics are acceptable. The R2 varies between 0.60 and 
0.80 and Durbin-Watson statistics provide no evidence of autocorrelation for the first 
Wference ofestunation (Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2. Estimation Results (1956-1994) 
Exogcnous 
variahles 
OLS 2SI-S 3SLS 
Constant 314770 (2.51)** 107900 (2.07)** 196930 (2. ()())* 
G ro wh 
i quation 'ýs 
0.74 (6.5 1 0.76 (2.34)** 0.90 (2,78)**: ' 
AB -0.51 (-4.30)*** -0.36 (-1.96)** -0.36 (-1.97)! ': ' 
2.9 0 (3.5 9) ** * 3.03 (2.81)*** 2.97 (2.76)*: ': ' 
, \L 1.10 (2.76): ' 1.05 (2.54)*** 0.90 (2.27y" 
Diagnostic k-': 0.80 (7: 566074 (7: 581431 
t es ts DW: 1.95 
Sw, ing Constant -172420 (-1.57) 3787 (0.02) -68690 (-0.42) 
equation 
-2.54 (-2.86)*** -0.97 (-0.72) -1.39 (-1.04) 
, \B 0.59 (4.66)*** 0.4ý (1.73y' 0.41 (1.57) 
/\Y 0.75 (7.71)*** 0.46 (2.26)** 0.55 (2.75)*: ': ' 
UNF -22127, (-3.81)*** - 17842 (-2.23)** -14612 (-1.88)* 
Diagnostic 
I t ; 
k-: 0.68 (7: ý44428 (3: 5186781 
" cs DW: 1.57 
B, dance of 
t l t 
Constant 516440 (3.99)*** 560000 (3.04)*** 575110 (3.12)*** 
rac e equa ion 
AM -1.27 (-1.33) -1.02 (-0.72) -0.73 (-0.51) 
ýýy -0.30 (-2.68): '* -0.36 (-1.59) --0.40 (-1.75) 
AEXRT 3598 (4.29)**: ' 3541 (4.19)*** 3391 (4.04y'** 
DUM60 -419920 (-4.14)**"' -424500 (-4.17)**: ' -4186100 (4.14)*** 
DUM70 -202970 (-2.80)-l** -2000300 (-2.77)*** -1960900 (-2.75y'" 
Diagnostic 
t 
R -': 0.60 (T: 582512 (7: 586544 
tcs 's, DW: 2.20 
DcfCllcc' Constant 1746(0.10) 1746(0.11) 78562 (0.05) 
C(IL1,111011 
'WC1 
0.12 (5.26)*** 0.12 (534) *** 0.13 (5.49)* ** 
AGRZIE 50871 (2.26y" S0871 (2.29)** 56045 (2.55)** 
, \NATO -7501 
(-0.07) -7501 (-0.08) -14315 (-0.15) 
DU-MKUR 108260 (2.97)*** 108260 (3.01)*** 108450 (3.04)*** 
DLTMC)T) 366450 (4.34)*** 366450 (4.40)*** 369650 (4.47)*** 
Diagnostic R-: 0.70 m 76990 77071 
DW: 1.79 
t statistics in the parenthesis. For 2SLS estimation; loglik=-1992.45 T=39 and LR test of over- 
identifying restrictions: C1112 (22) =65.328 10.0000]; For 3SLS estimation; loglik=-1993.54 T=39 
and LR test of'over-Identifying restrictions: Chi2(22) =67.504 [0.00001 
AY= real gross national product (first difference), AS= real gross saving (first difference), 
AB=real balance oftrade (first difference). AM= Real defence expenditure (first difference), AL= 
Employed labour force (first difference). APCI= Per capita income (first difference), AINFRT= 
Inflation rate (first difference). AEXRT= Real exchanae rate (first difference), AGRE-, = Greek 
military expenditures as a share ofGDP (first difference). ANATO-, = Average share of defence 
burden of' NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) (first difference), DUMKUR= 
Duinrnv vaf lable for conflict between Kurdish separatist and Turkey. This dummy takes a value 
ofone for the years 1989-1994. DUMCYP= Impulse durniny variable for year 1975 to absorb 
prus. DUM60= Impulse shock change in defence spending due to war between Turkey and Cy 
duminy variable for ycar 1960 to absorb shock change in the exchange rate, DLJM70= Impulse 
duininy variable for ycar 1970 to absorb shock change in the exchange rate, 
Notes: All computations if] this study have been carried out by PC-GIVE 8.0 and PC-FIML 8.0 
(See Doornik and Hendry. 1994,1905) 
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Is 
5.2.3. Results from Cointegration Analysis 
The results of this Chapter so far have supported the findings of a positive impact of defence 
on Turkish economic growth. To assess whether the findings are robust and to see long-run 
and short-run solution with a cointegration methodology, further investigations were carried 
out, using equations 5.5. and 5.6". We know from the Table 5.1 that the variables are non- 
stationary in level and stationary when they are first differenced. 
The cointegration analysis between economic growth and defence expenditure is tested 
tI ollowing the procedure outlined in Engle and Granger (1987). They suggest a two step 
estimation procedure in which the static long run equation is initially estimated and tested 
I'Or cointegration. When the cointegration relationship exists the residuals (which will be by 
definition 1 (0) are the used in the error correction model. Table 5.3. shows the results for 
co integration regression. The most frequently used test for cointegration residuals for a unit 
are the residual based DF (Dickey-Fuller) and ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) 1981 test. 
For the usual cointegration tests, the null hypothesIs is that the series are not cointegrated 
against the alternative that they are. The tests results showed that cointegration exists 
(Table 5.3). In the long run, positive relationships between Turkish economic growth and 
defence spending are supported by these results. 
Because ofstationaf ity of balance oftrade variable in level, cointeizration analysis is not applicable for this 
equation. and due to unsatisfactory rc,, ults. del' t- ence equation presented in the Appendix Table A5.4. 
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Table 5.3. The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-Run) Estimation 
for Growth Equation (1955-1994) 
Constant S B m L Trend 
y - 
1323900*** 
0.84*** -0.46** 
1 
3.01*** 
1 
1.49*** 
1 
-'13164()*** 
t statistics -5.52 8.67 -2.23 3.41 6.79 6.52 
Statistics 
R2 0.99 
1 1F 
statistics 2058 (0.0000) 
DF: -3.266*** 
T7F- 
-3.647*** 
Where Y is GDP, S is gross domestic savings, M is defence expenditure, L is labour force, B is balance of 
trade 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Table 5.4 presents the short-run dynamics of Turkish economic growth. In this estirnation, 
saving, labour and defence spending are positively correlated with economic growth and 
coefficient of balance of trade is negatively significant. The results are as expected and 
consistent with 2SLS and 3SLS findings. The negative sign for RES, -, 
is also as expected. 
2 The test statistics of this estunation is also acceptable with a high R 
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Table 5.4. The Engle-granger Second Stage 
(Short-run and ECM) Estimation for Growth Equation 
Dependent Variable AY 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t statistics probability 
Constant 201960** 1.70 0.08 
AS 0.78*** 7.57 0.00 
AB -0.56*** -5.20 0.00 
AM 2.39*** 3.22 0.00 
AL 1.75*** 4.19 0.00 
RES, 
-, -0.45*** -3.03 
0.00 
Summary Statistics Diagnostic 
R2 0.84 AR I- 2F(2,3 1) 0.43 
DW 1.79 
1 
ARCH I F(l, 3 1) 0.43 
SE 494229 NORM chi2 (2) 5.57 
F (5,33) 35.743 Xi2 F(I (), 22) 0.36 
Where Y is GDP, S is gross domestic savings, L is labour. M is defence spending, 
B is balance of trade and RES is Residuals from cointegrating regression. 
significant at 1017c 
significant at 517c 
significant at 117c 
The long-run effect of defence spending on gross domestic saving are represented in Table 
5.5. In the long run, the coefficient of defence spending is insignificant. This is consistent 
with 2SLS and 3SLS findings. In the long run, the determinants of savings are income, 
balance of trade and the economy's inflation rate. This Table also presents DF (Dickey- 
Fuller) and ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) residual based unit root test results which 
indicate that conitegration exists. 
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Table 5.5. The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-Run) 
Estimation for Saving Equation (1955-1994) 
Constant y B m INFRT Trend 
S -2653800*** 0.65*** 0.85*** -0.07 -17963*** -25509()*** 
t statistics -9.75 7.97 4.05 -(). 06 -2.75 -5.66 
Statistics 
R2 0.96 F (5,33) 195.11 (0.0000) 
DF: -2.712*** 
1 
ADF: -2.917*** 
Where Y is GDP, S is gross domestic savings, M is defence expenditure, L is labour force. B is balance of 
trade, INFRT is inflation rate. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
The Engle Granger short run results for savings equation (Table 5.6) showed that defence 
spending has a negative and significant effect on saving in the short run. The inflation rate 
also has a negative effect, while income and balance ot trade affect savings positively. 
RESt-I has the expected negative and significant sign. 
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Table 5.6. The Engle-Granger Second Stage 
(Short-run and ECM) Estimation for Saving Equation 
Dependent Variable AS 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t statistics probability 
Constant - 186060* 
1 
-1.71 0.07 
AY 0.72*** 7.34 0.00 
AB 0.62*** 4.86 0.00 
AM - 1.99** -2.05 0.04 
AINFRT -19664*** 
1 
-3.47 0.00 
RES, 
-, -0.17** -2.30 
1 
0.04 
Summary Statistics Diagnostic 
R2 0.69 AR I- 2F(2,3 1) 2.20 
DW 1.50 ARCH I F(l, 3 1) 0.38 
SE 479838 NORM chi2 (2) 0.03 
F (5,33) 15.117 Xi2 F(10,22) 1.71 
RESET F(l, 32) 4.29 
Where Y is GDP. S is gross domestic savings, L is labour, M is defence spending, 
B is balance of trade, INFRT is inflation rate and RES is Residuals from 
cointegratino reuression. 
significant at 101/c 
significant at 517c 
significant at 117c rý 
The whole cointegration analysis results showed that the findings are almost the same as 
findings of 2SLS and 3SLS esth-nations. The positive effect of defence spending on Turkish 
economic growth is supported by both cointegration analysis and Deger-type SEM analysis. 
5.3. Causal Analysis of Turkish Defence-Growth Relationships 
We have investigated Turkish defence-growth relationships using three different approaches. 
All the findings supported a positive effect ofTurkish defence spending on its economic 
growth. Howcvcr. the cxo(Tenity of the defence variable has not been tested. The third tý 
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analysis of Turkish defence-growth relationships in this Chapter will explores exogenity of 
defence variable using Granger causality tests. 
5.3.1. Granger Causality, Unit Roots and Choice of Lag Length 
A question that frequently arises In time series analysis is whether or not one economic 
variable can help to forecast another economic variable. For instance, does defence 
spending cause economic growth. This question was proposed by Granger (1969). Testing 
causality in the Granger sense involves using F tests to test whether lagged information on 
available Y provides any statistically significant information about variable X in the presence 
of lagged X. If not then "Y does not Granger cause X" 
The procedure assumes the long-run relationship between the series. The test for Granger 
causality consists of the equations: 
Xt:: -- ao + b, Xt 
j=l 
(5.10) 
where ut is a seriaRy independent random vector with mean zero and finite covariance 
matrix. 
The testing for Granger causality requires that data series must be stationary. Models 
containing non-stationary variables wifl often lead to a problem of spurious regression. 
(Engle and Granger, 1987). To test for the stationary of the variables, unit root tests are 
commonly used which is developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979). If data series contains a 
ilon-stationary variables, it should be differenced to result in a stationary series. In this 
-142- 
Chapter 5. An Alternative Anal ysis of Defence-Growth Relationshýps 
study, the following augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression is employed to test the unit 
root hypothesis: 
k 
AXt = (Xo + (Y. I TIME +a xt -+ (X 
x 213 
EA 
t-1 
+F 
i=l 
where Xt stands for economic growth or defence spending variables. 
(-,;;. 11) 
Granger causality tests are very sensitive to choice of lag length. Therefore, choice of lag 
length needs careful attention. This study uses Akaike's final prediction error (FPE) to 
determine appropriate lag length. 
5.3.2. Theoretical Expectations 
The study hypothesised that defence expenditure is an exogenous variable relative to 
economic growth while economic growth is an endogenous variable relative to defence 
spending. For this analysis, economic growth and defence burden (defence shares in the 
GNP) over the period 1924-1994 are used. Although level data are better for explai-nmg the 
defence growth relationships, only share data are available for earlier years (1924-1950). 
Figure 5.1 shows trends in defence burdens and econornic growth for Turkey. 
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Figure 5.1 Turkey's Economic Growth and Defence Burden (1924-1996) 
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5.3.3. Tests, Results and Discussions 
Table (5.7) repc rts the ADF test results for the level as well as for the first differences 
variables. As can be seen from the Table, calculated ADF statistics is less than its critical 
value for econornic growth. It means the series is said to be stationary or integrated of order 
zero (i. e. 1 (0)). On the other hand, the cletence spending variable seems non-stationary and 
it became stationary aftcr difierencing once. 
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Table 5.7 ADF Tests for Unit Roots 
Variables Lag Tests statistics Critical values 
Level First 
difference 
1% 5% 
Economic growth 3 -3.97** -7.55** - 3.53 -2.90 
Economic growth 2 -4.59** -7.93** -3.53 -2.90 
Economic growth 1 -5.49** -9.75** -3.53 -2.90 
Economic growth -10.02** -17.02** -3.53 -2.90 
Defence spending 3 -2.07 -5.3 1 ** -3.53 -2.90 
Defence spending 2 -2.05 -5.41** -3.53 -2.90 
Defence spending 1 -2.60 -7.44** -3.53 -2.90 
Defence spending 1 0 -2.64 - 8.43 **1 -3.53 1 -2.90 
The intercept term are included in the ADF equations 
** means significant I% level 
It is evident from the values of the ADF statistics that economic growth is 1 (0) and defence 
spending is 1 (1). The variables are not same order of integration, therefore, cointegrating 
regression is not applicable. The Granger causality test can still be applied on the variables 
(Asseery, 1996; Chen, 1993). 
The procedure assumes the long-run relationship between the series. The tests for Granger 
causality consist of the equations: 
mn 
EGt=ao+E biEG, 
-i+l: ý. 
DSt-j-+ttt (5.12) 
i=l j=l 
p I' 
DSt=uO+L PiEG, 
-i+l: 7))S, -j+Et 
(5.13) 
j=1 , j=1 where u, and F, are a serlafly independent random vector with mean zero and finite 
covariance matrix. EG refers to economic growth and DS is for defence spending. 
Equation (5.12) used to test caLlsafity runs from defence spending to economic growth, 
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whereas equation (5.13) tests that causality run from economic growth to defence spending. 7_1 
The causality test to be performed can be written simply: 
a) DS causes EG if H,,: Cj=O, j=1, ... ,n can be rejected 
a) EG causes DS if H,,: Pi=O, i=1, ... ,p can be rejected 
Feedback is said to occur if both (a) and (b) hold. If (a) and (b) cannot be rejected then it 
can be stated that there are no causal relationships between defence spending and economic 
growth. A priori, start with a lag length of 5 on both variables for each equation and work 
down. The results of calculating FPE for the different permutations are given in Table (5.8). 
It can be seen from the Table that the appropriate value of m, n, p and r, respectively. For 
these calculations, level variable of economic growth and first difference of defence spending 
variable were used because of non-stationarity of the defence spending variable in levels. 
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Table 5.8. Akaike Information Criterion 
Dependent variable economic growth (EG) Dependent variable defence spending (DS) 
AEG, 
-j 
ADS, 
-, 
FPE AEG, 
-j 
ADS, 
-j 
FPE 
5 5 43.81 5 5 1.39 
5 4 63.50 5 4 1.35 
5 3 63.05 5 3 1.31 
5 2 67.57 5 2 1.27 
4 5 44.40 4 5 1.35 
4 4 64.47 4 4 1.29 
4 3 63.16 4 3 1.25 
4 2 69.49 4 2 1.21 
3 5 54.56 3 5 1.33 
3 4 72.55 3 4 1.29 
3 3 70.21 3 3 1.24 
3 2 73.84 3 2 1.20 
2 5 56.00 2 5 1.29 
2 4 75.70 2 4 1.25 
2 3 73.52 2 3 1.20 
2 21 88.17 1 21 21 1.17 
These results indicate that appropriate lag length for the economic growth equation are 5-5 
and for the defence equation are 2-2. Regression results of equation 5.12 and 5.13 are 
shown in Table 5.9 and Granger causality test results are presented in Table 5.10. It u-nplies 
that defence spending affects economic growth while economic growth is exogenous. 
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Table 5.9. Regression Results of Equations (5.12 ) and (5.13 ) 
Explanatory Dependent Variable 
Variables 
AEG, ADSt 
Constant -0.602 (-0.79) -0.004 (-(). ()3) 
AEGt-j -0.99 (-9.03) 0.014 (1.03) 
AEGt-2 
-0.71 (-5.02) 0.013 (0.99) 
AEGt-3 
-0.61 (4.42) 
AEGt-4 
-0.50 (-3.76) 
AEGt-5 
-0.15 (-1.57) 
ADSt-I -4.23 (-5.57) -0.064 ( -1.07 
ADSt-2 0.19(0.22) -0.16 (-1.24) 
ADSt-3 
-3.62 (-4.22) 
ADSt-4 
-1.69 (-1.97) 
ADSt-5 
-4.26 (-5.17) - 
R2 0.78 0.07 
DW 1.89 1.98 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are t-ratios: DW is Durbin-Watson statistics: SE standard error of 
regressions: SC is the Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation: FF is the Ramsey 
RESET test for functional form: Norm. Is the normality test of the residuals 
Table 5.10. Granger Causality Tests (1924-1994) 
Null hypothesis F statistics 
5 F (5,54)= 11.672 probability: 0.0000 
E ý. =O Defence causes economic 
j=1 
growth 
2 F (2,63)= 0.61028 probability: 
1: 7, =O Economic growth causes 0.5464 
j=1 
defence 
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It is evident from these results that Granger causality between economic growth and doicnce 
spending does exist, and more importarit. the direction of causality running from defence 
spending to economic growth cannot be rejected at the 11,7( level of significance. These 
results coupled with the existence of a long-run relationship between economic growth and 
defence spending confirm that economic growth over the period of estimation was 
dependent on defence spending. 
5.4. Conclusions 
The Chapter has analysed defence-growth relationship with a demand and supply side 
(Deger type) model using simultaneous equation methodologies (2SLS and 3SLS). The 
data comprised 39 years of annual observations from 1956 to 1994. The empirical results 
suggest Deger's findings of positive (aggregate demand and spin-off) effects of defence 
expenditure have applied for Turkey. Turkey's econornic growth is stimulated by defence 
spending, but defence spending has no significant effect on saving. Deger type indirect 
effect of defence spending seems insignificant in this study. Furthermore, there is no 
significant relation between defence spending and balance of trade. It suggests that Turkish 
defence spending has greatly benefited from military aid from the US and NATO affiance. 
Therefore, Turkey's balance oftrade has not been negatively affected. Determinants of 
Turkish defence expenditure are mainly its income level, the conflict with PKK and Greece's 
defence spending. The results are consistent with findings of Chapter (4). Finally, using 
real values of variables rather than their shares improved the empirical results. The fmdmgs 
Support the positive effect ot'dcfence spending. To test for the robustness and reliability of 
the results more analysis was undertaken. Firstly, Engle-Granger Error Correction 
repi-csentation Nvas employed in the growth and savm&, s equations. The results showed 
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cointegration existed and a positive eflect of defence spending on economic growth was 
supported by these findings either in the long-run or in the short-run. Exogenity of c1cfence 
variable is also answered hi this Chapter. The analysis demonstrates that Turkish defence 
spending Granger causes economic growth, while economic growth does not Granger 
causes defence spending. It implies that there is bi-directional causality between two 
variables and it makes defence variable exogenous while economic growth variable is 
endogenous. These findings justify the defence-growth analysis for Turkey. 
The study so far shows that positive effect of defence spending on Turkish economic growth 
cannot be rejected: either supply-side (Feder type) or demand and supply-side (Deger type) 
models gave sh-nilar results. The following Chapter will analyse Greek defence-growth 
relationships for comparison with Turkey. Can the results be generalised across countries? 
Greece provides a comparative case study for answering this question. 
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ANALYSIS OF GREECE'S DEFENCE-GROWTH RELATIONSHIPS 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous Chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), Turkey's defence-growth relationship was 
examined. The results suggested that the Turkish defence sector stimulate economic growth 
in Turkey. The airn of this Chapter is to analyse Greece's defence-growth relationships so 
as to compare the results with those obtained for Turkey. Greece and Turkey show 
sh-nilarities. Both countries allocate large budgets to their defence sector as compared to 
other NATO countries and they started to produce their own equipment during the 1980s. 
One might therefore expect that Greece's defence-growth relationship should be similar to 
that found for Turkey. This Chapter is an attempt to see if we can generalise the results for 
Turkey, thereby assessing their robustness between similar nations. 
The analysis for Greece follows the same procedure and tests used for Turkey. The 
relationships between Greek defence spending and economic growth is estimated, first, with 
a supply-side (Feder type) model using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for the time 
period 1958-1994, and, second, with a demand and supply-side (Deger type) model using 
OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS for the same period. This Chapter also provides some results from 
cointegration analysis to test and compare the results those obtained for Turkey. 
The remainder ofthe Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 briefly reviews the Greek 
economy. Section 6.3 criticafly analyse Greece's defence economy. In sectlon 6.4 prev'Ous 
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Greek defence-growth studies are reviewed. Section 6.5 is devoted to empirical analysis 
with two parts. The first part (6.5.1) analyses the relationship with a supply-side (Feder 
type) model. In this part, section 6.5.1.1 describes the model and its specifications: The 
estimation procedures and results are discussed in section 6.5.1.2. In the second part 
(6.5.2), Deger type demand and supply-side analysis is performed. This part Mcludes the 
model and specifications (6.5.2.1), estirnation results (6.5.2.2) and some results from 
cointegration analysis (6.5.2.3). Finally, section 6.6 surnmarises the main findings and 
draws some conclusions. Throughout, the aim is to use Greece to ascertain whether the 
results for Turkey can be verified for another sii-nilar country. 
6.2. The Greek Economy 
Greece is a small country with a populatioii of over 10 million and is located at the southern 
edge of the Balkan peninsular. Greece is a member of the European Union and NATO and 
its economic development was retarded by historical factors (World War 11 and the civil war 
between 1939-1949) until 1950. However, after 1950, fi-nportant transformations took 
place in the economy. Between 1954-1974, the Greek economy achieved a high GDP 
growth but after the first oil shock and the recession of mid- 1970s, the Greek economic 
performance slowed down. During the 1980s, the Greek economy stagnated. It isolated 
itself from the mainstream of the industrial development process and its exports specialised 
in low value-added products (OECD, 1993). The low growth rate of the Greek economy 
continued untfl 1994. The Greek econorny gathered strength in 1996 (OECD, 1997). The 
traditional Greek industrial sectors were food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing, leather. 
furniture and cement. Ail expanding shipbuilding sector was mostly involved in repairs 
(Avramides. 1995). 
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Greece's general macroeconornics trends are shown in Table 6.1 which contains general 
macroeconomic data initially with ten years intervals then, between 1980 and 1990 with five 
year intervals and annual data after 1990. Greece's population growth rate has been very 
low during the period of 1954-1995. The Greek population rose from 7.9 million people 
in 1954 to 10.46 million in 1995. The inflation rate has been low until mid- 1970s but after 
the late 1970s, the annual rate increased and varied between 10% and 30%. Due to a large 
wave of emigration, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, the unemployment rate has been 
very low. However, there was an increasing trend after 1980. The growth of GNP (gross 
national product) between 1958 and 1994 averaged 4.8 17c annually. In per capita income, 
there was an increasing trend until 1980s then it became stable. The investment/GNP ratio 
showed a downward trend during the period. A slight increase was shown in the 
government consumption/GNP ratio but the ratio declined after 1985. In conclusion, 
Greece had rapid economic growth from 1954 to rnid- 1970s, after which the Greek 
economy was characterised by high inflation and macroeconomic stagnation (OECD, 1996). 
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Table 6.1. Main Econon-dc Indicators of Greece (1954-1995) 
Indicators 1954 1960 1970 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Population 7.89 8.33 8.79 9.64 9.93 10.09 10.20 10.31 10.35 10.4; 10.46 
(111iffion) 
Aunual Inflation 15.2 1.5 3.9 28.6 20.3 17.6 17.9 12.1 12.0 8.6 8.9 
rate (%) 
Unemployment - 6.1 3.1 2.8 7.8 7.0 7.7 8.7 9.7 9.6 10.0 
rate (%) 
Amiual real 6.2 4.3 6.9 1.9 3.2 -0.8 3.5 0.4 -0.9 1.5 1.9 
growth rate of 
(rNP* (%) 
Per-capita GNP 310 368 805 1,191 1,190 1,275 1,307 1,298 1,289 1,298 - 
(1990 thousand 
Greek Drachmas 
Investment/GNP 14.8 26M 23.2 23.4 19.2 23.5 21.3 20.5 19.5 18.8 23.3 
(17C) 
Goverm-nent 11.3 11.2 12.4 15.8 20.5 15.7 14.8 14.1 14.2 14.0 - 
consumption/ 
GNP (%) 
Export/GNP 7.3 5.8 6.3 12.5 13.7 9.9 10.1 10.4 9.4 9.8 
* Calculated using 1990 constant Greek Drachmas 
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys Greece and OECD Labour Force Statistics, IMF/IFS, US ACDA (1996) 
6.3. Greece's Defence Economy 
The Greek defence burden is the highest among NATO and European Union members. 
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 show indicators of Greek defence expenditures between 195 8 and 
1996 yearly. Defence expenditure is given in 1990 constant prices. The growth rate of 
defence expenditure has averaged 4.9 1/ý( per annum. The rate peaked at 1975 (70%) due 
to the Cyprus-Turkish war. Durfi-ig this period, the rate of economic growth also averaged 
4.9% per annum. 
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Table 6.2 Selected Indicators of Greek Defence Expenditure 
Years ME 
(billion 
drachmas) 
AME, AGNP (%) NIE/ 
GNP 
Years ME 
(hilli'm 
(Ira ch mas) 
%NIE (cý) AGNT 
(C7, 
NIE/ 
GNP (C-C) 
1958 135 -2.4 2.0 4.7 1978 709 1.4 5.9 6.5 
1959 141 4.5 2.5 4.8 1979 685 -3.2 3.6 6.1 
1960 148 4.8 4.7 4.8 1980 630 -9.1 2.1 5.5 
1961 144 -3.1 11.6 4.2 1981 776 23.3 -0.1 6.8 
1962 143 -0.4 4.8 4.0 1982 766 -1.3 -0.2 6.7 
1963 151 5.9 11.7 3.8 1983 706 -7.9 -0.8 6.2 
1964 154 1.9 9.7 3.6 1984 753 6.7 1.7 6.5 
1965 171 10.5 11.7 3.5 1985 830 10.2 2.4 7.0 
1966 189 10.6 10.4 5.5 1986 742 -10.6 1.1 6.2 
1967 241 27.6 5.1 4.3 1987 754 1.6 -0.2 6.3 
1968 275 14.3 6.0 4.6 1988 653 -13.5 4.4 5.2 
1969 311 13.2 10.6 4.7 1989 608 -6.9 3.9 4.7 
1970 330 6.2 6.9 4.7 1990 612 0.9 -0.3 4.9 
1971 352 6.5 9.6 4.6 1991 599 -3.9 3.6 4.41 
1972 374 6.4 9.5 4.4 1992 617 5.0 0.4 4.6 
1973 361 -3.5 7.4 4.0 1993 605 -2.1 -0.3 4.5 
1974 360 -0.3 -3.9 4.1 1994 615 1.7 1.4 4.5 
1975 612 70.1 6.1 6.6 1995 629 2.3 1.9 
1976 662 9.1 7.2 6 7 1996 6621 5.21 1.4 
1977 
1 
699 
1 
5.4 
1 
3.7 
1 
.d 8 .8 6.9 
Sources: SIPRI yearbooks, IMF/fFS yearbooks. NATO Review (1998) 
Notes: 
-ME: Military expenditure with 1990 constant Greek billion Dmchmas 
-AME: Real growth rates ofinilitary expenditure 
-AGNP: Real growdi rates ofoross national product 
-ME/GNP: Share ofinilitary expenditure in the GNP 
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Figure 6.1. Trends of Greek Defence Burden and Econo"c Growth 
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Sources: SIPRI, IMF/IFS, NATO Review 
For a comparative study, it is meaningful to cornpare Greece defence burdens with Turkey 
and the NATO average. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2 show such comparative data between 
1985 and 1995. During the period, the Greek defence burden was higher than both Turkey 
and NATO average (the average defence burden between 1985 and 1995 between 1985- 
1995 was 5.9171c, for Greece, 3.8"/'(, for Turkey and 3.9(-/,, for NATO: US ACDA, 1996). The 
other perspective of detence expenditure Is Its share III the central government budget. 
Greece's ME/CGB ratio is higher than NATO average but it is lower than Turkey's figures. 
Per capita military expenditure of'Grccce is also lower than NATO but much higher than 
Turkey, because Greece's population is very low when compared to Turkey. This makes 
per capita detCiice spending higher for Greecc. 
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Figure 6.2. Defence Burden for Greece, Turkey and NATO 
7f 
6- 
5 
4 
3- 
2- 
1- 
o 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
GREECE -- TURKEY ------ NATO 
Sources: US ACDA, 1996 
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Table 6.3 Defence Burden for Greece, Turkey and NATO 
r 
ME/GNP (r-7c) 
1 1 NIFJCGB (c7c) 
r- 
PCNIE 1 
Year G T N G T N G T N 
1985 7.0 4.6 4.7 13.8 17.9 14.4 539 97 907 
1986 6.2 4.9 4.7 12.5 22.5 14.7 480 110 935 
1987 6.3 3.3 4.6 11.9 19.4 14.7 487 80 932 
1988 6.3 2.9 4.3 11.9 17.7 14.2 505 72 909 
1989 5.8 3.1 4.2 9.5 18.4 14.0 477 74 900 
1990 5.8 3.5 4.0 8.8 20.3 13.2 475 89 855 
1991 5.4 3.7 -3.7 11.9 17.9 11.5 450 94 780 
1992 5.7 3.9 3.7 12.5 19.8 11.2 472 100 797 
1993 5.5 3.9 3.5 12.1 15.9 10. (1 466 108 748 
1994 -. 
6 4.0 3.3 11.5 17.4 10.0 2 105 710 
i 
1995 
1 
5.5 . 4.0 3.0 10.9 
1 
17.6 . 9.4 
1 1 
482 . 108 . 6L8J ý-8i 
Source: US ACDA 1996 
Notes: 
" ME/GNP represents shares ofmilitary expenditures in gross national product 
" ME/CGB is the share ofinilitary expenditure in central government budget 
" PCME is per capita military expenditure with 1995 constant US S 
"G is Greece 
"T is Turkey 
"N is NATO 
Defence spending can be divided into personnel, equipment, infrastructure and other 
operational expenditurcs. In this respect, Table 6.4 and FigUre 6.3 compare Greek and 
Turkish figures. The main point ofthis Table is that Greek defence expenditure devoted to 
personnel is higher than Turkey's, whereas equipment and infrastructure expenditures are 
lower than TUrkey. While between 1990 and 1994, an average of 63% of Greek defence 
expenditure goes to personnel cxpenditure, the figure for Turkey was 50.1% (hence, 
different capital-labour ratios). 
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Table 6.4 Distribution of Greek and Turkish Defence Expenditure by Category 
Years Personnel 
Expenditure(t7c) 
Equipment 
Expenditure (117c 
I nf rastructure 
Expenditure (1-7c 
Other Operational 
Expenditure (ý7c ) 
Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey 
1991 64.4 48.5 20.3 22.7 1.7 2.8 13.6 26.0 
1992 61.4 48.7 23,4 24.8 2.4 3.5 12.8 23.0 
1993 62.2 54.5 24.7 22.9 2.6 2.9 10.5 19.7 
1994 63.0 51.0 24.4 29.3 0.6 2.6 12.0 17.1 
1995 63.3 43.0 19.8 37.7 1.9 2.5 14.9 16.9 
1996 61.2 46.2 21.1 30.8 1.5 3.0 16.2 19.9 
Average 63.0 50.1 22.8 23.7 1.7 3.0 12.2 22.5 
1990- 
1994 
Notes: i) Share ofi-nilitary personnel expenditure in die total dct'Ciicc expenditure 
ii) Share of military equipment expenditure in die total dct'cnce expenditure 
iii) Share ofinilitary infrastructure expciiditure in the tout] defence expenditure 
iv) Share ofother operational expenditure in die total del'Ciice expenditure 
Source: NATO Review January 1996, Spring 1998 
Figure 6.3. Distribution of Greek and Turkish Defence 
Expenditure by Category (1996) 
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Greece has very large armed forces compared with its population. Greece armed forces 
were about 212 thousand in 1995, which was equivalent to about 5.9 17, c of the total labour 
fI orce. About 73% of the armed forces personnel are rnale conscripts doing their national 
service which currently lasts for about 19 months and it is compulsory for all able-bodied 
males. Compulsory military service m Greece seems likely to remam for the near future 
because the country feels threatened due to the Turkish threat in Aegean sea and Cyprus. 
However, Greece has a very low population growth rate. Very large armed forces arc Rely 
to create a problem M territorial delencc (Kollias, 1995). Table 6.5 and Figure 6.4 shows 
comparative mflitary personnel data for Greece, Turkey and NATO. Greek armed forces 
ranked 26 in the world in 1995 (US ACDA, 1996). 
Table 6.5 Military Personnel in Greece, Turkey and NATO 
1980 
1 
1985 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 
1 
Military Personnel 
Greece (000) 186 201 201 213 206 213 213 
Turkey (000) 717 814 769 686 811 807 818 
NATO (000) 5.036 5.930 5,778 4.905 4,893 4,700 4,617 
Greece/NATO 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.4 4.2 4.5 4.6 
urkey/NATO 12.7 13.7 13.3 14.0 16.6 17.1 17.7 
Greece/Turkey ((7c) 1 25.9 1 24.6 26.1 31.0 25.4 26.2 1L. Oj 
Source: NATO Review. Spring 1998 
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Figure 6.4 Military Personnel in Greece, Turkey and NATO 
Sources: NATO Revic,, N, 
Although Greece has started to produce its own mihtary requirements, Greece still imports 
most of its military equipment and arms exports are extremely low. These are also very 
similar for Turkey. Arms imports, arms exports and its share in total imports and exports 
for Greece between 1985 and 1995 can be seen m Table 6.6 and Figure 6.5. Greece was 
ranked Mth highest arms importer in 1995 (US ACDA, 1997). 
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Table 6.6 Greece's Arm Imports and Exports 
Year Arm 
Imports 
(Million US$) 
Arm Exports 
(Million US$) 
Arm Imports/ 
Total Imports 
(7, - ) 
Arm Exports/ 
Total Exports 
(c7c ) 
Balance of Arms 
Trade (Arn-Ls 
Ex. -Arnts Imp. ) 
1985 397 41 2.9 0.7 -334 
1986 280 53 1.9 0.7 -247 
1987 453 52 2.7 0.6 -379 
1988 718 25 4.7 0.4 -674 
1989 2,277 0 11.8 0 -2,206 
1990 506 22 2.2 0.2 -479 
1991 287 0 1.2 0 -300 
1992 780 22 3.1 0.2 -735 
1993 891 10 3.9 0.1 -832 
1994 482 5 2.2 0.1 - 
1995 825 0 - 
Source: US ACDA 1996 
Notes: 1995 constant millions US$ 
A very important development in the Greek defence economy was the estabfishment ol'a 
domestic defence industry in the mid- 1970s. The main reason for estabfishing this defence 
industry was strategic rather than econoi-nic. Therefore, leading defence companies were 
founded and operated by the state (Avrai-nides, 1995). The owner ofthese companies are 
state and military forces (Bartzokas, 1992). The projects airned to develop self sufficiency 
ofdefence requirements. The fields of arm production are aeronautics, mihtary arms and 
vehicles and shipyards. Most ofthe production activities involve licenced production. The 
defence industry also created iicw jobs for the Greek economy (Avramides, 1995). 
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Figure 6.5. Greece's Arm Imports and Exports 
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To surni-narise, this section has briefly surveyed Greece's defence expenditure, armed forces 
and defence industry. It showed that Greece has a high defence burden, a high proportion 
of its labour force goes to armed forces and it has a developing defence industry. The 
defence sector seems an important element in Greece economy. The development of the 
defence industry In Greece is very sii-nilar to Turkey's: thus, the relationships between 
Greece's defeiice expenditure and econornic growth should be analysed. Greece and Turkey 
are both members of NATO and they spend very high proportion of GNP to defence. After 
analysis of Turkey's defence-growth relationships in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, Greece 
provides a comparative case study for assessing whether a sirnflar defence-growth trade-off 
exists (I . e. similar to TUrkey). Before the empirical analysis, the next section wfl] review 
previous dctciicc-t, rowtll studics for Grccce. ltý 
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6.4. Previous Greek Defence-Growth Studies 
In recent years, Greek defence-growth relationship has attracted some authors. Kollias 
(1995) analysed Greek defence-growth relationship using the techniques of cointegration 
and the related notion of error correction methods. His single equation for the long run is: 
yt =(X 0+ (Y, 1m21 +(X 3 POP I+Vt yt yt 
(6.1) 
Where Y is the gross domestic product (GDP) at constant price, (x is the intercept, (M/Y) 
is the share of GDP, (I/Y) is investment share of GDP, POP is the growth rate of population 
and p, is a residual term. Kolhas (1995) study covers the period of 1963-1990. The study 
fI ound that defence spending has a positive irnpact on Greek GDP. The results are shown 
in Table 6.7: because of non-stationarity, the variables were first differenced. First 
differences are denoted by A and RES, -, is 
the lagged value of residuals from the 
cointegrating regression. 
Table 6.7. Empirical Results of Kollias (1995) Study 
Dependant Variable AY 
Coefficient t statistics 
Constant 0.022 2.69 
AM/Y 0.108 2.40 
A L/Y 0.122 1.96 
APOP -0.003 0.46 
AY, 
-, 
0.384 2.44 
RES, 
-, -0.103 
2.89 
A represents first difference of variables 
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Chletsos and Kollias (1995) investigated the relationship usmg OLS analysis covering the 
period 1974-1990. In this study, they hypothesised that military spending can have direct 
positive effects through aggregate demand stimulation and other spin-off effects and 
negative effect of military expenditure through crowding-out of investment. Their model 
is based on the typical Keynesian national income equation (GDP=C+I+G) and is of the 
f6flowing form: 
CONS=J'(MIY, PD1Y, MY, r (6.2) 
I=f(PDIG, Y-19 MIY, DUM2) (6.3) 
MIY=f(MLC, Y, DUMI, DUM2) (6.4) 
Y=f(CONS, I, M/r (6.5) 
Where CONS is total consumption expenditure as percentage of GDP, I is total investment 
expenditure as percentage of GDP, M/Y is the military spending as percentage of GDP, Y 
is gross domestic product at constant prices, PD/Y is the ratio of public deficits to GDP, 
PD/G is the ratio of public deficit to central government budget, IT is the ratio of indirect 
taxes to GDP, MLC is the ratio of per soldier spending of Greece over Turkey's acting as 
external threat variable, DUMI is Cyprus invasion dummy variable and DUM2 is 
government change dummy variable. Their fmdings are as predicted. Defence spending 
positively affects consumption and through it gross domestic product; on the other hand, 
the effect is negative on investment. Their results are shown in Table 6.8 
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Table 6.8. Empirical Results of Chletsos & Kollias (1995) Study 
CONS 
I 
I 
I 
M/Y 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
mly 0.01(2.19) PD/G -0.35 (-2.43) MLC 0.69(5.09) 
PD/Y 0.46(4-48) Y-1 0.00 (-2.31) Y 0.00(2.70) 
IT -9.25 (2.67) M/Y -0.01 (-1.61) DUM1 2.40(6.41) 
y 0,00 (-2.31) DUM2 0.02(l. 75) DUM2 0.25(l. 17) 
R2 0.89 R2 0.90 R2 0.79 
DW 2.03 DW 1.62 DW 1.79 
t statistics in parenthesis 
Antonakis (1996) analysed defence-growth relationship using simultaneous equation 
models and employed 3SLS estimation techniques. This complete model is: 
AYIY=ao+a, SIY+a 2 M1Y+a 3 PCI (6.6) 
ASIS=bo+b, MIY+b 2 AYIY+b 3 (AYIY*PCI) +b 4 INFRT 
(6.7) 
M/Y=c 
0 +(' 1 
PCI+c 
2 DUM+c 3 M/ Y(- 1) +C 4GA 
(6.8) 
Where AY/Y is output growth rate, S/Y is saving income ratio, M/Y is military burden, PCI 
is per capita GDP, INFRT is Mation, (AY/Y*PCI) is output growth rate multiplied by per 
capita GDP, GA is share of output devoted to expenditures on general administration and 
DUM is dummy variable for a continuous threat from Turkey after 1974. The empirical 
results are presented in Table 6.9. His findings are contrary to Kollias (1995) and Chletsos 
and Kollias (1995). Negative effect on growth and positive effect on saving are found. The 
study had a low R2 for the growth equation and the R2 is even lower for the saving equation. 
Therefore, the results were not robust. 
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Table 6.9. Empirical Results of Antonakis (1996) Study 
Growth Equation (AY/Y) Saving Equation (S/Y) 
J LDýefence 
Equation (M[Y) 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 8.48(2.39) Constant -10.98 (-1.77) Constant 6.31(7.10) 
S/Y 0.46(6.75) M/Y 2.82(2.19) PCI -0.03 (-3.70) 
M/Y -1.55 (-2.55) AY/Y 1.67(l. 56) DUM 1.63(6.12) 
PCI -0.06 (-1.70) (AY/Y*PCI) 0.01(0.30) mly-I 0.41(4.74) 
INFRT 0.15(0.82) GA -0.48 (-5.0) 
R21 0.37 1R21 0.14 1 
1R21 0.84 1 
t statistics in parenthesis 
The last paper analysing Greek defence-growth relationships came from Antonakis (1997). 
He used Feder model and estirnated Greek defence growth relationships between 1958- 
1991. The estirnated equations for this analysis are: 
AY=a I 
+p 
AL 
+7 
AM M (6.9) 
YYLmY 
AY, 
=a 
I 
+p 
AL 
+7 
AM 
yYLM 
Where (AY/Y) is growth rate of GDP, (I/Y) is investment ratio, (AL/L) is population 
growth rate and (AdM/M) and [(ANT/M)*(NI/Y)] are defence variables representing effect 
of defence spending on economic growth. After this study, he concluded that Greece's 
defence spending is detrirnental to its economic growth. (Table 6.10). However, the results 
are not robust. Although the coefficient of investment is statistically significant and positive, 
the det ence variable is only significant at the 101-7c level and the equation "explains- under 
5017c ofthe variation hi Lrowth rates. 
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Table 6.10. Empirical Results of Antonakis (1997) Study 
Dependant Variable AY/Y 
Equation 6.9 Equation 6.10 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -8.24 (-3.24) -8.45 (-3.31 
IN 0.55(5.56) 0.56(5.61) 
AUL -0.01(-0.01) -0.03 (-0.03) 
(AM/M)*(M[Y) -1.54 (1.71) 
AM/M -1 -0.10 (-1.80) 
R2 0.46 1 0.46 
t statistics in parenthesis 
Greek defence-growth studies were briefly reviewed above. The results are summarised in 
TAle 6.11, which are inconclusive. There are several shortcomings from these studies. In 
the Kolhas (1995) paper the model is not based on a theoretical framework. However, the 
paper employed recent econometric techniques. In the Chletsos and Kollias (1995) paper, 
theory entails simply ad hoc justification of the chosen set of regression. The sample period 
is relatively short. The short time period might have led to the introduction of bias in the 
11 11, 
* 
estirnates. In Antonakis (1996), first paper a Deger type model was employed and in the 
second paper (1997) he used a Feder type model. However, his data set, sample period, 
choice of variables and estimation techniques are rather different across the studies. This 
study employs level of variables for Deger type model and the defence equation is extracted 
tI rom standard demand for military expenditures model. In the second study, a Feder type 
estirnation, Cyprus dummy and trend variable are included in the model and also the 
stationarity of variables is considered. 
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Table 6.11 The Greek Defence-Growth Empirical Studies 
Author Model Sample Period Remarks Conclusion 
Kollias Production function 1963-1990 single equation, Positive and 
(1995) (Ad Hoc) cointegration and ERM significant effect of 
defence on growth 
Chletsos and Keynesian national 1974-1990 Four equations, Positive direct effect of 
Kollias income equation consumption, defence on growth, 
(1995) investment, military negative impact on 
and GDP equations, investment 
OLS estimations 
Antonakis Demand and 1958-1990 Three equations, Negative direct effect 
(1996) supply side (Deger) defence, saving, and of defence on growth, 
model growth equations. positive indirect effect. 
3SLS Net effect is negative 
Antonakis Feder model 1958-1991 Single equation, two 
_ 
Defence had a 
(1997) sectors i-nodel, military, negative impact on 
nonmilitary, OLS growth 
6.5. Empirical Analysis 
In Chapters 4 and 5, the defence-growth relationship was analysed using two different 
models for Turkey and it was found that Turkish defence spending is positively related to 
its economic growth. Of course, these results cannot be generahsed across countries. To 
facilitate comparison, this Chapter uses the models from Turkey to estimate a Greek 
defence-growth relationship using a highly sfi-nilar specification and sample periods to those 
employed in Chapters 4 and 5. This comparison is meaningful because Turkey and Greece 
are both members of NATO alliance, they both have a large armed forces relative to their 
population and their defence burdens are highest in the NATO. Due to data limitations, 
identical data series and sample period could not be used. The sample period for Greece is 
between 1958-1994 and population is proxied instead of the labour force. 
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6.5.1. Supply-side (Feder type) Analysis 
6.5.1.1. The Model and Specirications 
The model used in this section is extracted from Chapter 4. The model is developed by 
Feder (1983) for investigating export growth relationships but Ram (1986) redeveloped this 
model for analysing defence-growth relationship. The model used here is same as for 
Turkey 
The econometric form of models used are: 
(i) Two sector Feder model: 
AY=a 
+a _L+o 
AL 6E 
y y 0' 1yL 
+( 
1+6 
+ýýn) 
Ay 
(6.11) 
(ii) With separate externality effect and factor productivity differentials of defence 
expenditure: 
AY 16 AM AM 
=ao+ctl +pAL+ _0 +0 yyL( 1+6 
)Ym 
(6.12) 
Human capital is not included in the equations because such data are not reaRy 
available for Greece. Definition of variables and predictions are as specified in Chapter 4. 
6.5.1.2. Empirical Results 
Equation 6.11 and 6.12 are estimated using OLS. Table 6.12 reports empirical results from 
the estn-nation of equation 6.11 and 6.12 using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
methods. The results showed that the coefficient of investment is statistically significant and 
positive in both estimations. They are as expected, because economic growth of a 
developýig country is niamly stimulated by its mcreasmg capital stock. However, the 
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coefficient on the labour force variable is not statistically significant. The reason for this 
could be that population may not be a good proxy for labour force. Total effect of det'ence 
spending represented in equation 6.11 and it is insignificant and also estimates of equation 
6.12 gave insignificant results for defence size and defence externality variables. It ifnphes 
that the defence sector has no irnportant effect on economic growth in Greece. Factor 
productivity differentials between the defence sector and the rest of the economy are 
negative. It means the civilian sector is more productive than the military sector. The 
defence variables are insignificant for Greece, whereas. for Turkey, the defence variable is 
positive and significant. Turkey is at a relatively low stage of development when compared 
with Greece. Positive effects of defence spending mainly apply to LDCs, such as the 
creation of effective demand, enhancing human capital and the creation of the infrastructure. 
These might be reasons why positive relationships are found. 
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Table 6.12. Estimates of Equation 6.11 and 6.12 
Dependent variable: Econotnic growth 
Equation II Equation 12 
Independent variables Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.13*** -3.35 -0.13*** -3.43 
Investment 0.80*** 4.75 0.81 *** 4.81 
Labour Force -1.56 -1.14 -1.63 -1.2 
Defence size 1.29 1.55 -3.69 -0.79 
Defence externality - - 0.23 1.09 
Factor productivity 
Differential 
1 
-0.77 
1 
- 
Diagnostic Statistics 
R2 0.43 0.45 
DW 1.36 1.39 
(3,33) 8.5082*** 
1F 
stat. (4. 6.7218*** 
significant at 10 percent level 
significant at 5 percent level 
*** significant at I percent level 
The variables used in the estimation were measured as follows: Economic growth (AY/Y): 
Dependent vaf iable of the model is measured as the annual rate of growth of output. In order to do 
this, the difference between current value of the real GNP and previous year real GNP is divided by 
the previous years real GNP. Labour force (ALIL): growth rate of labour force. Greece's population 
is proxied due to unavailability of labour force data. The growth rate is calculated as explained 
above. Investment (I/Y): Investment GNP ratio. Real gross fixed capital of Greece is divided by 
previous year's real GNP. Defence size (AM/Y): The difference of real military expenditure 
between current and previous years are divided by the previous year real GNP. Defence externality 
(AM/M): Real growth rate of defence expenditure. It is calculated as in the above variables. 
In the estirnation, the R2s are relatively low. To investigate this problem, dummy variables 
are considered. Following Antonakis (1997). a trend variable is also be added into equation. 
Moreover, in July 1974, there was a Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. It greatly 
at ItI ected the Greek det'eiicc economy (Kollias, 1995) and from 1975, Greek defence 
expenditure increased substantially. Therefore, a Cyprus dummy should be included as well. 
Considering above discussions. cquatimis 6.11 and 6.12 are re-estinlated using trend and 
Cyprus dummy. The durnniv took value ofone betweeii 1975 and 1981 and zero elsewhere. 
The i-csults are also shown m Table 6.13. The first esth-nation (equation 6.11) Included the 
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trend variable. Addition of the trend gave significant and negative results, it improved the 
estimation results and the diagnostic statistics with higher R', but the defence variable 
remained insignificant. Secondly, both the Cyprus dummy and the trend variables were 
added into equation 6.11 then re-estimated and the results remained similar. While 
investment and the trend variable show significant and positive relationships with Greece 
economic growth, the Cyprus dummy and the defence variable are not statistically 
significant. It is evident that neither defence spending nor the Cyprus dummy is related to 
Greek economic growth. The Cyprus war caused an increase in Greek defence expenditure 
but Greek defence spending has no important effect on growth. Thereforc, the dummy 
variable did not give signillicant results. The same procedure was employed with equation 
6.12: this shows the separate defence size effect and externality effect of defence spending. 
Both defence variables are not statistically significant in all three estimations, but inclusion 
of a trend and the Cyprus durnmy variables improved the diagnostic statistics (Table 6.13). 
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Table 6.13. Estimates of Equation 6.11 and 6.12 with 
Trend and Cyprus Dummy 
Dependent variable: Econornic growth 
Equation 11 Equation II Equation 12 Equation 12 
Constant -0.04 
(-1.02) 
-0.06 
(-1.29) 
-0.05 -0.06 
Investment 0.59 
(3.43) 
0.61 
(3.37) 
0.60*** 
(3.49) 
0.6 1 
(3.38) 
Labour Force -1.49 
(-1.19) 
-1.09 
(-0.67) 
-1.55 
(-1.24) 
-1.32 
(480) 
Defence size 0.84 
(1. ()8) 
0.97 
(1.14) 
-3.06 
(-0.72) 
-2.80 
(-0.62) 
Defence externality 0.18 
(0.93) 
0.17 
(0.85) 
Cyprus dummy 
(-0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
Trend -0.01*** 
(-2.75) 
-0. ()1** 
(-2.44) 
0.01** 
(2.64) (-2.40) 
Factor productivity 
differential 
- - -0.74 -0.72 
R2 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 
DW 1.71 1.68 1.71 1.69 
F statistic 9.553*** 7.472*** 7.787*** 6.297 
t statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10 percent level 
significant at 5 percent level 
*** significant at I percent level 
For further investigation and to test reliability and robustness of the results, stationarity of 
the variables is tested. The same procedure used in Chapter 4 was employed. In Chapter 
4, due to non-stationarity ofvariables. first differences of variables are employed for final 
versions ofestirnation and this rnethod highly improved the empirical results for Turkey. 
Greek data was tested firstly for unit roots. The variables indeed showed unit roots and they 
became stationary after bcing, tu-st differenced (Table 6.14). 
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Table 6.14. Unit Root Tests in Levels and First Differences 
Unit Root in x1 Unit Root in Ax 1 
Variable (x) 
DF ADF DF ADF 
Growth -5.06** -5.0596** -9.165** -9.1653** 
Investment -3.437 -3.4374 -5.472** -5.472()** 
Labour -3.477 -3.4769 -7.335** -7.335 1 ** 
Defence size -5.633** -5.6330** -9.315** -9.3149** 
Defence externality -5.612** -5.6122** -9.399** -9.3988** 
Critical values I% -4.232 -3.623 -3.629 -3.629 
5% -3.539 -2.945 -2.947 -2.947 
The reported values are obtained from PC-Give 8.0 version by Doornik and Hendry, 1995. For calculated 
values intercept and trends are included in both DF and ADF equations for levels and intercept include for 
first differences. 
'where x represents level of variables and Ax represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at I 11c 
First differences of variables are re-estimated. The estU'nation results are shown in Table 
6.15. The trend variable is omitted because after the first difference of variables, the trend 
does not exist, but a Cyprus dummy is included (the constant represents the trend). It can 
be seen from the Table that the results remained almost the same. Significant and positive 
results are obtained for investment but the defence variables and Cyprus dummy gave 
insignificant results in all four different estirnations. Labour force is also insignificant. 
Labour force data rather than population for Greece is only available between 1965 and 
1994. Using labour force data, the equations were estimated for these years. but no 
significant results were obtained. These results are represented in Appendix 6.2. Despite 
all the different estfi-nations, no significai-it results were obtamed for defence spending. It 
suggests that Greece defence spending has no important effect on its economic growth. 
In this estimation. diagnostic tcst results are not vcrN, satisfactol-\,, the R2 's are very low and 
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the DW tests are very high indicating possible auto -correlation. 
Table 6.15 Estimates of Equations with 
First Differences of Variables 
Dependent variable: Economic growth (1959-1994) First Difference 
Equation II Equation II Equation 12 Equation 12 
Constant -0.02 
(-0.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.01 
(-0.59) 
Investment (first diff. ) 0.82*** 
(3.60) 
0.81*** 
(3.53) 
0.81*** 
(3.53) 
0.81 
(3.47) *** 
Labour Force (first diff. ) 1.70 
(1.19) 
1.68 
(1.16) 
1.55 
(1.01) 
1.52 
(0.97) 
Defence size (first diff. ) 0.84 
(1.26) 
0.84 
(1.23) 
-0.21 
(-0.06) 
-0.28 
(-0.07) 
Defence externality (first 
diff. ) 
- 0.05 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.30) 
Cyprus dummy 0.01 
(0.09) 
- 0.01 
(0.12) 
Factor productivity 
differential 
- - -0.13 -0.18 
R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 
DW 2.88 2.87 2.87 2.87 
F statistic 5.086*** 3.698** 3.728** 2.891** 
t statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10 percent level 
significant at 5 percent level 
*** significant at I percent level 
Because of insufficient tests statistics, an alternative estimation was performed (Table 6.16) 
using only first difference of investment and labour variables. Yet only these two variables 
were non-stationary in level (see Table 6.14). After estimation, the results remained almost 
the same. Coefficient of the investment variable is positive and significant and defence 
variables are insignificant. Moreover, the R2 's are improved and DW test statistics indicates 
no sign of auto-correlation. 
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Table 6.16 Estimates of Equations with First Differences of 
Investment and Labour Force Variables 
Dependent variable: Econornic growth 
Equation II Equation 12 
Constant 0.09 (8.23)*** 0.09 (8.03)*** 
Investment (first diff. ) 0.48 (2.57)*** 0.49 (2.55)*** 
Labour (first diff. ) 1.80(1.53) 2.03 (1.51) 
Defence size 0.25 (0.33) 2.01 (0.42) 
Defence externality -0.08 (-0.37) 
Trend -0.01 (-4.91)*** -0.01 (-4.85)*** 
R2 0.55 0.56 
DW 1.54 1.51 
F statistic 9.84*** 7.68*** 
t statistics in parentheses 
significant at 10 percent level 
significant at 5 percent level 
*** significant at I percent level 
FinaHy, Greece defence-growth association is estimated using four different versions of 
previously used Feder model. The results are presented in Table 6.17: the investment 
parameter is significantly positive in ah-nost all cases and labour force gave an insignificant 
result in all type of estirnations. Defence parameters (the size and externality) are not 
statistically significant in any cases. No significant effect of defence spending on Greece's 
cconomic growth is supported by four different types of estimations. It is clearly seen from 
these estirnation that while hivestment. is major determinants of Greek economic growth, the 
labour force and defence sector have no irnportant effects on growth. 
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Table 6.17 Estimation Results of Four Different Versions 
of Feder Model for Greece 
Dependent variable: Econornic growth 
Biswas and Ward et al. Ward and Alexander 
Ram (1986) (1991) Davis (1992) (1991) 
Constant -0.12*** 283.27** -0.12*** 13"** -0 (-3.00) (2.13) (-3.35) . (-3.18) 
Investment 0.76 -0.008 0.72*** 0.79***ý (4.39)*** (-0.10) (4.32) (4.45) 
Labour -1.61 0.06 -0.91 -1.60 (-1.15) (0.05) (466) (-1.10) 
Defence size 0.85 -5.37 -5.11 0.55 
effects (1.45) (483) (-0.75) (0.74) 
Defence externality 0.90 0.97 
(0.92) (0.99) 
Government size 0.02 -4.04 0.40 
effects (0. ()1) (-1.46) (0.58) 
Government -0.02 0.69* - 
externality (405) (1.70) 
Effect of export - 0.04 
t statistics in parentheses 
t statistics significant at the 0.10 level 
t statistics significant at the 0.05 level 
*** t statistics significant at the 0.01 level 
The econometric form of previously used some important Feder models are: 
Biswas and Ram (1986): 
AY_(,,, 
+, tlI+, 
A. L, ( 6 
+C 
AM M 
+8 yFL 1-6 
)mY 
Ward et al. (1991): (, 1/ ýý 
YAL+ 
_L-o AM-O. -ýLY- -L-O,, AN+O,, -LY+, ý L 1+6" -G 1+6 
nG 
Ward-Davis (1992): AY 
W. L+ AM+o A. M_ AN+O"AN+E 
TyL1 +6 yG 1+6,, yG 
AY I AL AM m AX x Alexander (1991): Bn 
LN+ Bn +B ---CE TY1,1-6n NY 1+6 MYI +6x IxY 
The variables used in the previous estimations were measured as follows: 
Economic growdi (AY/Y): Dependent variable ofthe model is measured as the annual rate of growth of 
output. In order to do t-his. the difference between current value ofreal GNP and previous year real GNP 
is divided by die previous ycars real GNP. Lahour Force (AL/L)- growth rate of labour force. Population 
gro,, vt-h rate of Greece were proxicd. Investment (I/)')- Investment GNP ratio. Real gross fixed capital of C, 
Greece is divided by previous ycar's real GNP. Defence si/c (-\Nl/)'): The difference ofreal military 
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expenditure between current and previous years are divided by the previous year real GNP. Defence 
externality (AM/M): Real growth rate of defence expenditure. It is calculated same as above variables. AY: 
Difference between current year GNP and previous year GNP. AL: Difference between current Nvar 
population and previous year population. AM: Difference between current year defence spending and 
previous year defence spending. AN: Difference between current year non-defence government spending 
and previous year non-defence government spending. AM/G: AM divided by previous year total government 
spending. AN/G: AN divided by previous year total government spending. AY: Difference between current 
year GNP and previous year GNP. AX/Y: Share of export in GNP. [(AX/X)*(X/Y)]: Growth rates of export 
multiply by share of export in GNP. 
When these results are compared with Turkey's (Chapter 4), the investment Nariable is 
positive and significant both in Turkey and Greece. While the labour force has a positive 
fi-npact on Turkish economic growth, the variable is insignificant for Greece. For Turkey, 
labour force data are used but due to the unavaflabflity of labour force data, Greece's 
population is proxied, so this may be the reason why the labour force is insignificant for 
Greece. Turning to defence variables, the total effect of defence spending is positive for 
Turkey and externalities from the defence sector to the rest of the economy are negative. 
The effects are insignificant for Greece. This implies that while Turkish military expenditure 
stimulates its economic growth, Greece defence spending has no important effect on 
Greece's economy. The results also suggest that the effect of defence spending differs 
across countries. Turkey and Greece are very sirnilar in many ways (high defence burden, 
similar security concern, sh-nilar defence industrial base and large armed forces). 
Components of defence spending in these two countries are different. While Greece spends 
rnore for military personnel, Turkey spends more for equipment. Turkish military is heavily 
involved in health, education and infrastructure (see Chapter 7). 
Furthermore, the Feder model gcnerafly Lives a smafl positive effect of defence spending or 
no significant effcct of defence spending on economic growth. To obtain robust results of 
the Greek defence-g, ro xv t li rclationships. the analysis should be performed using alternative 
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methods and models. Turkish defence-growth relationships were firstly analysed with Feder 
model then secondly, the Deger model was used for analysing Turkish defence- growth 
relationships in Chapters 4 and 5. Both analyses showed that Turkish defence spendm(-, is 
positively correlated to its economic growth. The same method will be employed for 
Greece. The next section will analyse Greek defence-growth relationships with an 
alternative model. 
6.5.2. Demand and Supply-side (Deger type) Analysis 
6.5.2.1. The Model and Specifications 
The results reported thus far all are based on various version of the Feder type model. To 
study whether these results are model- invariant, this sub-section runs the data through a 
Deger type model, essentially the same one used for the analysis of Turkey. Both model 
types showed that Turkish defence spending is positively related to its economic growth. 
The results for Greece are presented below. 
The equations for this analysis are constructed as follows": 
Y=ao+a I 
S+a 
2 M+a 3 B+a 4p (6.13) 
S=b +b M+b, Y+b B+b INFRT 0134 (6.14) 
B-c0+cIY+c 2 M+(-, EXCRT (6.15) 
m=do+d, PCI+d2DUMCYP+d 3 TUR-, +d4NATO-, (6.16) 
19 
The modcl and its variables arc cxtensn'cly explained in Chapicr 5. 
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Definition of variables and predictions are as specified in Chapter 5. Equation 6.13 is the 
same as Chapter 5 but for Greece, population is proxied for labour force. For saving. the 
same equation is constructed. In the balance of trade equation, dummy variables arc 
excluded because they were related to Turkish economy and finally, the defence equation 
is the same as in the previous Chapter. 
6.5.2.2. Empirical Results 
Table 6.19 reports the estimates for the equation system (6.13 to6.16) using OLS, 2SLS and 
3SLS estimation techniques. The approach is sirnilar to that used in Chapter 5. Firstly, the 
variables are tested for unit roots and due to non-stationarity, all the variables first 
differenced and they became stationary after being first differenced (Table 6.18). 
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Table 6.18. Unit Root Tests in Levels and First Differences 
Unit Root in xI Unit Root in Ax 1 
Variable (x) 
DF ADF DF ADF 
y -1.539 -0.299 -5.189** -5.188** 
S -1.96 -1.583 -6.328** -6.328** 
B -1.522 -3.986* -6.732** -6.731** 
m -1.324 -0.913 -5.724** -5.724** 
p 0.342 -1.303 -3.482** -3.48 1* 
INFRT -2.56 -2.942 -6.922** -6.922** 
PCI -2.392 -0.015 -4.106** -4.106** 
TUR -3.147* -3.100 -4.888** -4.888** 
NATO -0.500 -2.999 -6.16** -6.159** 
Critical I% -3.623 -4.232 -3.629 -3.629 
values 517( -2.945 -3.539 -2.947 -2.947 
The reported values are obtained from PC-Give 8.0 version by Doornik and Hendry, IM. For 
calculated values intercept and trends are included in both DF and ADF equations for levels and 
intercept include for first differences. 
'where x represents level of variables and Ax represents first differences of variables. 
Y is GDP, S is gross domestic savings, B is balance of trade, M is defence expenditure, P is 
population, INFRT is annual inflation mtc. PCI is per capita income, TUR is Turkish defence 
burden and NATO is average NATO defence burden excluding Turkey and Greece. 
significant at 5% 
* sign ifican t at I% 
The estirnation results in Table 6.19 show that in equation (6.13), the saving and defence 
variables are positively correlated to economic growth. These results are consistent with 
the previous Chapter. In Chapter 5, the estimated results showed that Turkish economic 
growth is stimulated by its saviiigs and its defence spending. These results apply for Greece. 
On the other hand, balance of trade as a proxy of capital inflows from abroad and population 
as a proxy oflabour force showcd insignificant results. It may be that they are not very 
good proxies. Three different cstirnations (OLS, 2SLS. 3SLS) showed very similar results. 
The second eqUation ii-i this analysis is the saving cquation (6.14) that Greece's gross 
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savmgs are positively correlated to its income. However, saviýigs are negatiý-ely correlated 
with its defence expenditure. Balance of trade and inflation variables did not give significant 
results. When these results are compared with Turkey's. Turkish defence spending showed 
no significant effect on its saving. However, the effect is negative and statisticaUy significant 
tI or Greece. It implies that increasing defence expenditure in Greece will cause lower 
savings level, hence lower investment (crowding-out). The results are not so different In the 
three types of estimation. The third equation balance of trade (6.15) did not give any 
significant results. The R' is very low (0.12) and no variables seem significant. The main 
reason for this may be inaccurate data. For balance of trade, both exports of goods and 
services in national accounts minus fi-nports of goods and services in national accounts and 
merchandise exports mirýus merchandise imports are proxied. Both proxies gave very 
similar results. In Chapter 5, Turkish balance of trade is mainly affected by its exchange rate 
and its mcome but for Greece, these variables are not significant. The results were not 
expected. Because of fixed exchange rate regimes of many LDCs, balance of trade data are 
not very accurate for time series. 
The final equation in this esth-nation is the defence equation (6.16). The same equation used 
iii Chapter 5 is estimated and only the Cyprus dummy gave significant results in 2SLS and 
3SLS estirnation. It showed Cyprus war caused an increasing trend in Greece defence 
spending. The dummy took a value of one between 1975-1981 and zero elsewhere. 
Although the results of growth and the saving equation are acceptable, the results of balance 
of trade and defence equations are weak and their diagnostic tests are not satisfactory. They 
exhibit a very low R2. 
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Table 6.19. Estimation Results 
Exogenous 
variables 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Constant 241.33 (4.63)*** 242.19 (3.47)*** 218.66 (6.02)*** 
Growth AS 0.95 (7.78)*** 1.24 (7.99)*** 1.23 (10.61)**: 1 
AB -0.06 (0.70) -0.01 (-0.02) -0.09 (-0.31) 
equation AM 1.20 (2.58)** 1.99 (2.84)*** 2.47 (3.86)*** 
A 5.58(0.07) 212.01 (-0.21) 30.06 (0.09) 
Diagnostic R 2: 0.66 a: 171.92 181.57 
tests DW: 1.33 
Saving Constant -137.5 (-4.46)*** -162.30 (-4.42)*** -178.23 (-5.55): ': "ý 
equation 
AM -0.96 (2.28)** -2.78 (-2.68)** -2.12 (3.79)*** 
AB 0.02(0.20) -0.04 (-0.19) 0.02(0.11) 
AY 0.63 (7.60)*** 0.75 (7.45)*** 0.81 (10.71)*** 
AINF -1.77 (0.61) 
1 
-5.88 (-1.11) 0.01 (0.01) 
Diagnostic R': 0.68 a: 142.92 (7: 149.54 
tests DW: 1.99 
Balance of Constant -5.97 (-0.16) -1.18 (-0.02) -0.69 (-0.01) 
trade equation 
AY -0.06 (-0.73) -0.09 (-0.73) -0.09 (-0.78) 
AM -0.70 (-1.72)* -0.26 (-0.35) -0.15 (-0.21) 
AEXRT -0.16 (-0.21) -0.21 (-0.20) -0.20 (419) 
Diagnostic Rý: 0.12 a: 183.13 a: 183.33 
DW: 2.49 
Defence Constant 1.13 (0.07) 1.13(0.07) -3.00 (-0.20) 
equation 
APCI 0.18(0.54) 0.18(0.55) 0.24(0.75) 
ATUR, 2.40(0.11) 2.40(0.11) -0.80 (-0.04) 
ANATO, 53.20 (0.71) 53.20 (0.74) 19.07 (0.26) 
DLTMCYP 52.78 (2.09) 52.78 (2.12)** 56.29 (2.34)** 
Diagnostic R2: 0.17 57.53 57.85 
tests DW: 2.01 
t statistics in the parenthesis 
For 2SLS estimation; loglik= -748.13 T= 36 and LR test of over -iden tifyin g restrictions: Chl'(21) 
300.97 
[0.0000]; For 3SLS estimation. loglik= -736.07 T= 36 and LR test of over-identifying restrictions: 
Ch i2 (21) 
= 276.85 [0.0000] 
The variables were measured as follows: AY= real gross national product (first difference); AS= real 
gross saving (first difference), AB= real balance of trade (first difference); AM= Real defence 
expenditure (first difference)-, AP= Population growth (first difference); APCI= Per capita income 
(first difference). AEXRT= Real exchangc rate (first difference); ATUR-I= Lagged Turkish military 
expenditures asa share of GDP (first difference). ANATO-, = Lagged average shares of defence burden 
of NATO countries (cxcluding Greece and Turkey) (first difference); DUMCYP= Dummy variable 
took value of one for the yeLrs 1975 to 1981 and zero elsewhere; Notes: All computations in this study 
havc been carried out by PC-GIVE 8.0 and PC-FIML 8.0 (Sce Doornik and Hendry. 1994; 1995) 
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In the defence equation, the lagged variables ATUR-1 and ANATO-, gave insignificant 
results, the variables were positive and significant for Turkey. It may be well that Greek 
defence spending does not react with a lag to Turkish defence spending but Mstead reacts 
instantaneously. Therefore the equation system was re-run replacing the lagged variable 
ATUR-1 and ANATO-I with ATUR and ANATO. The results are shown in Table 6.20. 
The first three equations gave very sh-nflar results with ii-nproving diagnostic tests. In the 
growth equation, coefficient of saving and defence are positive and significant. In the saviiig 
equation, coefficient of defence is negative and significant but output is positively correlated. 
Poor results for the balance of trade equation remained. The empirical results of defence 
equation are highly hmproved. ATUR variable is positively correlated to Greece defence 
spending. It suggests that Greece instantly responds to the Turkish defence spending. 
Greece defence spending is determined by its incorne, Turkey's defence spending, and 
Cyprus war (Table 6-20). 
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Table 6.20. Estimation Results 
Exogenous 
variables 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
G h 
Constant 241.33 (4.63)*** (3.43)*** 220.87 (5.15)*** 
row 
equation 
AS 0.95 (7.78)*** 1.26 (7.91)*** 1.25 (8.50)*** 
AB -0.06 (0.70) -0.04 (-0.08) 0.01 (0.01) 
AM 1.20 (2.58)** 2.08 (2.49)** 2.41 (3.41)*** 
AP 5.58(0.07) -249.96 (-0.26) -46.94 (-0.10) 
Diagnostic R-: 0.66 (7: 175.24 180.78 
tests DW: 1.33 
Saving Constant -137.5 (-4.46)*** -160.73 (-4.07)*** -174.09 (-4.66)*** 
equation AM -0.96 (2.28)** -2.81 (-2.60)** -1.99 (-2.54)" 
AB 0.02(0.20) -0.24 (-0.61) -0.18 (-0.50) 
AY 0.63 (7.60)*** 0.76 (6.86)*** 0.78 (7.67)*** 
AINF -1.77 (0.61) -9.12 (1.46) 1.27(0.42) 
Diagnostic R: 0.68 
---- 
cy: 156.72 150.19 
tests 17 1.99 
Mdance of Constant -5.97 (-0.16) -6.82 (418) -9.64 (-0.26) 
trade equation AY -0.06 (-0.73) -0.65 (-1.13) -0.63 (-1.12) 
AM -0.70 (-1.72)* -0.06 (-0.73) -0.06 (-0.71) 
AEXRT -0.16 (-0.21) 
I 
-0.19 (-0.24) -0.28 (-0.39) 
Diagnostic R': 0.12 (T: 135.53 (7: 135.59 
tests DW: 2.49 
Defence Constant -2.98 (-0.26) -1.01 (-0.09) -2.58 (424) 
equation APCI 0.48 (1.79)* 0.40(l. 47) 0.53 (2.00)** 
ATUR 54.77 (3.29)*** 54.28 (3.30)*** 45.00 (2.93)*** 
ANATO 123.92 (1.87)* 101.4 (1.64) 134.92 (2.43)** 
DLJMCYP 39.76 (1.98)"* 40.0 (2.00)** 42.24 (2.39)** 
Diagnostic R-: 0.47 (Y: 45.0 46.39 
tests DW: 2.26 
1 
1 
t statistics in the parenthesis 
For 2SLS estimation; lo(, Iik= -817.88 = 37 and LR test of over- iden tifyin g restrictions: Ch 12( 13) 
421.61 
[0.0000]; For 3SLS estimation, loglik= -790.57 T= 37 and LR test of over-identifying restrictions: 
CIji2( 13) 
= 366.99 [0.0000] 
The variables were measured as follows: AY= real gross national product (first difference), AS= real 
gross saving (first difference), AB= real balance of trade (first difference); AM= Real defence 
expenditure (first difference)-, AP= Population growth (first difference); APCI= Per capita income 
(first differencc)-, AEXRT= Real exchange rate (first difference); AINFRT= Inflation rate (first 
difference); ATUR= Turkish military expenditures as a share of GDP (first difference); ANATO= 
Average share of defence burden of NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) (first difference); 
DUMCYP= Dummy variable took value of I for the years 1975 to 1981 and zero elsewhere; Notes: All 
computations in this study have been carrlcd out by PC-GIVE 8.0 and PC-FIML 8.0 (See Doornik and 
Hendry. 1994,1995) 
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Balance of trade equation gave inaccurate results. Therefore, in final estimation, this 
equation is omitted and the results are presented in Table 6.2 1. The results suggest that 
Greek economic growth is positively affected by its gross savings and defence expenditure 
and Greek gross savings are negatively affected by its defence expenditure. Akjor 
determinants of Greece defence spending are its income level and Turkish defence 
expenditure. Greece response to Turkish defence spending is instant with no lag. 
In this model, the multiplier of military expenditure on growth can be calculated as: 
ay alb, +a 2_ (0.95) * (-0.96) +1.20 
=0.71 2M 1 -alb 21- (0.95 * 0.63) 
The multiplier is positive, suggesting that the net effect of Greek defence expenditure is 
positive in this model and estirnation (the multiplier for Turkey is 0.92). 
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Table 6.21. Estimation Results 
Exogenous 
variables 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Constant 241.33 (4.63)*** 244.89 (3.75)*** 204.65 (5.34)*** 
Growth equation 
AS 0.95 (7.78)*** 1.29 (7.80)*** 1.26 (7.82)* ý* 
AB -0.06 (0.70) 0.05 (0.28) -0.04 (-0.26) 
AM 1.20 (2.58)** 2.35 (3.14)*** 2.27 (3.11)*** 
Ap 5.58(0.07) -416.47 (-0.45) 211.48 (0.58) 
Diagnostic R-': 0.66 cv: 185.26 cy: 183.01 
tests DW: 1.33 
Saving Equation Constant -137.5 (-4.46)*** -159.49 (-4.00)*** -173.48 (4.58)*** 
AM -0.96 (2.28)** -2.83 (-3.02)*** -2.00 (2.85)*** 
AB 0.02(0.20) -0.06 (0.44) 0.04(0.38) 
AY 0.63 (7.60)*** 0.78 (6.91)*** 0.80 (7.39)*** 
AINF -1.77 (0.61) -9.36 (-1.60) -1.05 (-0.38) 
Diagnostic R': 0.68 a: 158.70 146.88 
tests DW: 1.99 
Defence Constant -2.98 (-0.26) -1.99 (-0.19) -3.45 (-0.34) 
equation 
APCI 0.48 (1.79)* 0.45 (1.75)* 0.54 (2.18)** 
ATUR 54.77 (3.29)*** 34.93 (2.02)** 30.96 (2.33)** 
ANATO 123.92 (1.87)* 92.70 (1.61) 115.03 (2.68)** 
DLTMCYP 39.76 (1.98)** 38.98 (2.09)** 41.54 (2.82)*** 
Diagnostic R-: 0.47 (T: 41.88 cv: 43.25 
tests DW: 2.26 
t statistics in the parenthesis 
For 2SLS estimation; loglik= -620.57 T= 37 and LR test of over-identifying restrictions: Ch i2 (8) 
371.95 [0.0000]; For 3SLS estimation; loglik= -538.03 T= 37 and LR test of over-identifying 
restrictions: CIji2 (8) = 206.87 [0.00001 
The variables were measured as follows: AY= real gross national product (first difference); AS= real 
-ross saving (first difference); AB= real balance of trade (first difference); AM= Real defence 
expenditure (first difference); AP= Population growth (first difference); APCI= Per capita income 
(first difference)-, AINFRT= Inflation rate (first difference); ATUR= Turkish military expenditures 
as a share of GDP (first difference); ANATO= Average share of defence burden of NATO countries 
(excluding Greece and Turkey) (first difference); DLTMCYP= Dummy variable took value of I for the 
years 1975 to 1981 and zero elsewhere; Notes: All computations in this study have been carried out by 
PC-GIVE 8.0 and PC-FIML 8.0 (See Doornik and Hendry, 1994; 1995) 
6.5.2.3. Some Results from Cointegration Analysis 
In Chapter 5, sorne results from an error correction mechanism were presented to show the 
long-run and short-run solutions. To test the reliability of the results and to make a sirnilar 
comparative study, the same analysis was carried out for Greece. The equation used for 
Deger type analysis are rc-cstimatiod using Engle-Graiiuer (1987) mechanism. ItiSshown tý 
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in Table 6.14 that the variables are non-stationary in level and stationary when they are first 
differenced. 
Table 6.22 The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-run) 
Estimation for Growth Equation 
Constant S B m p Trend 
y 2861.2 1.133*** -0.189 1.662*** -157.69 260.4()*** 
t statistics 0.827 10.435 -0.998 5.106 -0.371 8.945 
Statistics 
R2 0.99 F statistics 3427 (0000) 
ADF -3.515*** DF 3.811*** 
Y is GDP, S is gross domestic savings, B is balance of trade, M is defence expenditure, P is population, 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Engle-Granger suggest the two step procedure for cointegration analysis. Firstly, a long- 
run relationship is estfi-nated (Table 6.22). In this Table, DF and ADF test results indicate 
that cointegration exists. In the long run, savings and defence spending affect economic 
growth positively and balance of trade and population did not show any significant results. 
The second stage of Engle-Granger mechanism is to estimate first differences of variables 
using first lag of the residuals. The results are shown in Table 6.23, and are similar. Savings 
and defence spending are positively correlated to economic growth. In the short run, 
balance of trade gave negative and statisticafly significant result. RES, -, gave a negative and 
significant result, as expected. The findings are consistent with 2SLS and 3SLS fmdings. 
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Table 6.23. The Engle-Granger Second Stage (Short-run 
and ECM) Estimation for Growth Equation 
Dependent Variable AY 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coe icient t statistics probability 
Constant 187.26*** 4.21 0.00 
AS 0.89*** 9.67 0.00 
AB -0.27** -2.15 0.03 
AM 1.07*** 3.04 0.00 
AP 1028.2 1.63 0.11 
RESt-I -0.66*** -4.43 0.00 
Summary Statistics 
R2 0.81 SE 119.40 
DW 1.41 F (5,30) 25.936 
Where A represents first differences of variables. Y is GDP, S is gross domestic 
savings, B is balance of trade, M is defence expenditure, P is population, and RES,, 
is Residuals from cointegrating regression. L represents natural logarithms and A 
represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 517c 
*** significant at 1% 
The same procedure was used for the saving equation. In the long-run Greek defence 
spending has a negative effect on its gross domestic savings. The effect is the same in the 
short run. It fi-nplies that Greek defence spending is harmful for its savings. The residuals 
are also negative and significant as expected. The saving equation results are also consistent 
with 2SLS and 3SLS findings (Table 6.24 and 6.25). 
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Table 6.24. The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-run) 
Estimation for Saving Equation 
Constant y B m INFRT Trend 
S -1070.7*** 0.72*** 0.15 -0.92*** 1.69 -180.9*** 
t statistics -7.16 11.58 1.06 -3.43 0.42 -10.27 
Statistics 
R2 0.95 F statistics 121.6*** (000) 
DF -4.292*** ADF -3.844*** 
Where Y is CiDP, S is gross domestic savings, B is balance of trade, M is defence expenditure, 
INFRT is annual inflation rate. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Table 6.25. The Engle-Granger Second Stage (Short-run 
and ECM) Estimation for Saving Equation 
Dependent Vairiable AS 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t statistics probability 
Constant 199.48*** -6.88 0.00 
AY 0.81 10.59 0.00 
AB 0.14 1.33 0.19 
AM -0.80** -2.14 0.04 
AINFRT 4.07 1.23 0.22 
RES, 
-, -0.69*** -4.16 
0.00 
Summary Statistics 
R2 0.80 SE 107.84 
DW 1.60 F (5,30) 24.822*** 
Where A represents first differences of variables. Y is GDP, S is gross domestic 
savin, gs. B is balance of trade, M is defence expenditure, INFRT is annual inflation 
rate and RES, -, 
is residuals from cointegrating regression. L represents natural 17, logarithms and A represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 101/( 
significant at 
significant at I(/(' 
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Finally, cointegration analysis is used on the defence equation. The results showed that 
cointegration exists (Table 6.26). In the long run, the determinants of Greek defence 
spending are per capita income, average NATO defence spending and the Cyprus contlict. 
Turkish defence spending seems an insignificant determinant of Greek defence spending in 
the long run (see Table 6.26). 
Table 6.26. The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-run) 
Estimation for Defence Equation 
Constant PCI TUR NATO CYP Trend 
m -2150.3 0.77 7.65 410.69 94.55 15.56 
t statistics -4.89*** 4.05*** 0.29 4.87*** 1.95-* 2.59** 
Statistics 
R2 0.93 F statistics 84.315 (0000) 
DF -3.031*** ADF -2.931*** 
ADF -2.931 
Where Y is GDP, M is defence expenditure, PCI is per capita income, TUR is Turkish defence 
burden and NATO is averagle NATO defence burden excluding Turkey and Greece, CYP is 
Cyprus dummy. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 117c 
The short-run dynamics of Greece defence spending are represented in Table 6.27. In the 
short-run, Greek defence spending is determined by its income, Turkey's defence spending, 
average NATO defence spending and the Cyprus conflict. The results are very sirnflar to 
the long-run but the difference is that Turkish defence spending positively affects Greek 
defence spending in the short run, but not in the long run. 
In ueneral the evidence from cointegrating regressions are consistent with findings of 2SLS 
and 3SLS estirnation. They support the general fmdmLs of this study. 
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Table 6.27. The Engle-Granger Second Stage (Short-run 
and ECM) Estimation for Defence Equation 
Dependent Variable AM 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coe icient t statistics probability 
Constant -0.17 -0.16 0.98 
APCI 0.45* 1.65 0.10 
ATUR 46.16*** 2.84 0.00 
ANATO 149.97** 2.35 0.02 
ACYP 37.39* 1.95 0.06 
RESt-, -0.26** 2.14 0.03 
Summary Statistics 
R2 0.54 SE 44.10 
DW 2.09 F (5,30) 7.1303*** 
Where A represents first differences of variables. M is defence expenditure, PCI is 
per capita income, TUR is Turkish defence burden and NATO is average NATO 
defence burden excluding Turkey and Greece, CYP is Cyprus dummy and RES, -, 
is residuals from cointegrating regression. 
significant at 1017c 
significant at 517c 
*** significant at 117c 
The results for Turkey and Greece are shown in Table 6.28. While both models suggest a 
positive effect of defence spending on Turkish economic growth, the results for Greece are 
iiiconclusive. Interestingly. the Fcder model did not give any significant results for Greece. 
A Feder model only considers the supply-side of an economy. Supply side considerations 
might be less irnportant for the Greek defence sector which is based on arms imports. On 
the other hand. on the dernand side, the Greek defence sector showed a positive effect on 
economic i, -rowth. 
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Table 6.28. Comparative Results 
Greece Turkev 
Feder Effect of defence size on growth Insignificant Positive 
Model 
Externality effect of defence on Insignificant Negative 
growth 
Deger Effect of defence spending on Positive Positive 
Model growth 
Effect of defence spending on Negative Insignificant 
saving 
Effect of defence spending on Insignificant 
balance of trade 
Determinants of defence spending Per capita *Per capita 
income income 
,, Turkish Greek defence 
defence expenditure 
expenditure *The conflict 
*Cyprus war with PKK 
1 *Cyprus war 
6.6. Conclusions 
This Chapter briefly surveyed the Greece economy and intensively investigated its defence- 
growth relationship. The results were compared to Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for Turkey. 
To ease comparison, in both cases Feder type models (supply-side) and Deger type (demand 
and supply-side) were used for the time period 1958-1994. 
Various conclusions may be drawn. Both Greece and Turkey carry high defence burdens 
and both use large conscripted armed forces. Both began to establish an indigenous arms 
industry at a similar tifne. Even so, both are major arms importers and only minor arms 
exporters. But with respect to the economic impact of military spending on their respectiVe 
economies, the countries differ significantly. tý 
The estimation vvith a supply side model showed that Greek defence expenditure has no 
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significant impact on its economic growth. Defence size and externality effects are non- 
significant. However, like Turkey, the factor productivity differential is negative implying 
the defence sector is less productive in the Greece economy. 
But when a Deger type demand and supply-side model is estimated, the results are different. 
They suggest that Greek defence spending has a statistically significant positive direct effect 
on economic growth but an indirect and statistically significant negative effect on gross 
savings. The net effect is positive. The estimated model also suggest that the maýjor 
determinants of Greek defence spending are its per capita income, contemporaneous rather 
than lagged, Turkey defence spending, the Cyprus War in 1974, as well as NATO's military 
expenditure. 
In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that the defence-growth relation for Greece Is 
inconclusive. While the Feder type model suggests no significant trade-off between defence 
spending and growth, the Deger type model suggests a positive net effect of defence 
spending on economic growth for Greece. The results are different when different models 
are used. Esth-nation with a demand and supply-side (Deger type) model suggest that 
Greece defence spending has a significant positive direct effect on economic growth and a 
significant negative indirect effect on gross savings. The calculated multiplier showed that 
the net cffect is positive. The models also suggest that the major determinants of Greece 
dcfence spending are its income, Turkish defence spending and NATO's average 
expenditures. Cyprus disputes also positively affected Greece defence spending. 
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The evidence from cointegration analysis are consistent with the findings of Deger type 
analysis. 
Finafly, the effect of defence spending differs across the countries even when the countries 
are very similar, as in the case of Turkey and Greece are similar (defence burden, economic 
structure, threat, defence industrial base). Very similar time perods and same models were 
deliberately used to estiý-nate Greece's and Turkey's defence-growth trade-offs in this 
Chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5. Although Turkey's defence sector appears to stimulate 
economic growth, the results are inconclusive for Greece. 
In this study, Greece was used as a reference point and comparator for the results from 
Turkey. The airn was to see if the Turkey results generalise to sh-nilar countries. This 
Chapter has shown that they do not. 
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CHAPTER 7 
A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS OF DEFENCE 
EXPENDITURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
7.1. Introduction 
So far, the study has discussed how total defence spending affects economic growth. 
However, the effects of sub-components of defence expenditure were not considered 
separately. Defence spending was accepted as homogeneous spending. In this Chapter, the 
relationship between economic growth and defence spending is analysed using disaggregated 
defence expenditure data- an approach which has not been used in the literature. The main 
aim of this Chapter is to check the robustness of the estimates and to make a further 
original contribution by testing for the effects of sub-components of defence spending 
on econon-& growth. 
This Chapter also shows how defence equipment spending affects economic growth across 
two countries. Previous Chapters showed that the defence spending of each country 
(Greece and Turkey) has a different effect on their economic growth. The defence data of 
NATO countries show how defence expenditure is allocated between equipment, personnel, 
infrastructure and other operational inputs (capital and labour). Personnel and other 
operational cxpcnditures dominate defence budgets (an average of 72.6'7'(-, for Turkey and 
75.217c for Greece for 1990-1994: Table 7.1). Equipment spending is also an important 
component of dcfence spending. This spending MCIUdes R&D spendmg in the NATO 
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classification. The composition of defence spending in Turkey and Greece is different. This 
might cause different impacts on economic growth because of different capital-labour ratios, 
coi-nbination of military manpower, the impact of each countries' defence industrial base 
(including R&D, technology) and arms imports capacity. The different components of 
defence expenditure are likely to have different impacts on a nation's growth rate. 
The plan of this Chapter is as follows. In section 7.2. disaggregated data and its availability 
are described. In section 7.3. the model and methodology is discussed. Sections 7.4 and 
7.5 are devoted to empirical analysis. Section 7.6 discusses the findings and the last section 
7.7 presents conclusions. 
7.2. Disaggregated Data 
Defence expenditure can affect the economy through a iiumber of channels because defence 
expenditure includes different types of spending. They are personnel spending, equipment 
spending (include R&D), infrastructural spending and other operational spending. NATO 
publishes disaggregated defence data for its member countries showing four types of 
defence spending (equipment, personnel, infrastructure, other). However, the data set have 
lirnitations. Firstly, the four groups of data are only available after 1985. Between 1975 and 
1985, NATO published percentage of defence equipment in total defence spending. Non- 
equipment defence spending as a whole can be calculated from these data. Although NATO 
publishes an average of four year data (such as 1970-1974,1975-179), these data are not 
available on annual basis. Arinual equipment spending data for Greece are available from 
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1977. Table 7.1 shows a brief disaggregated data for Turkey and Greece 20 . 
The 
disaggregated data do not show the proportion of equipment spending which goes to arms 
imports. This might be important for determining the effect of disaggregated defence 
spending on economic growth, but the data are not available. 
Table 7.1. Disaggregated Defence Expenditure Data for Turkey and Greece 
20 
Period Equipment % Personnel % Infrastructure % Other 
Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece Turkey Greece 
Average 
1975-79 
19.2 19.3 47.6 57.6 7.3 5.3 23.7 17.0 
Average 
1980-84 
9.1 17.4 45.3 54.6 13.2 2.8 30.1 24.9 
Average 
1985-89 
18.2 18.2 37.1 
1 
60.5 5.4 2.2 38.4 18.4 11 
Average 
1990-94 
23.7 22.8 50.1 63.0 3.0 1.7 22.5 12.2 
1986 17.9 15.8 33.3 61.8 6.1 1.9 42.6 20.5 
1987 21.2 17.2 34.7 61.7 5.9 1.9 38.3 19.2 
1988 22.5 23.3 35.6 58.2 4.5 2.3 37.5 16.1 
1989 18.5 21.9 42.3 61.5 4.0 2.6 35.2 14.0 
1990 20.7 21.8 46.1 63.7 
1 
3.4 3.3 29.8 11.2 
1991 22.7 20.3 48.5 64.4 2.8 1.7 26.0 13. 61 
1992 24.8 23.4 48.7 61.4 3.5 2.4 23.0 12.8 
1993 22.9 24.7 54.5 62.2 2.9 2.6 19.7 10.5 
1994 29.3 24.4 51.0 63.0 2.6 0.6 17.1 12.0 
1995 29.7 19.8 50.9 63.3 2.5 1.9 16.9 14.9 
1996 35.1 21.1 
1 
42.7 61.2 
1 
2.6 1.5 
1 
19.6 16.2 
1997e 32.6 19.4 43.7 62.2 3.0 2.1 20.7 16.2 
NATO Review*, Spring, 1998, January. 1996 
e: estimate 
Note: R&D expenditure are included in equipment expenditures 
Appendix 7.1. provide full data sct used in thk Chapter 
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Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 illustrates the distribution of defence expenditure in Turkey and 
Greece. It can be seen from the Table that in both countries, the majority of the defence 
spending goes to personnel. In 1997.43.767(- of Turkey's defence spending was for 
personnel and this figure is even higher for Greece (62.2%). On the other hand, equipment 
spending figures for Turkey were 32.61/; ( and 19.4-7(-. for Greece. The trend over the th-ne 
is similar. The share figures might reflect the relatively low cost of military personnel in 
Turkey (differences in definitions are a further possibility but this is unlikely for NATO 
data). Turkey's equipment spending and also equipment shares are higher than Greece's 
while Greek defence personnel spending is always higher than Turkey. Figure 7.1 shows 
that Turkish defence equipment spending represents an increasing trend between 1986-1997. 
Spending on personnel in Turkey shows an increasing trend until 1996. A decreasing trend 
can be seen from infrastructural spending over the years. It is as expected, because the need 
tI or mtrastructure is likely to decrease when countries are developed. Other operational 
spending also shows a decreasing trend. It shows that personnel and equipment spending 
became more important In total defence spending, because higher technology causes higher 
spending on equipment and needs skilled personnel, so causing an increase in personnel 
spending. 
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Figure 7.1. Trends of Turkish and Greek Defence 
Equipment and Personnel Spending 
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To see the a broad picture of disaggregated data, the whole of NATO and some other 77 
NATO countries'distribUted defence expenditure are presented in Table 7.2 and Figure 7.2. 
They show that personnel shares dominates all countries defence budget and while Turkish 
1-igures on personnel is lowest of the group, the figure is the highest for Portugal (77.3%). 
Equipment spending shares are the higher in Greece and Turkey when compared with all 
other NATO nations. Other operational expenditure ol'Turkey is much higher than Greece, 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and NATO Europe average but the same as afl NATO average 
because ofUSA's highcr operational expenditures. Turkey is out of hne with others in 
respect to personnel spcnding- Wage payments are low in Turkey when compared to other 
NATO nations. This mI(-, ht he main reason for low pci-sonnel spcnding. On the othcr hand, 
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eqUipment spending figures are relatively high t'()r Turkey and Greece. 
Table 7.2. Comparative Disaggregated Defence Expenditure 
(An average of 1990-1994) 
Turkey Greece Spain Italy Portugal NATO' 
Europe 
(%) 
NAT02 
All 
(17c) 
Personnel 50.1 63.0 64.9 63.0 77.3 60.5 57.8 
Equipment 23.7 22.8 12.4 16.3 5.7 13.6 15.0 
Infrastructure 3.0 1.7 1.2 2.4 2.3 4.7 4.3 
Other 22.5 12.2 21.2 17.7 13.8 20-7 -12.5 
Source: NATO Review, 1996,1998 
'An average of NATO Europe countries excluding Turkey and Greece 
2 An average ofwhole NATO countries excluding Turkey and Greece 
Figure 7.2. Comparative Share of Disaggregated 
Defence Spending (Average 1990-1994) 
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The other important feature of defence spending is the proportion of defence equipment 
spending which goes to arms imports. This would show the real figures for domestic arms 
production; but there are no available data showing the proportion of equipment spending 
which goes to arms imports. However, comparison of spending on equipment and on arms 
import might give some ideas. Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 show the trend of Turkish and 
Greek arms irnports share in total defence spending and in the share of defence equipment 
spending. There appears to be no direct relation between arms fi-nports and equipment 
spending. However, except for 1989, there is a paraflel trend between them for Greece but 
the trend is not valid for Turkey. The calculated correlation coefficient of arms imports and 
equipment spending were 0.21 l'Or Turkey and 0.63 for Greece. 
Table 7.3. Share of Arms Imports in Total Defence Spending 
YEAR TURKEY(%) GREECE(%) 
US ACDA SIPRI EQU US ACDA SIPRI EQU 
1985 14.03 24.48 13.6 7.43 5.21 14.5 
1986 16.49 22.40 17.9 3.76 4.95 15.8 
1987 36.78 43.56 21.2 9.32 2.96 17.2 
1988 35.65 46.47 22.5 14.21 25.46 23.3 
1989 35.56 41.77 18.5 47.58 55.17 21.9 
1990 27.80 19.59 20.7 10.53 31.61 21.8 
1991 24.65 17.46 22.7 6.21 15.51 20.3 
1992 18.41 28.54 24.8 15.98 71.74 23.4 
1993 19.67 35.89 22.9 18.39 23.71 24.7 
1994 17.84 34.59 29.3 9.77 25.75 24.4 
1995 10.60 - 29.7 16.32 - 19.8 
Sources: US ACDA, 1996, SIPRI yearbooks 
US ACDA: Share of arms imports in total defence spending using US ACDA data 
SIPRI: Share of arms imports in total defence spending using SIPRI data 
EQU: Share of equipment in total defence budget I 
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Figure 7.3. Trends of Arms Imports and Equipment 
Spending in Turkey and Greece (%) 
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This Chapter makes a valuable and original contribution to the clefence-growth issue in 
several respects. First, the relationships are analysed using disaggregated data; secondly, this 
Study employs the recent econometric technique of error correction mechanisms. Thirdly, 
in respect of defence spending, two very sirnflar countries are compared: once agam, to see 
whether the results can be generahsed across countries (see Chapter 6). 
7.3. The Model and Methodology 
This study focuses on the rclationship between the disaggregated defence spcndmg 
(equipment and non-equipmcnt) and economic growth iii Turkey and in Greece. Empirical 
analysis of the cconomic cfICct ofdcJcncc spending faces inevitable difficulties (Koffias, 
1995; 16-18). These difficulties are eveii (Treater when disaggregated defence data are used. Z7 - 
There are a number of channels through which dctencc spending may influence the It 
1993 1995 
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performance of the econorny. However, this Chapter explores the hypothesis that 
equipment, personnel, infrastructure and other operational expenditure spending have 
differential impacts on the economy. 
The defence sector has positive and negative impacts on the economy. These impacts come 
tI rom different sources. Technological fi-nprovements and spin-off effects originally come 
tI rom domestic equipment spending (i. e. on the national defence industry) and also 
infrastructure should have a positive fi-npact on growth because, especially in LDCs, 
infrastructure expenditures are mostly used for civilian purposes. It helps economic growth 
(eg. airports, bridges, roads). On the other hand, human capital enhancements come from 
personnel spending. Negative ii-npacts of defence spending are mainly based on diverting 
resources from other sectors to defence with the defence sector being less productive". For 
the estimation, real values are produced using total defence spending and share of defence 
equipment and personnel spending. Then real level values are used rather than share 
variables. For single country analysis, real values give better results (see Chapter2). Given 
those, this study modefled economic growth as: 
a0+aI I+(x 2 
L+(x 
3 
M+[It (7.1) 
where Y is real gross domestic product, ao is the intercept, I is fixed capital formation, L is 
civilian employed labour force, M is rcal defence spending and u, is residual term. For a 
disaggre. gated analysis, (M) defence spending is divided into equipment expenditure, 
personnel spending. infrastructure and other operational expenditures (NATO classification). 
Equipment spending includes R&D as there are no available separate R&D data. The model 
Scc Chapter 4 
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then is as follows; 
Y= (X() +(X I 
I+a 
2 
L+(x 
3 EQU+(x4PER +(X5 INFR +(X6 OTH +(17"t (7.2) 
Where, EQU is real defence equipment spending, PER is real defence personnel spending. 
INFR is defence infrastructure spending and OTH is other operational defence spending. 
The annual data for this classification are available for a limited time period (1985-1996), 
but between 1975-1996, annual equipment spending data are available. Then, the equation 
can be rearranged as equipment spending and non-equipment defence spending (equation 
7.3). 
Y=a 
0 +a I 
I+a 
2 
L+cc 
3 EQU+a 4 NEQU+ttl (7.3) 
22 
where NEQU is non-equipment defence spending. 
Then, the study hypothesised from the model (equation 7.3) that investment and labour 
tI orce variables are positively related to economic growth 22 . Equipment spending 
in the 
defence budget should affect economic growth positively. This spending includes R&D 
spending. R&D spending may have a useful application for the civilian sector and also 
direct technological effect and spin-off may help economic growth. However, if countries' 
equipment spending mainly goes to overseas purchases, these effect should be small. Greece 
and Turkey are maýjor arms fi-nporter countries. High arms imports may lead to an adverse 
balance of payments. Therefore, the positive effect of equipment spending could be very 
low, but Turkey's defence industrial base is more developed than Greece. Turkey produces 
F- 16 fighter aircraft and many other equipment (see Chapter 3). Therefore, the positive 
ct'fect for Turkey should be higher. On the other hand, A this spending may inhibit 
f)otlic,,, I,,,, cs for investment and labour force are given in Chapter 4 Hy 
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economic growth, if the spending diverts resources from more productive public and private 
civil investment. Non-equipment defence spending is not a homogeneous variable because 
it includes personnel spending and other operational spending. Personnel spending affects 
economies through human capital enhancements and training activities. These expenditures 
can promote economic growth especiafly in LDCs (by providing training and education to 
a segment of the population: Benoit, 1978). Personnel spending affects economic growth 
negatively if the military forces divert the labour force from the civilian sector to defence. 
This can be the case for Greece because of lack of labour force but it is not the case for 
Turkey. Turkey has experienced a high unemployment rates for a long time. While non- 
equipment spending should be positive for Turkey, this effect seems ambiguous for Greece. 
The study applies integration and cointegration analysis after Engle and Granger (1987). 
It has been shown (Granger, 1986-, Engle, Granger, 1987) that if two variable Y, and Y, -1 are 
integrated of the same order 1 (1) then any linear combination of these series pt: --Xt-aYt may 
be 1 (0). It become apparent that u, is the "equilibrium error" that measures the deviations 
tI rorn the equilibrium and may itself be stationary. The error correction variable in a short- 
run dynamic relationship measures the proportion of the disequilibrium from one period that 
is corrected in the next period. 
Testing for the stability of the relationship involves testing for stationarity of the residuals 
ot I the cointegrating regression. Before this is done, stationarity of the variables must be 
tested. This is accomplished by testing the hypothesis of a unit root in each variable of the 
equation in levels and in first differences. The study employs the same methodology for 
Turkish and Gi-cck dcfencc-growth relationships. 
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7.4. Empirical Analysis of Disaggregated Turkish Defence Expenditure 
In this part, the effect of Turkish defence equipment spending on economic growth is tested 
empirically. The annual data series of four different types of defence expenditures 
(equipment, personnel, infrastructure, other operational) are only available between 1985- 
1995. This data series was used for OLS estimation and they did not give satisfactory 
results. Cointegration methodology were not been used because of very short time series 
of data. The results are presented in the Appendix A7.2.2. This study use a small sample 
of 21 observations which means that the results are at best suggestive rather than 
conclusive". 
The first step of the estirnation is to determine the order of integration of the series. Dickey- 
Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were used to test whether variables 
were stationary or needed to be differenced. The number of times series need to be 
differenced is given by the order of the integration- i. e. if the variable is integrated of the 
order of 1, it will be differenced once. All test results were compared with the critical 
values. With respect to critical values, Table 7.4. indicates that, all the variables are 1 (1) 
at I% and 5% significance levels in DF and ADF tests with the exception of labour. This 
variable is 1(2), and because of the small sample properties, the labour force can be treated 
I( 1) at the 1017, (, significance level. 
Data sources art-' dven in Chaptcr 2 and data are provided in Appendix 7 
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Table 7.4. Turkey: Unit Root Tests in Levels and First Differences (1975-1996) 
Unit Root in x, Unit Root in Ax 1 
Variable (x) DF ADF DF ADF 
LY -2.037 -2.012 -5.390** -3.626** 
LI -2.380 -3.609 -3.782* -3.193* 
LL -0.461 -2.859 -2.527 -2.376 
LEQU -1.967 -3.339 -3.407* -3.212* 
LNEQU -2.190 -2.611 -4.172** -4.8()5** 
Critical values 117r, -4.469 -4.500 -3.807 -3.830 
5% -3.645 -3.659 -3.020 -3.029 
The reported values are obtained from PC-Give 8.0 version by Doornik and Hendry, 1995. For calculated 
values intercept and trends are included in both DF and ADF equations for levels and intercept include for 
first differences. 
'where x represents level of variables and Ax represents first differences of variables. 
Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment. L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and NEQU is non- 
equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at I% 
Like the earlier tests of each variable for unit roots, the formal test for a cointegration 
relationship requires the application of the DF and ADF tests for the residuals. These tests 
are shown in Table 7.5 and 7.6, respectively. The residual based DF test and ADF test 
results appear to support stable, genume long run relationships- i. e. cointegration exists 
among the variables involved. The rejection of the non-cointegration hypothesis show that 
imposed relationship is a valid coMtegrating vector. 
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Table 7.5. Turkey: DF Test from Error- Correction Model 
Cointegrating regressions Calculated Critical values 
DF 1% 5% 
LY=f(LI, LL, LEQU, LNEQU, TREND) -4. ()08** -2.682 1 -1.958 
1 
The reported critical values are taken trom PC-Cjive 8.0 versions. The intercept term is not included in the 
ECM DF equation 
Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and NEQU is non- 
equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Table 7.6. Turkey: ADF Test from Error- Correction Model 
14 
Cointegrating regressions Calculated Critical values 
DF 1% 5% 
LY=f(LI, LL, LEQU, LNEQU, TREND) -3.761** -2.689 -1.959 
The reported critical values are taken from PC-Give 8.0 version. The intercept term is not included in the 
ECM ADF equation 
Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and NEQU is non- 
equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at I% 
After analysing the stationarity of the variables, the Engle-Granger two step procedure was 
applied to the Turkish data. The first step is the estimation of a long-run cointegrating 
relationships using the levels of the variables of equation (7.3). Evidence of cointegration 
includes critically a significant DF test on the residuals, high R' and significant t statistics of 
the coefficients. The long-run estiMation enabled us to decide whether or not the variables 
in the levels equation are cointegrated (Table 7.7 )24. In this estimation, Turkish economic 
growth is positively affected by its investment, labour force and defence equipment spending 
in the long run. The results are consistent with expectations. The positive effect of defence 
Estimation xvith only equipment spending or non-equipment defence spending is presented in Appendix 
, -\7.2.1. The results are simlllr. 
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equipment spending might come from new developing defence industrial base and from 
technological improvements in the defence sector (eg. producing F- 16 combat aircraft: see 
Table 7.7). 
Table 7.7 Turkey: Results for Cointegrating Regression 1975-1996 
Constant Ll LL LEQU LNEQU Trend 
LY -0.25 0.10* 0.90* 0.03* 0.01 0.02** 
t statistics -0.03 1.84 1.88 1.92 0.01 2.07 
Statistics 
R2 0.99 F statistics(5,16) 500.29 (0.000) 
AR 1-2F (2,14) 1.601 (0.2343) DF -4.0()8*** 
DW 2.44 
I 
n 
ADF -3.761 *** 
Where Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and NEQU 
is non-equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
**, ' significant at 1% 
The second stage of the Engle and Granger (short-run) estirnation is shown in Table 7.8. 
The validity of the RES,, specification requires the existence of a long-run relationship or 
comtegration between the variables. The error correction terms are significant at 11-7, -,, and 
have the expected negative signs. Investment variable is as expected positive and 
significant. The labour variable is insignificant in the short run. Defence equipment and 
non-equipment defence spending gave insignificant results for Turkey. When the results of 
long run and short run are compared, the coefficients of non-equipment defence spending 
are insigniticant in both estirnations. This irnplies that Turkish personnel and other 
operational expenditure do not have any ii-nportant effect on Turkish economic growth over 
the period 1975-1996. This result was not expected but non-equipment defence spending 
is not an homogeneous variable. This might cause a bias in the results. On the other hand, 
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the coefficient of equipment spending is positive and significant in the long run and 
insignificant in the short run. Equipment spending provides technological improvements and 
spin-off in the long run. Turkey's new developing defence industry seems to have a positive 
impact on its economic growth in the long run. The overall goodness of fit of the error 
correction specification to defence-growth data is satisfactory in terms of R2 and the 
statistical tests reported in Table 7.8. 
Table 7.8. Turkey: Dynan-tic Short-run Effects of Turkish 
Disaggregated Defence Spending 
Dependent Variable AY (1976-1996) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t statistics probability 
Constant 0.02** 2.69 0.01 
ALI 0. ()9*** 2.03 0.05 
ALL 0.47 0.98 0.33 
ALEQU 0.01 0.04 0.96 
ALNEQU 0.05 0.88 39 0. 
q 
RES, 
-, -1.04*** -4.33 
0.00 
Summary Statistics Diagnostic 
R2 0.75 AR I- 2F(2,13) 0.220 
DW 2.09 ARCH I F(l, 14) 0.507 
SE 0.021 NORM chi2 (2) 3.473 
F (5,15) 8.9456 X? F(10,4) 1.069 
1 
RESET F(l, 14) 0.288 
Where Y is GDP. I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence 
equipment spending. NEQU is non-equipment defence spending, and RES is 
Residuals frorn cointegrating regression. L represents natural logarithms 
and A represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 101ý( 
sicynificant at 5('( 
sicynifi .1 icant at V' 
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7.5. Empirical Analysis of Disaggregated Greek Defence Expenditure 
The same procedure for the Turkish data was f6flowed for estimating the effect of defence 
equipment spending and non-equipment defence spending on Greek economic growth. 
Once again, Greece is a comparator to determine whether the results can be generalised 
between similar countries. 
The visual inspection of the variables (i. e. LY, LI, LEQU, LNEQU) showed that they are 
all stationary in levels and stationary in first differences. The study then applied the Dickey- 
Fuller (DF) test and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test for unit roots as a formal test. 
It can be seen from Table 7.9 that the hypothesis of unit root in LY, LI, LL, LEQU and 
LNEQU cannot be rejected at 115, and 51-7c significance level both in DF and ADF tests. The 
only exception is LEQU. The variable seems stationary in DF tests but non-stationary in 
ADF tests. When all variables are first differenced, they become stationary in both DF and 
ADF tests. It means the variables l(l) but the LL variable is 1(2). However, the result also 
supports the general conclusion of the variables being non-stationary. 
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Table 7.9. Greece: Unit Root Tests in Levels and 
First Differences (1977-1996) 
Unit Root in x, Unit Root in Ax, 
Variable (x) 
DF ADF DF ADF 
LY -2.3369 -2.4386 -4.0215** -3.677 1* 
LI -1.8948 -2.3555 -3.6352* -3. ()778* 
LL -2.2813 -3.0642 -2.4161 -1.7504 
LEQU -3.7336* -3.5833 -5.1803** -4.2393** 
LNEQU -1.9238 -1.7664 -4.3147** -2.9722 
Critical values 117(, -4.535 -4.574 -3.857 3.888 
5% -3.675 -3.692 -3.04 3.052 
The reported values are obtained from PC-Give 8.0 version by Doornik and Hendry, 1995. For calculated 
values intercept and trendsare included in both DF and ADF equations for levels and intercept include for 
1-irst differences. 
'where x represents level of variables and Ax represents first differences of variables. 
Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and NEQU is non- 
cquipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at 117c 
The study employed the residual-based DF and ADF tests. The results showed that 
although cointegration does exist in DF test, the null hypothesis of non-cointegration cannot 
be rejected in the ADF tests for Greece (Table 7.10; Table 7.11). 
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Table 7.10. Greece: DF Test from Error- Correction Model (1977-1996) 
Cointegrating regressions Calculated Critical values 
DF 
I% 5 (7c, 
LY=f(LI, LL, LEQU, LNEQUý TREND) -2.98** -2.697 
1 
-1.96 
'I he reported critical values are taken from PC-Uive 8.0 versions. The intercept term is not included 
in the ECM DF equation 
Where Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and 
NEQU is non-equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at 1% 
Table 7.11. Greece: ADF Test from Error- Correction Model (1977-1996) 
Cointegrating regressions Calculated Critical values 
DF 
1% 5% 
LY=f(LI, LL, LEQU, LNEQU, TREND) -1.299 -1.961 -2.706 
The reported critical values are taken from PC-Give 8.0 versions. The intercept term is not included in 
the ECM ADF equation 
Where Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and 
NEQU is non-equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 5% 
** significant at I% 
The next step is to estirnate long-run relationships. The results for cointegrating regression 
are shown in Table 7.12. In this estimation, investment (LI) is statistically significant and 
positive. The capital stock is its rnain factor of production. The empirical result of long-run 
relationship showed that labour force is not significant. The short time series might be the 
reason for this result. The results for defence equipment spending (LEQU) and non-defence 
equipment spending (NLEQU) are statistically insignificant. This implies that Greek 
equipment spending has no important impact on its economic growth. It might be that 
Greece has a relatix, cly smaller dclence industrial base and its imports of defence equipment 
are higher than Turkey. It is also noted that the time trend (trend) variable involved the 
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equation 7.3, with a positive and significant coefficient. It reflects changes in technology 
and it promotes economic growth. 
Table 7.12. Greece: Results for Cointegrating Regression 1977-1996 
Constant Ll LL LEQU LNEQU Trend 
LY 1.843 0.234*** 0.758 -0.016 0.074 0.010*** 
t statistics 0.496 4.873 1.438 -0.473 1.554 3.062 
Statistics 
R2 0.98 F (5,14) 165.44 (0.000) 
AR 1-2F (2,12) 1.5035 (0.2614) DW -2.98*** 
DW 1.38 
1 1D 
-1.299 
Where Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence equipment spending and NEQU 
is non-equipment defence spending. L represents natural logarithms. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
The last stage of cointegration methodology is to estirnate the dynamic short run effect of 
Greek defence expenditure using error correction terms (Table 7.13). In this estimation, the 
error correction coefficient (RES, I) has the expected negative sign and is statisticafly 
significant. The coefficient of the ALI and ALL are consistent with expectations and enter 
into our dynamic short-run regression with a positive sign. The result for Greek defence 
equipment spending is negative and significant in the short run. Greece is a major arms 
importer country in the world. Defence equipment mainly comes from overseas purchases. 
This might cause a balance of payment problems so inhibiting economic growth. Non- 
equipment defence spending has a positive and significant effect in the short run. This result 
is not as predicted. The reason for this result might be higher personnel spending stimulates 
ag, (,, i-cgate demand in the Greek economy. 
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Table 7.13. Greece: Dynan-dc Short-run Effects of Greek 
Disaggregated Defence Spending (1977-1996) 
Dependent Variable AY 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient t statistics probability 
Constant 0.007 1.268 0.22 
ALI 0.218*** 5.377 0.00 
ALL 1.362* 1.890 0.08 
ALEQU -0.042* -1.733 0.10 
ALNEQU 0.099** 2.492 0.02 
RES, 
-, -0.63** -2.249 
0.04 
Summary Statistics Diagnostic 
R2 0.72 AR I- 2F(2,11) 0.10585 
DW 1.87 ARCH I F(l, 11) 0.41946 
SE 0.012 NORM chi'(2) 4.2551 
F (5,13) 6.9145 Xi2 F(10,2) 0.0848 
RESET F(l, 11) 
L- 
1.9902 
I Where Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence 
equipment spendiml, NEQU is non-equipment defence spending, and RES is 
Residuals from cointegrating regression. L represents natural logarithms and A 
represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 517c 
*** significant at 117c 
The results obtained from the two countries differ. While Turkey's disaggregated defence 
data show no important effect on growth in the short run, the results for Greece are 
different. Greek defence equipment spending negatively effects its economic growth and 
non-equipment defence spending has a positive impact on economic growth in the short run. 
In the long run, Turkey's defence equipment spending showed a positive and significant 
impact on Turkish economic growth while non-equipment defence spending has no 
important eftects. The lom! run results I'Or Greece disaggregated defence spending did not 
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give any significant results (Table 7.14). 
The positive effect of defence equipment spending for Turkey implies that its developing 
defence industry helps its economic growth and the negative coefficient of defence 
equipment spending for Greece (short run) implies that high proportion of arms imports are 
harmful for the Greek economy. 
Table 7.14. Comparison of the Results 
Long-run Short-run 
LEQU LNEQU ALEQU ANLEQU 
Turkey Positive 
significant 
Positive 
insignificant 
Positive 
insignificant 
Positive 
insignificant 
Greece Positive 
insignificant I 
Positive 
insignificant 
Negative 
significant 
Positive 
significant 
7.6. Conclusions 
This Chapter investigated the disaggregated defence expenditures effects on economic 
growth in an error correction context for two countries. While Greece spends higher 
proportion of its defence budget on personnel, Turkey spends a relatively low proportion 
on defence personnel. The empirical results showed that the effects of disaggregated 
defence expenditure for each country are different and the results also differ between the 
long run and short run. For Turkey, equipment spending has a positive impact on economic 
(Trowth in the long run but there is no important impact in the short run. For Greece, 
equipment spending has no important ii-npact in the long run and the effect is negative in the 
short run. suggesting that arms imports creates balance of payments problems for Greece 
and hence retards the Greek economy. 
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Non-equipment defence spending did not show any important effect in either the short run 
or long run for Turkey. It suggests Turkey's personnel and other operational expenditures 
are not harmful to economic growth. However, non-equipment defence spending affects 
the Greek economy positively hi the short run. Greek defence personnel spending might 
stimulate aggregate demand. Because of non- availability of long enough time series data, 
the study used shorter tirne series. Therefore, the results should be treated with caution. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1. Summary and Conclusions 
This Chapter surnmarises the results of the earlier Chapters and reaches some broader 
conclusions. The main purpose of this study has been to explore the relationship between 
defence spending and economic growth for Turkey. The central hypothesis of the thesis was 
Turkish defence spending should have a positive impact on its economic growth. The main 
motivation of the thesis was the lack of single country analysis in this area. 
Following Benoit's (1973) path breaking study, many researchers have analysed the issue, 
but most of the studies have used cross sectional analysis. Single country analysis of any 
defence-growth relationship has been neglected. The other motivation of this thesis was 
trend of Turkish defence expenditure and its economic growth. Turkey has achieved 
considerably high economic growth with a high defence burden. Turkey is a member of 
NATO and constantly allocates substantially high budgets to its defence sector compared 
with other NATO nations and the role of the military in Turkey is very important (politically 
and economically). For comparative purposes, the relationship between Greek defence 
expenditures and economic growth was analysed for the period 1958-1994. Greece and 
Turkey have many sirnflarities. Both countries have a high defence burden and both are 
members ot'NATO. Thcy started to produce their own military equipment after the 1980s. 
So Greece was included to tcst the robustness of the rcsults obtamed for Turkey (i. e. to see 
whether the results for TurkcN7 caii be goneralised across sirnflar countries). 
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Chapter 2 reviewed alternative approaches to defence-growth relationships. It also 
reviewed some important empirical defence-growth studies and data problems were 
discussed. The previous studies showed that there is no consensus among the findings. 
Mainly, three types of methods were used, namely, Feder type (supply-side) models, Deger 
type (demand and supply-side) models and Granger causality tests. The mikjority of the 
Deger type models found a negative effect of defence spending on economic growth, while 
the Feder type models have either a small positive impact of defence spending or have no 
significant impact on economic growth. The classification into developed countries and 
LDCs did not show any clear results. Moreover, causality studies have not reached any 
consensus. The Feder model offers much scope for empirical study. It considers 
externalities among sectors: it may explairi the size effect of defence spending and also factor 
productivity differentials between the defence and civilian sectors; but it focuses on the 
supply-side only. Therefore, it tends to a give positive effect of defence spending. On the 
other hand, Deger type model consider both the supply and demand sides. Nevertheless, 
this model also has some shortcomings. Firstly, the theoretical derivation of the equation 
is unclear and ad hoc and it is very sensitive to specification errors. Granger causality is not 
an answer to defence-growth relationships. It is a test for exogenity of the defence variable. 
This thesis focused initially on Feder type supply-side model: then to test for robustness and 
tI or the reliability of the results, a Deger type model, Granger causality and error correction 
models were introduced into the analysis. Data sources and problems were also presented 
and discussed in Chapter 2. 
Trends in Turkish detence expenditure and economic growth, the Turkish armed forces, its 
defence industry and its modernisation were analysed in Chapter 3 (Turkey's military- 
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industrial complex). The growth rate of the Turkish economy has shown dramatic 
fluctuations over time although the average rate is rather high and Turkish defence 
expenditure has also shown an increasing trend. Despite the fact that many countries havc 
started to cut the size of their armies, the Turkish army has not shown any decreasing trends 
and it remains one of the largest armed forced in the world (ranked 6' in 1995: US 
ACDA, 1996). Moreover, Turkey is a maýjor arms irnporting country: its arms imports 
ranked 8' in 1996 (US ACDA, 1997). Turkey has also established a domestic defence 
industry and now produces its own fighter aircraft (F- 16); and the shipbuilding industry and 
military electronics industry have been developed; but, so far it has not led to lower arms 
h-nports nor to higher arms exports. 
Chapter 4 of the study presents a model to test for the Turkish defence-growth relationships. 
This Chapter argued that Turkish defence spending has an important effect on its economic 
growth. A Feder type supply-side model was used to test for the size effect of defence 
spending and for any externalities from the defence sector to the rest of the economy. There 
are several important features of this Chapter. First, labour force data were constructed 
instead of using a proxy based on population. Second, a human capital variable was 
introduced into the Feder model. This Chapter showed that Turkish economic growth is 
Supported by its defence sector. These findings are consistent with most of the literature 
and also support the central hypothesis of this thesis. 
Chapter 4 analysed Turkish defeiice-growth relationships using a supply-side model and it 
found that Turkish defencc cxpenditures are positively correlated with its economic growth. 
However, Feder type models gciicrafly give either a jwsitii, e effect of defence spending or 
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no important effect of defence spending on economic growth. To test for the reliability and 
robustness of the results, a different approach is used in Chapter 5. This is based on Deger 
type supply and demand-side model and the analysis provided further evidence on the 
Turkish defence- growth relationship. In this model, the direct and indirect effects of defence 
spending on economic growth are identified. The findhigs of this Chapter support those of 
Chapter 4: Turkey's economic growth is stimulated by its defence spending. This 
approach also provided a model of the determinants of Turkish defence spending (e. g. arms 
race effects). They are its income, the conflict with PKK and the defence spending of 
Greece. Although Deger type models generally tend to find a negative effect of defence on 
growth, this Chapter estirnates a positive relationship. In contrast, many of the Deger 
studies generafly find a direct positive effect and negative indirect effect (through 
investment), giving an overaH negative impact. In this study, the direct and indirect effects 
are positive, implying that defence spending does not cause a crowding-out effect for 
Turkey. In this Chapter, the Engle-Granger error correction representation was used for 
the growth equation. The positive effect of defence spending on Turkish economic growth 
is also supported by cointegration analysis. 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 analysed the causal relationships between the Turkish defence 
burden and economic growth. In this Chapter, relatiVely longer data series were used. It 
covers almost all the period of the Turkish republic (1924-1996). Because of problem of 
spurious regression, A variables were tested for stationarity. The analysis demonstrated 
that Turkish defence spending Granger causes econornic growth, while economic growth 
does not Granger causes defence spending. 
1-2-2 3- 
Chapter 8: Conclusions and Proposals for Future Research 
Greece provided a comparative case study and Chapter 6 addresses Greece's defence- 
growth relationships. Greece is used as a case study to see whether the results for Turkey 
can be generalised to shnilar nations, since these two countries' defence characteristics are 
very similar. Like Turkey, Greece has a high defence burden and large armed forces when 
compared with its population and its armed forces are mainly based on conscripts. Greece 
is a maýjor arms irnporting country and its arms exports are very low. However, the findings 
of this Chapter show that defence spending differently affects the two countries. While the 
Feder type model showed no significant effect for Greece, the Deger type model showed a 
net positive irnpact on Greek economic growth. As a result, the findings are inconclusive. 
The main conclusions of this Chapter are that the effects of defence spending differ 
across the countries even when the countries are very similar. 
Defence expenditure is usually divided into personnel, equipment, maintenance and 
infrastructure expenditures. Their effects on economic growth could be different and could 
vary between countries: this is the focus of Chapter 7. When compared, it turns out that 
Turkey spends less on personnel but more on equipmcnt, infrastructure and maintenance 
than Greece. While Turkey spends 50.1 % of its defence budgets on personnel, this figure 
is 63% for Greece (an average of 1990-1994; NATO Review, 1996). The different impact 
ot'defence expenditure on economic growth in Turkey and Greece might be due to the 
different composition of their respective military spending. 
Finafly, Chapter 7 invcstigated the effects of disaggregated defence expenditure on 
economic growth in an error correction context for Turkey. Turkey spends a higher 
proportion of its defence budgct on equipment and a relatively low proportion on defence 
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personnel compared with the other NATO nations. The empirIcal results showed that the 
effect of defence equipment spending is positive for Turkey. It implies that the Turkish 
defence industry assists its economic growth. 
Chapter 7 also investigated the effect of disaggregated Greek defence spending as a 
comparative study. The results differed. Greek defence equipment spending has a negative 
irnpact on its economic growth, while the effect is positive for Turkey: the Turkish defence 
industry is more developed than Greece which might explain the negative effect for Greece. 
Greece's high arm imports might cause a balance of payment problem and so retard the 
country's economic growth. 
The main findings of this thesis which differ from those of the existing analyses and from the 
literature on the defence-growth relationship can be summarised as f6flows: 
i) The bulk of the empirical defence-growth studies has been reviewed and it was 
shown that the issue remains controversial. 
ii) Turkey has allocated a considerably higher percentage of its GNP to defence and 
Turkey has one of the largest armed forces in the world. Moreover, although a major 
arms importing country. Turkey has started to build its own defence industry after 
1980 and the sector has been growing. 
iii) Empirical evideiice showed that there are a positivc and significant relationships 
between defencc spcnding, and econornic growth for Turkey when the Feder typc 
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supply-side model was used. 
iv) The positive effect of defence spending on Turkish economic growth is also 
supported by the Deger model. 
v) Turkish defence expenditure is determined by its income, the conflict with PKK and 
the defence spending of Greece. 
vi) Greece is used as a comparator to test the reliability of the results for Turkey. 
Greece has a high defence burden, large armed forces and has started to produce its 
own military equipment but the effects of defence spending differ from Turkey. Greek 
defence spending has no h-nportant effect on its economic growth when Feder model 
used and has a net positive effect when Deger model used. The evidence indicates 
that the defence-growth relationship for Greece is inconclusive. 
vii) Disaggregated analysis of Turkey and Greece's defence spending show that 
equipment spending and non-equipment spending have a different impact on their 
economic growth and also the effect is different in the short-run and in the long-run. 
viii) In conclusion, Turkish defence spending seems to help its economic growth, 
while the effect is not clear for Greece. Thus, the failure to obtain si"lar results 
for Greece suggests that cross country studies can be problematic. 
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8.2. Proposals for Further Research 
This thesis has both strengths and weaknesses. In terms of its strength, the thesis is 
noteworthy because it is the most comprehensive analysis of Turkish defence- i-, rowth 
relationships. This thesis also uses recent data and econometric methods and does not rely 
on OLS estimation. The data series used in this thesis cover a relatively long period for a 
developing country. 
In terms of weaknesses, due to data limitations, the findings are not always clear. Defence 
expenditure data are not very accurate for a number of reasons, namely, definitions differ, 
significant amounts of security expenditure never entcr the account and the data differ 
considerably between the data sources. Turkey's Imig period of high inflation creates 
valuation problems. For disaggregated analysis, very limited data are available. Using 
population as a proxy for labour for Turkey and Greece and the small sample for 
disaggregated analysis in Chapter 7 makes these empirical results limited and tentative. 
Despite these problems, the thesis is an irnportant contribution to understanding the defence- 
growth relationship in Turkey. 
A number of suggestions can be made for future work on defence-growth relationships. 
Cross section analysis provides limited evidence, because countries differ. Choosing a cross 
country sample can be problematic and also currency conversion makes comparative data 
less reliable. It is clear that still more single country studies are needed to obtain a clear 
picture of the issue. The single country analysis overcomes the heterogenity problem and 
takcs into account the historical and institutional information unique for each country 
(Dunne, Nikalaidou. 1998). Some Mediterranean countries, such as, Portugal and Spain in 
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NATO are good examples for further analysis of the defence-growth relationship. They are 
the poorer or peripheral economies in the EU and show some similar characteristics with 
Greece and Turkey. 
In the Degcr model, human capital can be incorporated into the model. In the Feder model, 
this thesis isolated human capital and it fi-nproved the empirical results. The Deger model 
with human capital variables offers scope for future work. Human capital can be proxied as 
the enrob-nent rate, schooling and educational expenditure. Although economic growth is 
often necessary for development, it is also insufficient. It is possible that policies which aid 
economic growth may have a harmful effect on econornic development (Deger, 1986). 
This thesis has added to our knowledge of defence-growth relationships. For Turkey, it has 
presented results similar to Benoit. However, these results were not supported for Greece, 
suggesting that empirical work in this field is sensitive to the choice of country for analysis. 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
Additional Literature Review 
Introduction: This Appendix provides some important empirical evidence on defence- 
growth studies which are not reported m Chapter 2. 
A2.1. Smith (1980) 
Under the Keynesian demand side model, the effect of demand spending on investment was 
examined with 14 large OECD countries. Cross sectional and time series estimations were 
employed to examine the crowding-out effect of defence spending. The model of the study 
is derived from the conventional Keynesian model that is Q-W=Y=C+I+M+B. In this 
equation Q is potential output, Y is actual output, W is the gap between actual and potential 
output, C is consumption, I is investment, M is delCiice spending and B is balance of 
payments. C and I include both government and a civilian sector. The equation is divided 
byQis give i=i-w-c-m-b. After some transformation the final form of equation is derived: 
"=(' 
where u is unemployment rate, g is the growth rate of actual output and ai are consumption 
share function parameters. In the above equations, if defence expenditures rise, then this 
crowds out investment. Except for two countries, Smith found a significant negative 
relationships between defence spending and investmcnt. The coefficient on the defence 
spending term is significantly different 1'rom zero and near - 1, it shows strong negative 
association. In brief, delencc spending has negative effect on investment and hence growth 
tI or devcloped COLintries. 
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A2.2 Frederikson and Looney (1983) 
Frederikson and Looney investigated defence growth relationships using the Benoit's 
method. They used the same sample and the same time period. The main difference is that 
they divided the sample countries according to their economic position. Their prediction 
was that in relatively poor countries a negative relationship between defence spending and 
growth is expected. On the other hand the richer countries have positive relationships. The 
sample countries were divided into four groups but two groups are important, the other two 
groups have less irnportance from authors point of view. Group one countries were named 
as the resource abundant and group two countries named resource constrained. Group one 
is relatively developed (or rich) countries and group two is relatively poor. They found a 
positive coefficient for group one countries and negative coefficient for group two as 
predicted. 
Group I 
G=(1.77) +(0.16)1+(0.12)Aid+(0.22)Def R2 =0.89 (A2.2) 
Group 2 
G=(4.72) +((). 15)1+(0.19)Aid-(1.22)Def R'=0.76 (A2.3) 
R2 is hi both equations higher than irt Benoit's study. Eventually they concluded that 
defence spending will have a positive effect in "resource unconstrained" countries 
(education, linkages with industry etc. ). on the contrary, in countries with lack of foreign 
cxchange and government revenues, defence spending wiH reduce growth. 
Frederikson and Looncy's study can be criticised in that they used the same method as 
Benoit. hence the sarne shortcommgs pi-cN, afled. In the study, capital inflow variable is only 
used as bilateral aid. Furthermore, Benoit's sample coLintries were divided into two groups 
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(actually four), so the findings came from very small samples. Group two include only nine 
countries (Grobar & Porter 1983). 
A2.3 Lim (1983) 
This paper was presented in 1983. Due to Benoit's controversial findings, Lim reexamined 
the relationship between defence spending and economic growth with 54 LDCs in the period 
of 1965-1973. The sample countries consisted of 21 African, 13 Western Hemisphere, II 
Asian and 9 Middle Eastern and Southern European LDCs. An explicit Harrod-Domar 
growth model was employed by the study. The general form of Harrod-Domar growth 
model is: 
Yg =f(IO CR, Il 1) (A2.4) 
where, Yg denotes the growth rate of the real GDP; IOCR is the incremental output-capital 
ratio, and IN is investment GDP ratio. Under the closed Harrod-Domar economy a higher 
defence spending will create a lower investment (i. e. when D/Y (defence burden) increase, 
then IN will decrease), hence a lower growth rate of output (Yg). The relationships 
between defence and investment are I/Y=f(D/Y) and they are negatively correlated. When 
the foreign capital inflow isolated the model, the equation will be IJY=f(D/Y, F/Y), where, 
F/Y is the foreign capital inflow to GDP ratios. In this case, F/Y is positively correlated 
with IN but D/Y is negatively correlated. The final form of equation is 
Yg =f(IO CR, DI GE, FIS) (A2.5) 
Where Yg denotes the growth rate of real GDP, IOCR is the incremental output capital 
ration, D/GE is the share of defence spending in government expenditure. F/S is the deficits 
on current account to gross national savim-, s ratios. Instead ol'F/Y, F/S is preferred. It is 
expected to bruw, a more direct effect. Iii additimi. gowrnmerit expenditure (GE) replaced 
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total output Y because. a defence sector better is represented by government sector. The 
least square regression method was the estimating model. After the empirical test, the 
regression coefficient f'Or D/GE is negative and statistically significant, this means in contrast 
to Benoit's work defence spending had negative impact on growth. Alexander( 1990) 
criticised this study in that the equation was not enough to explain the growth rate of 
output. Lim omitted crucial variables such as labour and technology and human capital 
(Alexander 1990). 
A2.5 Faini, Annez and Taylor (1984) 
This paper was presented in 1984. The defence-growth relationship was empiricany 
examined with 69 LDCs in the period of 1952-1970. Ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimation was used to estimate the coefficients. Their paper concluded that defence 
spending has negative effect on growth, furthermore, when defence spending is increased, 
savings and investment shares in GDP decrease and a greater tax burden will occur and also 
economic activity will shift frorn agriculture toward manufacturing sectors. In addition, 
under the Indian case with tirne series estimations negative effect of defence spending on 
growth was found. During the study, the authors used basic structuralist principles. Instead 
ofaggregate growth, they emphasised the disaggregated structure of the economy, hence 
they took a series of variables into their equation. The equation is: 
(Iogp)2 X=a+bllogY+b 2 (109 1ý +b, (IogP)+b 4 +b 5 F+b 6d (A2.6) 
where X denotes the share in GDP of a number of disaggregated variables. X is dependent 
variable on per-capita incorne(Y). population(P), capital inflow from abroad(F) and the 
defence burden "d" (delciicc spending in GDP). A significantly negative coefficient was 
found for the dcl'cnce burden. The neLatl\'c cffect of' dcfcnce spending on agriculture is 
-232- 
Appendices 
destructive for developments. Structuralist theory gives a big importance on agricultural 
bottlenecks as an obstacle to growth (Deger & Sen 1995). The serious critique to Fami et 
al. (1984) paper came from Stewart(1991) M that Faini et al. assumed there is no 
nonmilitary public spending and main result was misstated. The methodology was also 
criticised by Stewart. Faini et al. did not show the equation can be derived from their 
structural model and connection appears rather tenuis (Stewart, 199 1). 
A2.6. Landau (1986) 
Landau carried out a very extensive study in 1986. He investigated many kinds of variables 
related to economic growth for LDCs between 1960 and 1980. Only one part of his study 
examined the fi-npact of defence spending on economic growth. Cross section time series 
estimation with OLS was employed. He found that defence spending had no impact on 
economic growth or it has very little h-npact. Landau's study included very large number 
of variables and well-def-med criteria to find out appropriate results but his econometric 
tI ormulation seems insufficient (Ram 1995). 
2.7. Rasler and Thompson (1988) 
Rasler and Thompson brought a different aspect for defence-growth relationships. They 
examined two systems or hegemonic leaders in nineteenth century Great Britain and in 
twentieth centuries United States. Defence spending is a form of insurance for the 
hegemonic leaders and it has some costs. The leader provides protection for other capitalist 
states. Therefore, the cost of defence for the leader is likely to be higher. Systematic 
leadership involves very hi-gh protection cost such as armed forces, the financing of allies. 
tI orei(-, n aid and the cost associated with mamitainmig the international economy. The 
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historical leaders in economic growth (Britain and United States) exhibit lower rates of 
investment and growth than more recent newcomers &e Japan. Rasler and Thompson's 
model for systematic leadership was: 
I 
--: ('O+pl 
m 
+P2 
Y, 
+ 
yy yt-I (A2.7) 
where IN represents annual change in Exed domestic capital investment as a proportion of 
GDP, M/Y is annual change in defence spending as a proportion of GDP, and final term is 
annual change in GDP per capita, and a is constant, P's are coefficient. In this equation 
capital investment formation(I/Y) is dependent variable and defence burdens and the 
economic growth is independent variables. They added to model systematic or hegemonic 
leadership. The empirical study showed that defence burden coefficient was msignificant 
for the nineteenth century system leader (GB). The coefficient of the defence burden was 
statistical. ly significant and negative for the twentieth century leader (US). In conclusion, 
they found some evidence of adverse effect of defence spending on investment and hence 
growth. 
A2.8. Stewart (1991) 
Stewart investigated the defence-growth association. OLS estfi-nation method with pooled 
data for African and Latiý-i American countries were employed. The model of study was 
derived from Faini, Annez and Taylor model. Unlike Fami et al. (1984) model, the author 
isolated non-defence component on the model which is G=GD+GN (G is total government 
spending, GD is defence spendmg. GN is non-defence spending). The study showed that 
there is no evidence to support higher defence burdens creating a lower economic growth. 
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However, higher defence spending is stimulative but non-defence spending is more 
sth-nulative. After refori-nulation of Faini et al. (1984) model, Stewart found positivc effect 
of defence spending on economic growth in contrast to Faini et al. (1984) because the 
model is improved after adding non-defence government spending. Faini et al. Work 
seriously flawed by a factor to control for non-defence public spending and omission of 
lagged defence burden variable (Stewart, 199 1). 
A2.9. Landau (1994) 
He investigated the defence-growth relationships using traditional (ad hoc) growth model. 
Cross-sectional estimation method employed a full sample of 71 LDCs in the period of 
1969-89. He hypothesised a negative resource use effect, defence spending diverts 
resources from productive sectors to defence, positive security effect and efficiency effect, 
secures and peaceful environment helps output growth. The model used in this study is: 
Y=f(L, N, Kp, Kh, T, E) (A. 2.8) 
where Y is growth rate, L is labour, N is labour resources, Kp is physical capital, Kh is 
human capital, T is technology and E is efficiency. Based on above equations, econometric 
form of equation is: 
Y=ot 
I 
M+(x 
2 
M2+(X 
3 NM+(x4G +(15C+()t6p+(17 D +()t8 L+agDPI+a, 00 (A2.10) 
Where; (xi: constants coefficients 
M: defence spending as share of GNP 
M2: M squared 
NM: average M ofneighbouring countries 
G: groxvth rate 
C: 17( clianuc terms of trade Cý 
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P: per capita product 
D: foreign debts as share of GDP 
L: hfe expectancy 
DPI: the dummy for political mstabihty 
0: oil exports as share of GNP per cent 
At low level of defence expenditure, increased defence spending will be associate with faster 
economic growth due to security and policy efficiency. This is measured by M (defence 
share in GNP) and beyond certain level, the impact of increasing defence spending on 
growth wiff be negative (resource effect). This is measured by M2. M is predicted positive 
an M2 is predicted negative. The Landau model also considered neighbouring countries' 
defence spending and he found a large positive effect of the neighbours' defence spending 
on the country's own growth. Their results from the study are that no evidence of a 
negative relationship was found between defence spending and economic growth. 
The existing studies showed that maýjority of demand side and demand and supply side 
model uncovered a negative ý-npact of defence spending on economic growth. The main 
source for this result is a defence sector diverts resource away from other productive sectors 
(crowding out of investment, export, education and health). In these models, demand side 
suggest a negative ii-npact and supply side suggest a positive effect on growth, but the net 
effect seems negative (Deger, 1986a. 1986b; Deger and Smith, 1983; Scheetz, 1991). 
Although these models provide amore complete pictures of defence growth relationship, 
they have been criticised for not being strong based on theory and then relying on ad hoc 
justification (Dunne and Nik-oladou, 1998). However. these models over come problem of 
exogenity and simultaneity. 
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A2.10. Ram (1986) 
Ram used a supply based model which had been developed by Gershon Feder(1983). Ram 
study did not focus on defence spending, but it focussed on government size effect on 
growth and economic performance. A large sample of 115 countries in the period of 1960- 
1970 and 1970-1980 were used and cross sectional time series estimation is employed. In 
the model, assumed economy includes two sectors, the government sector(G) and a non- 
government sector(C). Two sectors can be written as C=C(Lc, Kc, G) and G=G(L, (!, Kg) 
where K and L denote labour and capital respectively and lowercase denotes sectoral mputs. 
This model consists of both a network of externalities among sectors and productivity 
differences. In the equation, government sector implies positive externalities (6G/6C) for 
the non-government sector. Ram's study concluded that government size has a positive 
effect on growth and economic performance and positive externality effect of government 
size on the rest of the economy. Hence defence spending also has a positive impact on 
growth. Two problems arise from Feder-Ram model III that the theoretical analysis ignores 
the interaction between the demand and supply side ofthe economy and it is difficult to fix 
externalities among sectors (Sandler & Hartley 1995). 
A2.11. Atesoglu and Mueller (1990) 
Atesoglu and Muefler empiricafly investigated defence -growth association using United 
States data for 1949-89. In the study, the economy is assumed two sectors as civilian and 
defence. Further assurned, the defence sector is a relatively less competitive part of the 
economy and model include both externality effect and productivity difference. The 
aggregate production function for each sector is: 
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D=D(Kd, L d) (A2.10) 
C=C(Kcý Lc, D) (A 2.11) 
And Q=D+C is aggregate output. Total capital and labour consist of: 
L=L(L 
d, L, ) (A2.12) 
K=K(Kd. Kc) (A2.13) 
he fmal form of model which is developed by Feder(1983): 
_+c, 
dL L 
+( 
6 
_7r) 
dD D dD ýQ-ck 1 
-+71- (A2.14) 
QQLQ 1+6 DQD 
where dQ/Q denotes the growth of real output, I/Q is investment ratio, (dL/L)(L/Q) is 
employment growth effect, (dD/D(D/Q) is defence spending growth effect, dD/D is growth 
in real defence spending and ck, ci, [6/(1+6)-rl] and 11 are empirical parameters to be 
estirnated. The findings were a positive and significant relation between defence spending 
and economic growth in the US. Instead of a burden, defence sector is an engine of 
economic growth, so that if defence spending is reduced after the cold war, growth will 
be affected negatively but the adverse effect will not be very large from the authors point 
of view. The fnidi-ngs of positive effect of the defence sector in the USA might be valid 
because the USA spends a higher proportion to R&D and this cause technological 
improvement. Many technological improvements originally comes from defence sector and 
also the USA is a rnýkjor arms exporter country. These exports may help the USA economic 
growth. 
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A2.12. Huang and Mintz (1991) 
The study used the same sample and the same model with Huang and Mintz (1990) but 
externality and relative productivity components isolated into three sector model, then they 
assumed that non-defence sector and defence sector affect the production of C with 
constants elasticitiesOf Onand 0,, respectively. Then three sector model was: 
C=C(Lcý Kc, N, *=N""'M"(D(Lc, Kc) (A2.15) 
This time again the authors employed ridge regression method for the same reason. After 
the study the findings are consistent with earlier (Huang-Mintz 1990) study. Addition of 
the externality and relative productivity effect into three sector Feder-Ram model did not 
change the conclusions that defence spending does not have a significant externality effect 
on economic growth and also productivity effect is insigmificant. However, a non-defence 
government sector has a significantly positive externality effect. The findings of Huang and 
Mintz were contrary with Atesoglu and Mueller (1990). They used same sample country 
ofthe USA and the sirnilar tinýe period but the findings were contrary. The reason for this 
might be the form of Feder model. Atesoglu and Mueller used two sector model while 
Huang and Mintz used three sector model as defence, non-defence government and civilian 
sector. Inclusion of a non-defence sector into defence sector and little difference in the time 
period resulted no effect of defence spending in the US economic growth. 
A2.13. Adams, Behrman and Boldin (1991) 
Adams, Behrman and Boldin investigated defence-growth relationships in 1991 with the 
sample of LDCs in. the period of 1974-86 and employed cross sectional ti-tne series 
cstimation. The study cxtciidcd Rani(1986) and Biswas and Ram(1986) modcl. The 
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government sector was separated as defence and non-defence sectors. Like an export 
sector, it is assumed government sector has its own separate production function and it 
creates externality to non-government and non-export sector. The final form of model is: 
Y, 
_ 
Y_ GG 
=(x 
I 
+( 
6 
+Nx 'ý 
X 
+NG 
G 
(' +PG 
6P GP 
YY YG Yc L, 1+6 
)x 
YC G, Yc GP Yc 
(A2.16) 
Where Yc is civilian GDP, the NG and PG terms indicate measures of the externality effects 
of the two components of government spending on non government GDP. Empirical results 
of study showed that there is no statistically significant impact from a defence sector on 
growth, although the export sector has significantly positive effect on growth. 
A2.14. Biswas (1993) 
Biswas study intended to rephcate of the empirical part of the earber Biswas-Ram(1986) 
study. The study analysed defence-growth relationships with a sample of 74 LDCs in the 
period of 1981-89. The traditional model and the Feder-Ram model were employed on the 
study. The model for neoclassical production function is: 
ý=Pj I 12ý1314 
y 
(A2.17) 
Where the dot represents rates of growth (Y over the dot is rate of growth of total output- 
GDP), L is for labour and M is for defence spending. IN is the investment- output ratio. 
P, shows the margmal product of capital andP2 shows the elasticities of output with respect 
to labour andP 3 shows elasticities Of OLItpUt with respect to defence spending. For this 
model, a significantly positive ef - ICct ol'a defence sector on economic growth was found. 
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The model for augmented neoclassical form is comprised to the two sectors(defence and 
civilian). The model considers externalities that flow from a defence sector to a civilian 
sector. The model was: 
ý=a I +Pý+( 
6- 
-O)AýM+OAý (A2.18) y 1+6 y 
Where, IN and NI/Y are the investment- output ratio and defence spending-output ratio 
respectively. 0 is the elasticity of civilian output with respect to defence output and 5 shows 
fI actor productivity. This model provides the externality effect and the relative factor 
productivity separately. 
The empirical result of the augmented model also has a positive effect of defence spending 
on growth, but externality effect and factor productivity differentials are not clear. Both 
results (conventional and augmented) had positive effects in contrast to earlier Biswas- 
Ram(1986) study. It had found no significant effect of defence spending on economic 
growth. This study used the same model but a more recent data set. It implies that defence 
spending become to effect economic growth positively in LDCs. However, no significant 
externality effect or factor productivity differentials are found. It is possible that high 
correlation between the two defence variables lowers the estiMation results. 
A2.16. Jeording (1986) 
He investigated econornic growth and defence spending using Granger causality tests. 
Causahty is an important problem when using OLS estimations. To find out sufficient 
results the problcin of causality must be sorted out. Without priori mformation, one cannot 
say whether high defence causes high growth or vice vcrsa. The direction of causality is tý 
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very important because there is nothing to do if high growth "causes" high defence 
spending. In other words, defence spending should be independent variable (Deger 1986). 
Granger causality tests show whether the present value of X is related to the past value of 
X and some other series Z. If the past values of time series X on Z are better estimators of 
X than the past value oJ'X, the Z Granger causes X. The tests can be indeterminate or no 
causality can be found or causality may be in both directions (Sandler & Hartley 1995). 
Previous studies generally employed OLS estimations that G=uX+fiM+c where G denotes 
growth, a and P are coefficient, X is a vector of explanatory variables, M is defence 
spending. These models are suitable, if defence spending is econometrically independent 
variable, otherwise the results will not be appropriate. To find out Granger causality 
between defence spending and economic growth, Jeording employed the following 
equations using data from SIPRI 1960-1975 and from US ACDA 1967-1976 with 57 LDCs. 
Mt =a+ß (L)M, -, +7 
(L) G, 
-, +0 
(L)I +k(L) GS + F-, (A2.19) 
Where M denotes military spending, G is growth rate, I is investment, GS is government 
spending and O(L) and k(L) are fifth degree polynomials in the lag operator, 7(L) and P(L) 
are fourth degree polynomials. After the Granger causality test for 57 LDCs, it is found that 
defence spending is not a strongly independent variable relative to economic growth. In the 
light of the Jeording's findings, previous studies should be reexamined which implicitly or 
explicitly assumed defence spending is an independent variable of economic growth. 
A2.17. Chowdhury (1991) 
He conducted Granger causality test for defence-growth relationships using time series data 
from 55 LDCs. Causality is tested for each country with defence burden measurmg the 
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share of GDP devoted to defence and with economic growth measured by the growth rate 
of GDP. The causality problem was rarely mentioned in the defence-growth literature. 
Initially the important study was Jeordmg(1986) who employed a cross country analysis. 
Chowdhury employed tirne series analysis to identify the distributed lag relationship between 
defence and growth. Granger causality tests indicate whether the current value is related to 
the lagged value. If there are two values of X and Y and X related to Y then Y can be 
better predicted by using X variable. For the study, the equations are: 
n 
X, =E alx, -i+y: 
b'ývt-l +elt (A2.20) 
i=l i=i 
kp 
+ dx, t Y, =E ciýýI-i -j+e 2 
(A2.21) 
Where ei and e2 are assumed to be hidependent and identically distributed. Granger 
causahty between defence(x) and growth was tested bj=O, j=i... n and ctj=O J=i p 
The results of the study were no causality for 30 countries, negative effect of defence 
spending on economic growth for 15 countries and economic growth causing high defence 
spending for seven countries, and finally bidirectional causality for 3 countries. The results 
show little evidence of unidirectional positive causal flow from defence spending to 
cconomic growth. Ram(1995) pointed out that regression specification error test is more 
suitable than Granger causality tests for this kind of empirical study (Ram 1995). 
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A2.18. Chen (1993) 
Chen study is based on causality between defence speiiding and economic gýowth for the 
case of mainland China in the period of 1950-1991. Recent econometric techniques ofunit 
root and cointegration were employed. The findings of this study strongly suggest that 
defence spending and economic growth were not cointegrated and they do not posses a long 
run equilibrium relationship. He suggests that defence spending is related to non-economic 
factors for China. 
A2.19. Madden and Haslehurst (1995) 
Madden and Haslehurst analysed Australian economic growth and defence spending causal 
relationships in light of the Chowdhury's (1991) study. Chowdhury applied Granger 
causality test to investigate defence-growth causal relationships and the results suggested 
that the association between growth and defence spending cannot be generalised. However, 
over of the half sample no causal relationships were found. Madden and Haslehurst 
ernployed the same analysis for Australian case. After the Granger causality test they found 
no causal relationships between defence spending and economic growth. 
A2.20. Ahmed A. A. Asseery (1996) 
Asseery nivestigates causality between Iraq defence spcnding and economic growth. This 
study was also supported by new econometric techniques of unit root and cointegraton. The 
time period for this study is 1950-1980. This study is U-nportant because defence spending 
doi-ninatc the Iraqi economy. The result showed that the cconomic growth over the period 
ofest4nation was hea\, ily dcpendmg on defence spending and it is negative. 
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As a result of causality studies, there is no consensus among studies. While Chen (1993) 
and Madlen and Haslehurst (1995) found no causal relationship between defence spending 
and economic growth, Chowdhury (1991) suggest that causality run from growth to 
defence. On contrary Asseery found that defence spending causes economic growth. 
Jeoerding (1986) findings are inconclusive. It suggests that causal relationship is not certaln 
among countries. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
DATA: List of Series and Descriptive Statistics 
Introduction: This appendix presents the various series used for estimation and descriptive 
statistics. 
Table A4.1.1 List of Series Used in Estimation (Turkey) 
Year GNP I Hi IN 1 L P AR 
1954 6301207 912322 182540 344606 11208000 23206000 
1955 7377714 1042549 189242 377293 11633000 23859000 
1956 7658300 1059334 207532 364756 11805000 24442000 610000 
1957 8594457 1116218 200950 356402 12197000 25252000 605000 
1958 8789983 1119464 186259 335565 12550000 25983000 481000 
1959 9535923 1336899 236056 430181 12913000 26735000 507000 
1960 8495000 1252667 272288 401667 12417000 27509000 510000 
1961 8953333 1299000 352288 453000 12534000 28233000 507000 
1962 8676857 1265143 345636 425714 12651000 28933000 520000 
1963 9557143 1523571 419926 451000 12769000 29655000 529000 
1964 8913750 1375000 460012 430375 12888000 30394000 526000 
1965 9591250 1403625 468719 477625 12357000 31151000 511000 
1966 11427500 2017750 531385 499500 12509000 31934000 552000 
1967 11275556 1960222 552762 510667 12533000 32750000 550000 
1968 12498889 2244556 611019 573222 12591000 33585000 564000 
1969 12489000 2180700 549589 539500 12617000 34442000 607000 
1970 13363636 262W5 659583 567000 12583000 35321000 625000 
1971 14769231 2561000 936338 652846 12843000 36215000 615000 
1972 
1 
16054000 2733)-111 869295 664067 13137000 37132000 561000 
1973 17212778 3077778 1063255 677333 13909000 38072000 563000 
1974 17 7Q58 -', 
3, 38 963203 651*25 12407000 39036000 574000 
1975 19841111 4447037 117253,7 1118519 14387000 40078000 584000 
1976 21093750 4Q37188 1167610 1271ý94 14594000 40915000 674000 
1977 2 18 22 50() 4675000 141407ý, 1-244750 15070000 41768000 771000 
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Year GNP I HI N1 L p AR 
1978 22649123 3719298 1423121 162088 15276000 42640000 -If Hý ý 
1979 22448980 3591837 1316093 951714 15505000 43530000 698000 
1980 22175000 3755000 1164926 928280 15702000 44438000 
1981 23077465 4985915 1036284 1102349 15839000 45470000 741000 
1982 24196676 4662050 929749 1240416 16006000 46690000 769000 
1983 24950324 4518359 1559437 1202458 16169000 47860000 824000 
1984 26438849 4733813 1009783 1155459 16420000 49070000 815000 
1985 27797000 5960000 916521 1235000 16699000 50310000 814000 
1986 30053435 7512214 958046 1425954 17010000 51430000 860000 
1987 32285006 8098126 1189301 1365491 17402000 52560000 879000 
1988 33493839 8068931 1203699 1261738 17668000 53710000 847000 
1989 34143859 7641354 1581806 1434182 18005000 54890000 780000 
1990 37262161 8775457 2127334 1798677 18364000 56100000 769000 
1991 37380759 11663176 2346046 1927957 18420000 57330000 804000 
1992 39775838 12732978 2825602 2109576 18600000 58580000 704000 
1993 44315521 15535781 3160749 2385179 18702000 59870000 686000 
1994 42040800 12287699 2191450 2184662 19169550 61180000 8110001 
InvesUrnent for the 1991-1994 is taken from new GNP series. Therefore, Investment/GNP variable after 
1991 are calculated using new GNP series. (GNP new series: 1990: 84592243; 1991: 84886777; 1992: 
90324672; 1993: 100646138-, 1994: 95480283). 
0 GNP: Real Gross Natioanl Product (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
0 1: Real Gross Fixed Investment (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
0 HI: Real educational expenditure in the general budget (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
0 M: Real defence expenditure (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
0 L: Employed labour force (person) 
0 P: Population (person) 
0 AR: Armed Forces (person) 
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Table A4.1.2. Descriptive statistics of variables (Turkey) 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Level I st difference Level I st difference 
Growth 0.05028 -0.005697 0.05997 0.09333 
Investment 0.1875 -0.001112 0.04136 0.03385 
Labour 0.01364 -0.0003301 0.01680 0.02185 
Human capital 0.04946 0.0004979 0.01454 0.01051 
Defence size 0.002295 -0.0002490 0.005942 0.008348 
Defence 
externality 
0.05558 -0.004588 0.1443 0.2075 
Table A4.1.3. Correlation matrix (Turkey) 
Correlation Matrix 
Growth Investment Labour Human 
capital 
Defence 
size 
Defence 
externality 
Growth 1.000 0.6527 0.3368 0.4565 0.6366 0.5855 
Investment 0.3844 1.000 0.1911 0.2108 0.5191 0.4733 
Labour 0.3257 0.1904 1.000 0.1236 0.09335 0.1030 
Human capital 0.1548 0.1728 -0.005507 1.000 0.3531 0.3408 
Defence size 0.5137 0.3982 -0.01727 0.2147 1.000 0.9884 
Defence externality 0.4708 0.3915 1 -0.001520 0.2078 0.9897 1.000 
bold faces represents correlation matrix for I st differences 
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APPENDIX 4.2. 
Further Empirical Results 
Introduction: This Appendix reports more regression results which were not presented 
Chapter 4 
Table A4.2.1. Regression with different proxy of 
investment variable (Turkey) 
Dependent variable: Economic Growth 
1 3 4 
Constant -0.01 
(-0.36) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.38) 
0.03 
(1.03) 
Investment 0.20 
(0.97) 
0.11 
(0.58) 
0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.03 
(-0.12) 
Labour 1.09** 
(2.30) 
1.25** 
(2.72) 
0.76 
(1.51) 
0.78 
(1.55) 
Defence size 4.66-1** 
(3.24) 
4.51*** 
(3.22) 
3.44*** 
(3.74) 
3.54*** 
(3.88) 
R2 0.39 0.38 0.45 0.45 
DW 1.96 2.01 1.36 1.40 
t statistics in parenthesis 
significant at least 10% 
significant at least 5% 
*** significant at least I 17c 
1. Investment variable is proxied with 
1994) 
gross fixed investment of IMF/IFS data (1955- 
2. Investment variable is proxied with gross fixed capital formation of IMF/IFS data 
(1960-1994) 
3. Investment variable is proxied with gross fixed investment of SPO (State Planning 
Organisation of Turkey; 1969-1993) data 
4. Investment variable is proxied with fixed investment excluding housing of SPO (State 
Planning Organisation of Turkey; 1969-1993) data C- 4-- 
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Table: A4.2.2. Regression with Different Proxy of 
Defence Expenditure Variables (Turkey) 
Dependent variable: Econon& Growth 
1 2 3 4 
Constant -0.01 
(-0.36) 
-0.04 
(-0.99) 
-0.04 
(-1.02) 
-0.04 
(-1.00) 
Investment 0.21 
(0.97) 
0.40* 
(1.84) 
0.40* 
(1.87) 
0.39* 
(1.82) 
Labour 1.09** 
(2.30) 
1.05** 
(1.99) 
1.04** 
(1.98) 
1.04** 
(1.97) 
Defence 
size 
4.66*** 
(3.24) 
1.50 
(0.83) 
1.71 
(0.97) 
1.59 
(0.97) 
R' 0.39 0.24 0.25 0.25 
FT 1.96 2.21 2.20 
t statistics in paranthesis 
significant at least 10% 
significant at least 5% 
*** significant at least I% 
1. Defence variable is measured with SIPRI defence expenditure data (1955-1994) 
2. Defence variable is measured with share of MOD (Ministry of Defence) 
expenditure in the Tukey's Central Government Budget (1955-1992) 
3. Defence variable measured with share of MOD and Gendermeria forces 
expenditure in the Turkey's Central Government Budget (1955-1992) 
4. Defence variable measured with share of total security expenditures (including 
MOD, Gendermeria forces, Security forces, Coast guard and Ministry of Interior) 
in the Turkey's Central Government Budget (1955-1992) 
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Table A4.2.3. Regression of level variables with lags (Turkey) 
Dependent variable: Econornic Growth 
Equation (4.7) Equation (4.9) 
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics 
Constant 0.01 0.29 -0.01 -0.41 
Investment 0.76*** 2.97 0.79*** 3.12 
Investment-, -0.66*** -1.77 -0.73*** -3.03 
Labour 0.88** 2.03 0.86** 2.01 
Human capital - 0.70 1.39 
Defence size 3.23** 2.41 2.77** 2.03 
R2 0.50 0.53 
DW 1.84 1.83 
LM Serial Correlation 
X2 
0.334 probobality: 0.8807 0.169 probability: 0.9186 
significant at least 1017( level 
significant at least 5% level 
*** significant at least I% level 
In this regression three lags were introduced for all variables, then insignificant lags were 
omitted individually; finally, only the lagged investment variable gave significant results. It 
implies that lagged investment is negatively linked with economic growth. 
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Table A4.2.4. Regression with different proxy 
of human capital (Turkey) 
Dependent variable: Econon-tic Growth' 
2 4 
Constant 0.02 
(0.43) 
-0.01 
(-0.47) 
-0.01 
(-0.28) 
0.10 
(-1.44) 
Investment 0.37 
(1.34) 
0.41 * 
(1.82) 
0.29 
(1.40) 
0.32 
(1.55) 
Labour 0.99** 
(2.05) 
1.11** 
(2.43) 
1.14** 
(2.45) 
0.81* 
(1.73) 
Human capital -0.56 
(-0.93) 
-1.62* 
(-1.94) 
-3.41 * 
(-1.70) 
3.94 
(1.26) 
Defence size 4.34*** 
(2.93) 
4.27*** 
(3.05) 
4.64*** 
(3.14) 
4.55*** 
(3.22) 
R2 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.41 
DW 1.92 2.02 2.02 2. E) 
t statistics in parenthesis 
significant at least 1017c 
significant at least 5 17c 
*** significant at least 1 17c 
1. Human capital variable is proxied with primary school enrol Imen t/popu lation ratio (1955- 
1994) 
2. Human capital variable is proxied with secondary school enrollment/population ratio (1955- 
1994) 
3. Human capital variable is proxied with higher education enrol I men t/popu lation. ratio (1955- 
1994) 
4. Human capital variable is proxied with armed forces/population ratio (1956-1994) 
[for comparison, labour force data were also employed instead of population in the all above 
ratios, but the results were very similar therefore only the regressions with using population are 
reported] 
+la(ys also introduced all reoressions but they were insignificant therefore they are not reported. Z7, -- 
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Table A4.2.5. Regression with First Differences of 
Investment, Labour and Human Capital (Turkey) 
Dependent Variable Economic Growth 
Equation 4.7 Equation 4.8 Equation 4.9 Equation 4.10 
Constant 0.04*** 
(5.74) 
0.04*** 
(5.80) 
(). 41*** 
(5.79) 
0. ()4*** 
(5.83) 
Investment 
(first diff. ) 
0.61*** 
(2.82) 
0.57** 
(2.63) 
(). 60*** 
(2.78) 
1 
(). 57** 
(2.60) 
Labour force 
(first diff) 
(). 9()*** 
(2.93) 
0.88*** 
(2.89) 
(). 87*** 
(2.82) 
0.86*** 
(2.78) 
Human capital 
(first diff. ) 
- 0.63 
(0.91) 
0.57 
(0.83) 
Defence size 3.31*** 
(2.74) 
12.91 
(1.60) 
2.88** 
(2.21) 
12.00 
(1.46) 
Defence externality - -0.39 
(-1.20) 
- -0.37 
(-1.12) 
R 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.56 
DW 1.79 1.72 1.84 1.75 
F statistic 13.469*** 10.593*** 10.268*** 8.536*** 
t statistics in parenthesis 
significant at least 10% 
significant at least 5% 
*** significant at least I% 
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APPENDIX 5.1. 
Further Data and Empirical Results 
Introduction: This appendix presents the various series used for estimation and descriptive 
statistics in Chapter 5 and regression results which were not reported in the Chapter. 
Table A5.1.1a List of Series Used in Estimation (Turkey) 
Year GNP s B 'N I GS INF 
1955 7377714 841115 -201433 377293 906625 13.9 
1956 7658300 947610 -111724 364756 1024715 16.2 
1957 8594457 1043305 -72913 356402 1032889 17.7 
1958 8789983 1042992 -76472 335565 1019479 19.5 
1959 9535923 1045982 -290717 430181 1192840 23.1 
1960 8495000 1015667 -237000 401667 1084500 1.3 
1961 8953333 1026333 -272667 453000 1266667 0.5 
1962 8676857 927286 -337857 425714 1273429 2.9 
1963 9557143 1057143 -428571 451000 1057143 3.6 
1964 8913750 1188750 -250000 430375 1075000 -1 
1965 9591250 1316250 -125000 477625 1187500 5.4 
1966 11427500 1877500 -212500 499500 1375000 7.1 
1967 11275556 1895667 -97222 510667 1384222 6.6 
1968 12498889 2032667 -245222 573222 1565111 2.5 
1969 12489000 2018500 -204000 539500 1546800 8.3 
1970 13363636 2480091 -397909 567000 1701727 9.5 
1971 14769231 2376000 -559231 65-1846 1927538 17 
1972 16054000 2720667 -586667 664067 2133333 15.5 
1973 17212778 332 1889 -488889 677333 2388889 21 
1974 17795933 1179167 -1166667 659625 2208333 26.9 
1975 19841111 1507778 - 15 55 55 6 1118519 2851852 11.4 
1976 21093750 1843750 -1440625 1271594 3343750 17.3 
1977 21822500 3147500 -1775000 1244750 3800000 28.5 
1978 22041)123 3122807 -877193 162088 1491223 51.6 
1971) 22448080 3 13 26 51 -908163 Q -ý 1714 1146939 75.1 
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Year GNP s B NI GS I NT 
1980 22175000 2635000 -1655000 928280 2200000 90.3 
1981 23077465 4323944 -1151408 1102349 3031690 34.1 
1982 24196676 4257618 -722992 1240416 2753463 27.4 
1983 24950324 3600432 -1542117 1202458 3140389 28.1 
1984 26438849 3998561 -969784 115ý459 2825899 46.4 
1985 27797000 5446000 -760000 1235000 3139000 41.7 
1986 30053435 6764885 -809924 1425954 3505344 27.5 
1987 32285006 8900221 -638368 1365491 3998897 39.3 
1988 33493839 10530470 474192 1261738 4038628 60.8 
1989 34143859 8859948 -718694 1434182 5367862 65 
1990 37262161 9420612 -2183033 1798677 7133221 49.6 
1991 37380759 9924033 -1434660 1927957 6377491 52.6 
1992 39775838 11364540 -1609350 2109576 7044400 67.1 
1993 44315521 13915889 -3448454 2385179 7822688 62.5 
1994 42040800 13212227 563872 2184662 6718493 149.61 
Sources: IMF/lFS yearbooks (various years), SIS, Turkey (1994; 1996), OECD Labour 
Force Statistics Yearbooks (various years), SIPRI yearbooks (various years), US 
ACDA (1994; 1995; 1996) 
0 Y: Real Gross National Product (1985 constant prices; million Turkish 
Liras) 
" S: Real Gross savings (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
" M: Real defence expenditure (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
" B: Real balance of trade (1985 constant prices; million Turkish Liras) 
" GS: Real government spending (1985 constant prices; million Turkish 0 
Liras) 
0 INF: Inflation rate 
0 EXRT: Real exchange rate 
0 L: Employed labour force (person) 
" GRE: Share of defence expenditures in Greece's GDP 
" NATO: Average share of defence burden of NATO countries 
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Table A5.1.1b List of Series Used in Estimation (Turkey) 
Year Armlmp Armlmp(95) WorldEx EXRT GRE NATO L 
1955 - 87 981 5.18 5.3 11633, 
1956 - 97 881 5.98 5.1 11805 
1957 - 104 788 5.07 4.9 12197 
1958 - 100 639 4.82 4.6 12550 
1959 - 106 559 4.91 4.6 12913 
1960 - 118 1500 4.93 4.4 12417 
1961 - 122 1500 4.29 4.5 12534 
1962 - - 128 1286 4.08 4.7 12651 
1963 - - 140 1286 3.86 4.5 12769 
1964 - - 157 1125 3.62 4.4 12888 
1965 - - 170 1125 3.50 4.2 12357 
1966 - - 192 1125 3.58 4.2 12509 
1967 214 868 200 1000 4.35 4.4 12533 
1968 210 817 222 1000 4.69 4.3 12591 
1969 240 891 255 900 4.79 4.0 12617 
1970 250 881 298 1350 4.75 3.9 12583 
1971 260 871 333 1077 4.69 3.9 12843 
1972 210 674 397 933 4.56 3.8 13137 
1973 160 486 553 778 4.10 3.5 13909 
1974 250 699 820 577 4.28 3.7 12407 
1975 260 664 843 556 6.83 3.8 14387 
1976 320 773 950 516 6.90 3.7 14594 
1977 140 318 1076 481 7.03 3.6 15070 
1978 230 486 1245 439 6.70 3.6 15276 
1979 190 370 1604 357 6.28 3.5 15505 
1980 330 589 1920 446 ý. 67 3.5 15702 
1981 380 620 1899 466 6.97 3.7 15839 
1982 500 768 17 5 -1 
5,12 6.85 3.8 16006 
1983 550 811 1712 605 6.28 3.5 16169 
1984 525 744 1817 637 6.53 3.5 16420 
1985 500 686 1848 574 6.97 3.5 16699 
1986 700 936 2034 577 6.14 3.4 17010 
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Year Armlmp Armlmp(95) WorldEx EXRT GRE NATO L 
1987 1200 1556 2391 561 6.27 3.4 17402 
1988 1100 1376 2729 604 5.19 3.2 17668 
1989 1200 1440 2965 463 4.65 3.2 18005 
1990 1200 1381 3379 380 4.72 3.1 18364 
1991 1200 1328 3477 414 4.38 3 18420 
1992 1000 1077 3723 426 4.58 2.9 18600 
1993 1200 1260 3712 444 4.53 2.8 18702 
1994 1100 1128 4222 886 4.54 2.8 19169 
Sources: IMF/lFS yearbooks (various years), SIS, Turkey (1994; 
Statistics Yearbooks (various years), SIPRI yearbooks (various years), 
9 Armlmp: Arms imports of Turkey (current million US$) 
0 Armlmp(95): Arms imports of Turkey (1995 prices; million USS) 
0 WorldEx: World exports Average (current billion US$) 
41 EXRT: Real exchange rate 
0 L: Employed labour force (person) 
0 GRE: Share of defence expenditures in Greece's GDP 
0 NATO: Average share of defence burden of NATO countries 
1996), OECD Labour Force 
US ACDA (1994; 1995; 1996) 
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Table A5.1.2. Estimation Results (Level) (Turkey) 
Exogenous 
variables 
OLS )SLS 
G h 
Constant -24075000 (-9.05)*** -24346000 (-7.14)*** 
rowt equation 
S 0.77 (5.34)*** 0.48 (1.98)* 
B -0-52 (-1.66) -0.58 (-0.99) 
m 3.80 (2.89)*** 5.74 (2.38)** 
L 2.51 (10.71)*** 2.48 (7.96)*** 
Diagnostic R 2: 0.99 1102840 
tests 
DW: 0.42 
Saving Equation Constant -2471300 (-6.61)*** -2227200 (4.90)*** 
m 1.93 (1.38) 5.97 (2.41)** 
B 1.01 (3.49)*** 1.70 (3.00)*** 
y 0.29 (4.10)*** 0.12(l. 00) 
INY4 -13931 (-1.55) -17244 (-1.46) 
Diagnostic R 2: 0.93 11274400 
tests 
DW: 0.69 
Balance of trade Constant -1492900 (-2.94)*** -1569000 (-2.99)*** 
equation 
m -2.36 (-3.27)*** -3.15 (-2.95)*** 
y 0.10 (2.70)** 0.14 (2.57)** 
EXRT 1205 (2.91)*** 1231 (2.94)*** 
DUM60 -490140 (-0.78) -476390 (0.76) 
DLTM70 -587640 (-0.96) -1569000 (-1.03) 
Diagnostic R-: 0.53 564560 
DW: 2.08 
Defence equation Constant 377000 (1.09) 377000 (1.10) 
PCI 0.25 (5.95)*** 0.25 (6.04)*** 
GRE 53208 (2.06)** 53208 (2.09)** 
NATO 109400 (-1.55) -109400 (-1.15) 
DUMCYP 184640 (1.49) 184640 (1.51) 
DLTMKUR -55265 (-0.32) -55265 (-0.33) 
Diagnostic R-: 0.96 112755 
DW: 0.89 
7 
t statistics in the ptrendiesis 
For 2SLS estimation; loglik=-2038.1 I T=39 and LR test of over-identifying restrictions: 
Chi'(22) =72.76 [0.00001 
Y= real gross national product 
S= real gross savino. 
B= real balance oftrade., 
M= Real defence expenditure, 
L= Employed labour force. 
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PCI= Per capita income, 
INFRT= Inflation rate. 
EXRT= Real exchange rate, 
GRE= Greek military expenditures as a share of GDP 
NATO= Average share of defence burden of NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) 
(first difference) 
DUMKUR= Dummy variable for conflict between Kurdish separatist and Turkey. This dummy 
takes a value of one for the years 1989-1994. 
DUMCYP= Impulse dummy variable for year 1975 to absorb shock change in defence spending 
due to war between Turkey and Cyprus. 
DLTM60= Impulse dummy variable for year 1960 to absorb shock change in the exchange rate 
DUM70= Impulse dummy variable for year 1970 to absorb shock change in the exchange rate 
Notes: All computations in this study have been carried out by PC-GfVE 8.0 and PC-FýMl- 8.0 
(See Doornik and Hendry, 1994; 1995) 
Table A5.1.3. Correlation of Residuals (Turkey) 
AY AS AB AM 
AY 1000 
AS -0.1766 1000 
AB -0.07750 -0.5120 ION 
AM -0.3384 -0.3453 0.2915 1000 
For 2SLS estimation 
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Table A5.1.4. Estimates of Balance of Trade Equation 
Using Arms Imports (Turkey) 
Dependent variable: Balance of Trade (1967-1994) 
Level First difference 
Coefficient t statistics Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -1.60* -1.94 5.61** 22.7 4 
Armlmp -1.51 -0.11 -0.75 
y -0.21*** -3.03 -0.38*** -21.9 3 
EXRT 3118*** 4.33 3681*** 2.96 
WORLDEX 2.08* 1.92 1.04 0.88 
DUM70 - 1.36* -1.80 -2.12** -2.24 
Trend 2.74-1** 3.19 - - 
R2 0.58 0.61 
DW 1.82 2.20 
significant at least 1017c 
significant at least 5 17c 
*** significant at least 1 170 
ArmImp: Growth rate of arm imports (US ACDA 1995 US million $) 
Y: real gross national product 
B: real balance of trade 
EXRT Real exchange rate 
DLTM70: Impulse dummy variable for year 1970 to absorb shock change in the exchange 
rate 
WorldEx: Growth rate of World exports 
Notes: All computations in this study have been carried out by PC-GIVE 8.0 and PC-FIML 
8.0 (See Doornik and Hendry. 1994; 1995) 
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Table A5.1.5. The Engle-Granger First Stage (Long-run) Estimation 
for Defence Equation (1955-1994) (Turkey) 
Constant PCI GRE-1 NATO., CYP DUMKUR Trend 
m -596940*** 2.44*** 27848 3144.3 185270 451360*** 9214.7 
t 
statistics 
-3.30 2.85 0.89 0.68 1.25 3.58 1.17 
Statistics 
R2 0.95 F statistics 111.82*** 
DW: 075 
L- 
DF: -3.127 
I 
ADF: -4.443 
I 
significant at 10% 
significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table A5.1.6. The Engle-Granger Second Stage (Short-run and ECM) 
Estimation for Defence Equation (1955-1994) (Turkey) 
Dependent Variable AM 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coe icient t statistics probability 
Constant -2938.2 -0.22 0.82 
APCI 2.34*** 4.92 0.00 
AGRE-1 33666* 1.81 0.07 
ANATO-1 -2073.4 -1.20 0.23 
CYP 286430*** 3.97 0.00 
DUMKUR 119750*** 3.84 0.00 
RESt-, 
1 -0.45*** -4.44 1 
0.001 
Summary Statistics Diagnostic 
R2 0.78 AR I- 2F(2,29) 2.47 
DW 1.42 ARCH I F(l, 29) 0.28 
SE 67536.3 NORM chi2 (2) 0.57 
F (3,31) 19.288 Xi2 F(21,9) 0.26 
RESET F(l, 30) 
Where PCI is per capita income, GRE is Greek defence burden, NATO is average 
NATO's defence burden excludin Greece and Turkey, CYP is Cyprus dummy and 
DLTMKUR is Kurdish dummy variable, RES is Residuals from cointegrating 
regression and A represents first differences of variables. 
significant at 10% 
significant at 517c 
*** significant at 117c 
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Table A5.1.7 Turkey's Econon-ft Growth and Defence Burden (1924-1996) 
Year Economic 
Growth 
M 
Defence 
Burden 
(67() 
Year Economic 
Growth 
M 
Defence 
Burden 
NI) 
Year Economic 
Growth 
(%) 
Defence 
Burden 
( C71- ) 
1924 14.8 2.7 1948 25.8 5.1 1972 9.2 3.4 
1925 12.9 4.1 1949 -5.0 5.7 1973 4.9 3.3 
1926 18.2 3.5 1950 9.4 4.5 1974 3.3 3.2 
1927 -12.8 4.6 1951 12.8 4.0 1975 6.1 3.3 
1928 11.0 3.9 1952 11.9 4.5 1976 9.0 3.6 
1929 21.6 3.0 1953 11.2 4.4 1977 3.0 3.7 
1930 2.2 3.7 1954 -3.0 5.2 1978 1.2 3.1 
1931 8.7 3.8 1955 7.9 6.1 1979 -0.5 3.3 
1932 -10.7 3.5 1956 3.2 4.4 1980 -2.8 3.8 
1933 15.8 3.7 1957 7.8 3.6 1981 4.8 3.5 
1934 6.0 4.6 1958 4.5 4.0 1982 3.1 2.8 
1935 -3.0 4.6 1959 4.1 4.0 1983 4.2 3.21 
1936 23.2 4.0 1960 3.4 3.7 1984 7.1 2.9 
1937 1.5 4.4 1961 2.0 4.4 1985 4.3 2.7 
1938 9.5 4.5 1962 6.2 4.1 1986 6.8 2.8 
1939 6.9 7.6 1963 9.7 3.9 1987 9.8 2.5 
1940 -4.9 11.4 1964 4.1 4.2 1988 1.5 2.2 
1941 -10.3 10.2 1965 3.1 4.1 1989 1.6 2.6 
1942 5.6 7.6 1966 12.0 3.8 1990 9.4 2.8 
1943 -9.8 5.9 1967 4.2 3.8 1991 0.4 3.0 
1944 -5.1 8.3 1968 4.1 3.8 1992 6.4 3.3 
1945 -15.3 4.5 1969 4.3 3.4 1993 8.0 3.0 
1946 31.9 5.3 1970 4.4 3.4 1994 -5.5 3.0 
1947 4.2 6.4 1971 7.0 3.8 1995 8.0 3.1 
L 1996 7.1 
Sources: SIS Turkey (1994; 1996). Ministry of Finance (1993; 1995) and SPO (State Planning 
Organisation) Turkey (1998) 
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APPENDIX 6.1. 
Greece 
Introduction: This appendix presents the various series used for estimation and 
descriptive statistics for Greece. 
Table A6.1.1 List of Series Used in Estimation (Greece) 
Year GNP I m P GDP DEF 
1958 2856 539 135 8170000 3.30 
1959 2927 627 141 8260000 3.35 
1960 3063 798 148 8330000 3.45 
1961 3420 774 144 8400000 3.50 
1962 3583 783 143 8450000 3.56 
1963 4003 757 151 8480000 3.55 
1964 4352 905 154 8510000 3.66 
1965 4861 1052 171 8550000 3.69 
1966 5366 1139 189 8610000 3.80 
1967 5651 1126 241 8720000 3.90 
1968 5990 1360 275 8740000 4.00 
1969 66-12 1600 311 8770000 4.10 
1970 7079 1644 330 8790000 4.30 
1971 7686 1893 352 8830000 4.40 
1972 8420 2278 374 8890000 4.60 
1973 9040 2467 361 8930000 5.50 
1974 8688 1873 360 8960000 6.70 
1975 9219 1865 612 9050000 7.50 
1976 9883 2035 662 9170000 8.60 
1977 10247 2282 698 9270000 9.70 
1978 10853 2527 708 9360000 11.00 
1979 11238 2818 685 9450000 13.10 
1980 11478 2686 630 1 9640000 15.40 
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Year GNP I m P GDP DEF 
1981 11463 2480 776 9730000 18.40 
1982 1 11445 2233 766 9790000 23.00 
1983 11349 2277 706 9850000 27.40 
1984 11538 2130 753 9900000 33.00 
1985 11814 2269 830 9930000 38.80 
1986 11945 2233 742 9960000 45.60 
1987 11917 2063 754 9980000 52.10 
1988 12445 2720 653 10000000 72.30 
1989 12912 2956 608 10040000 82.80 
1990 12867 3028 612 10090000 100.00 
1991 13328 2845 588 10200000 118.00 
1992 13378 2744 617 10310000 135.30 
1993 13343 2600 605 10354000 154.30 
1994 13536 2541 615 10430000 171.20 
Sources: IMF11FS Yearbooks, SIPRI Yearbooks 
0 GNP: Real Gross Natioanl Product (1990 constant prices; billion 
Greek Draclimas) 
0 1: Real Gross Fixed Investment 1990 constant prices; billion Greek 
Drachmas) 
0 M: Real defence expenditure 1990 constant prices; billion Greek 
Drachmas) 
0 P: Population (person) 
0 GDP DEF: Greece's GDP deflator (I 990= 100) 
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Table A6.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of 
Variables (1958-1994) (Greece) 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Level 1st 
difference 
Level 1st 
difference 
Growth 0.04427 -0.0001556 0.04063 0.04046 
Investment 0.2303 -0.0001911 0.03154 0.02599 
Labour 0.006864 -0.00002535 0.003955 0.004140 
Defence size 0.002021 0.00005502 0.006440 0.008858 
Defence externality 0.04848 0.001136 0.1390 0.1903 
Table A6.1.3. Correlation Matrix (Greece) 
Correlation Matrix 
Growth Investment Labour Defence 
size 
Defence 
externality 
Growth 1.000 0.5065 0.1787 0.1348 0.1545 
Investment 0.6167 1.000 - 
0.002549 
-0.1063 -0.09852 
Labour -0.06585 0.08738 1.000 0.03133 0.09445 
Defence size 0.1991 0.02661 0.1537 1.000 1.000 
Defence 
externality 
0.2155 0.01878 0.1592 0.9840 1.000 
bold faces represents correlation matrix for I st differences 
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APPENDIX 6.2. 
Introduction: Regression Results: This Appendix presents more regression results 
which are not reported in Chapter 6 
Table A6.2.1. Regression with Proxy of 
Labour Force (1964-1994) (Greece) 
Dependent variable: Economic Growth 
3 4 5 
Constant -0.13 
(-3.28)*** 
0.13 
(-3.39)*** 
-0.12 
(-3.23)*** 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.05 
(1.24) 
Investment 0.74 
(4.09) *** 
0.74 
(4.14) *** 
0.71 
(4.17)*** 
0.41 
(2.30)** 
0.30 
(2.11)** 
Labour 0.50 
(1.43) 
0.58 
(1.65) 
0.43 
(1.29) 
0.23 
(0.78) 
0.07 
(0.31) 
Defence size 1.18 
(1.41) 
-4.82 
(-1.03) 
1.09 
(1.39) 
0.23 
(0.30) 
-0.09 
(-0.16) 
Defence 
externality 
0.28 
(1.31) 
- - 
Cyprus 
dummy 
-0.06 
(-2.10)** 
- -0.09 
(-4.13)*** 
Trend - - - -0.002 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.003 
(-5.31)*** 
R2 0.46 0.50 0.540 0.63 0.78 
DW 1.06 1.18 0.94 1.58 1.39 
t statistics in paranthesis 
Significant at least 10% 
significant at least 5% 
*** significant at least 1 17c 
Note: Labour force data were taken fromvarious issues of OECD Historical Statistics 
1. Using equation (6.11) 
". Using equation (6.12) 
3. Using equation (6.11) with Cyprus dummy 
4. Using equation (6.11) widi trend zlý 
5. Using equation (6.12) with trend and Cyprus dummy 
The variables used in the estimation were measured ýis follows: Economic growth (AY/Y): 
Dependent vw-iable of the niodel is measured as the annual rate of growth of output. In 
order to do this. the difference between current N'Aue of'real GNP and previous year real 
GNP is divided by die previous years real GNP. Labour force (AL/L)- growth rate of 
labour force. Growth rate is calculated as explained above. Investment (I/Y): Investment 
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GNP ratio. Real gross fixed capital of Greece is divided by previous year's real GNP. 
Defence size (AM/Y): The difference of real military expenditure between current and 
previous years are divided by the previous year real GNP. Defence externality (AM/M): 
Real growth rate of defence expenditure. It is calculated as in the above variables. 
Notes: All computations in this study have been carried out by PC-GIVE 8.0 (See D(-x)riiik 
and Hendry, 1995) 
Table A6.2.2. Regression with Proxy of 
Labour Force (First Difference) (Greece) 
Dependent variable: Economic Growth 1965-1994 
1 2 3 
Constant -0.002 (-0.49) -0.002 (-0.48) -0.001 (-0.26) 
Investment (I st diff. ) 1.07 (5.12)*** 1.06 (4.98)*** 0.88 (3.15)*** 
Labour (Ist diff. ) -0.23 (-1.03) -0.21 (-0.90) -0.19 (-0.80) 
Defence size (Ist diff. ) 1.15 (2.11)** 0.03(0.01) -0.19 (-0.06) 
Defence externality 
(I st diff. ) 
0.05(0.40) 0.06(0.46) 
Cyprus dummy - - -0.03 (-0.98) 
R2 0.50 0.51 0.52 
DW 2.20 2.20 2.19 
t statistics in paranthesis 
significant at least 10% 
significant at least 5 'Yc 
*** significant at least I 0/c 
Note: Labour force data were taken froinvarious issues of OECD Historical Statistics 
1. Using equation (6.11) 
2. Using equation (6.12) 
3. Using equation (6.11) with Cyprus dummy 
The variables used in the estimation were measured as follows: Economic growth 
(AY/Y): Dependent variable of the model is measured as the annual rate of growth of 
output. In order to do this, the difference between current value of a real GNP and 
previous year real GNP is divided by the previous years real GNP. Labour force (AL/L): 
growth rate of labour force. Growth rates is calculated as explained above. Investment 
(I/Y): Investment GNP ratio. Real gross fixed capital of Greece is divided by previous 
year's real GNP. Defence size (AM/Y): The difference of real military expenditure 
between current and previous years are divided by the previous year real GNP. Defence 
externality (AM/M): Real growth ratc of defence expenditure. It is calculated as in the 
above variables. 
Notes: All computations in this study have been carried out by PC-GIVE 8.0 (See 
Doornik and Hendry. 1995) 
-268- 
Appendices 
APPENDIX 6.3. 
Introduction: This appendix presents the various series used for estimation of Deger type 
multi-equation model. 
Table 6.3.1. List of Series Used in Estimation (Greece) 
Year GNP s B m POP INFRT PCI TUR NATO 
1958 2856 315 -276 135 8170000 0.63 239 3.82 4.60 
1959 2927 364 -305 141 8260000 -2.52 354 4.51 4.60 
1960 3063 348 -441 148 8330000 1.55 368 4.73 4.40 
1961 3420 494 -397 144 8400000 2.41 407 5.06 4.50 
1962 3583 474 -354 143 8450000 1.49 424 4.91 4.70 
1963 4003 549 -304 151 8480000 -0.86 472 4.72 4.50 
1964 4352 656 -410 154 8510000 4.93 511 4.83 4.40 
1965 4861 683 -550 171 8550000 -3.29 568 4.98 4.20 
1966 5366 839 -395 189 8610000 8.51 623 4.37 4.20 
1967 5651 808 -410 241 8720000 3.14 648 4.53 4.40 
1968 5990 897 -515 275 8740000 0.65 685 4.59 4.30 
1969 6622 1178 -583 311 8770000 0.00 755 4.32 4.00 
1970 7079 1265 -581 330 8790000 3.88 805 4.24 3.90 
1971 7686 1464 -609 352 8830000 4.08 870 4.42 3.90 
1972 8420 1820 -683 374 8890000 5.88 947 4.14 3.80 
1973 9040 2211 -967 361 8930000 24.07 1012 3.94 3.50 
1974 8688 1555 -804 360 8960000 31.34 969 3.71 3.70 
1975 9219 1549 -897 612 9050000 7.95 1018 5.64 3.80 
1976 9883 1840 -791 662 9170000 13.68 1077 6.03 3.70 
1977 10247 1804 -835 698 9270000 13.89 1105 5.70 3.60 
1978 10853 1995 -743 708 9360000 10.57 1159 5.13 3.60 
1979 11238 2216 -849 685 9450000 20.59 1189 4.24 3.50 
1980 11478 2119 -592 630 9640000 28.66 1190 4.19 3.50 
1981 1 11463 1022 -727 776 9730000 22.75 1178 4.78 3.70 
1982 11445 t 1605 -I 15 3 766 9790000 17.37 1169 5.13 3.80 
1983 11341) 1628 -115-) 700 9850000 19.74 1152 4.8 2 3.50 
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Year GNP s B m POP INFRT PCI TUR NATO 
1994 11538 1823 -953 753 9900000 20.05 1165 4.37 3.50 
1985 11814 1676 -1381 830 9930000 20.37 1189 4.44 3.50 
1986 11945 1598 -1031 742 9960000 18.44 1199 4.74 3.40 
1987 11917 1326 -876 754 9980000 9.79 1194 4.23 3.40 
1988 12445 1788 -1114 653 10000000 10.09 1244 3.77 3.20 
1989 12912 1622 -1431 608 10040000 12.88 1286 4.20 3.20 
1990 12867 1419 -1640 612 10090000 17.65 1275 4.83 3.10 
1991 13328 1639 -1554 588 10200000 17.90 1306 5.16 3.00 
1992 13378 1569 -1354 617 10310000 12.13 1297 5.30 2.90 
1993 13343 1448 -1343 605 10354000 12.03 1289 5.38 
1994 13536 1504 -1267 615 10430000 8.64 1297 5.20 2.80 
Sources: IMF/IFS yearbooks (various years); SIPRI yearbooks (various years). 
" GNP: Real Gross Natioanl Product (1990 constant prices; billion Greek drachmas) 
" S: Real Gross savings (1990 constant prices-, billion Greek drachmas) 
" B: Real balance of trade (1990 constant prices; billion Greek drachmas) 
" M: Real defence expenditure (1990 constant prices; billion Greek draclimas) 
" POP: Greek population 
" INF: Inflation rate 
" PCI: Per capita income (1990 constant prices; thousand Greek drachmas) 
" TUR: Share of defence expenditures in Turkey's GDP 
" NATO: Average share of defence burden of NATO countries 
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APPENDIX 6.4. 
Introduction: Further Regression Results (Deger Model) 
Table A6.4.1. OLS Estimation Results (1958-1994) (Greece) 
Share Estimation Level Estimation 
Exogenous 
variables 
Share of variables Exogenous 
variables 
Level 
Constant 0.05(0.90) Growth Constant -25324 (-13.36)*** 
Growth 
equation (S/Y) 0.52 (2.71)** 
equation 
(Y) (S) 1.93 (11.76)*** 
(AY/Y) (B/Y) 0.004 (0.01) (B) -0.78 (-2.45)** 
(M/Y) -1.76 (-0.10) (M) 0.80(l. 39) 
(AP/P) -0.16 (-0.10) (POP) 3302 (13.76)*** 
Diagnostic R 2: 0.37 Diagnostic R 2: 0.99 
tests 
DW: 1.51 
tests 
DW: 1.09 
Saving Constant 0.12 (3.56)*** Saving Constant 272.24 (2.13)** 
Equation 
(S/Y) (M/Y) 0.21 (0.55) 
equation 
(S) (M) 0.02(0.05) 
(B/Y) 0.40 (2.01)** (B) 0.65 (2.44)** 
(AY/Y) 0.67 (5.65)*** (Y) 0.15 (3.15)*** 
INFRT 0.002 (4.85)*** (INFRT) 19.84 (2.84)*** 
Diagnostic R 2: 0.61 Diagnostic R': 0.80 
tests 
DW: 0.81 
tests 
DW: 0.96 
Defence Constant 0.04 (3.09)*** Defence Constant -165.75 (-1.78) 
equation 
(M/Y) PCI -0.0001 (-2.68)** 
equation 
(M) PCI 0.03(0.43) 
TUR 0.001 (0.36) TUR 40.40 (2.05)** 
NATO 0.00001 (1.60) NATO 0.29 (7.10)*** 
DUMCYP 0.015 (2.01)** DUMCYP 98.18 (1.57) 
Diagnostic R': 0.62 Diagnostic R': 0.94 
tests 
DW: 0.43---l 
tests 
DW: 0.66 
t statistics in the parenthesis 
Y= real gross national product 
S= real gross saving 
B= real balance of trade 
M= Real defence expenditure 
P= Population 
PCI= Per capita income 
INFRT= Inflation rate 
TLJR= Turkish military expenditures as a share of GDP 
NATO= Average share ot'defence burden of NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) 
DLJMCYP= Cyprus war duminy. The dummy took value of one between 1975 and 1981 and zero 
elsewhere.. 
Notes: All computations in this sttidý, have been carried out hy PC-GIVE 8.0 and PC-FIML 8.0 (See 
Doornik and Hendry. 1994.1995) 
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APPENDIX 7.1. 
List of SeHes Used in Estimation 
Introduction: This Appendix presents the data set used in Chapter 7 
Table A7.1.1. Turkish Disaggregated Data 
Year EQU PER INRS OTH TDEF 
1975 25.2 - - 1118519 
1976 28.5 - - - 1271594 
1977 21.9 - - - 1244750 
1978 18.5 - - - 1162088 
1979 9.1 - - - 951714 
1980 4.7 - - - 928280 
1981 9.4 - - - 1102349 
1982 10.8 - - - 1240416 
1983 10.1 - - 1202458 
1984 13.1 - - - 1555459 
1985 13.6 36.9 7.3 41.8 1235000 
1986 17.9 33.3 6.1 42.6 1425954 
1987 21.2 34.7 5.9 38.3 1365491 
1988 22.5 35.6 4.5 37.5 1261738 
1989 18.5 42.3 4.0 35.2 1434182 
1990 20.7 46.1 3.4 29.8 1798677 
1991 22.7 48.5 2.8 26.0 1927957 
1992 24.8 48.7 3.5 23.0 2109576 
1993 22.9 54.5 2.9 19.7 2385179 
1994 29.3 51.0 2.6 17.1 2184662 
1995 29.7 50.9 2.5 16.9 2410347 
1996 30.8 46.2 3.0 19.9 2734156 
1997 32.6 43.7 3.0 20.7 - 
Sources: NATO Review (various issues) 
OEQU represents Turkish equipment spending share in the total defence spending 
*PER represents Turkish personnel spending share in the total defence spending 
OINFR represents Turkish infrastructure spendin-g, share In the total defence spending 
OOTH represents Turkish other operitional spending share in the total defence spending 
OTDEF is real Turkish defence spending (1985 constant million Turkish Liras) ZI I 
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Table A7.1.2. Greek Disaggregated Data 
Year EQU PER INFRS OTH TDEF 
1977 20.3 - - - 698 
1978 18.1 - - - 707 
1979 17.7 - - - 685 
1980 18.8 - - - 629 
1981 20.5 - - - 776 
1982 17.0 - - - 766 
1983 15.9 - - - 705 
1984 15.3 - - - 752 
1985 14.5 59.6 3.1 23.3 830 
1986 15.8 61.8 1.9 20.5 742 
1987 17.2 61.7 1.9 19.2 754 
1988 23.3 58.2 2.3 16.1 653 
1989 21.9 61.5 2.6 14.0 608 
1990 21.8 63.7 3.3 11.2 612 
1991 20.3 64.4 1.7 13.6 588 
1992 23.4 61.4 2.4 12.8 617 
1993 24.7 62.2 2.6 10.5 605 
1994 24.4 63.0 0.6 12.0 615 
1995 19.8 63.3 1.9 14.9 626 
1996 21.1 61.2 1.5 16.2 658 
1997 19.4 62.2 2.1 16.2 
Sources: NATO Review (various issues) 
OEQU represents Greek equipment spending share in the total defence spending 
OPER represents Greek personnel spending share in the total defence spending 
OINFR represents Greek infrastructure spending share in the total defence spending r-I 
OOTH represents Greek other operational spending share in the total defence spending I r-I 
OTDEF is real Greek defence spending (1990 constant billion Greek Drachmas) 
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APPENDIX 7.2. 
Further Regression Results 
Introduction: This Appendix presents some more regression results which were not 
reported in Chapter 7. 
Table A7.2.1. OLS Regression Results using 
Equipment Spending and Non-equipment 
Spending Variables Separately (Turkey) 
Dependent Variable LY (1975-1996) 
Coefficient t statistics 
Constant -0.25 (-0.32) -7.38 (-0.94) 
Ll 0.10 (1.97)* 0.19 (4.74) *** 
LL 0.90 (1.96)* 1.17 (2.6 8) 
LEQU 0.03 (2.00)* 
LNEQU 0.01(0.22) 
Trend 0.02 (2.13)** 0.01 (1.13) 
R2 0.99 0.99 
F 664.33*** 538.31*** 
DW 1.75 1.58 
Y is GDP, I is (Yross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence 
equipment spending and NEQU is non-equipment defence spending. L 
represents natural logarithms, 
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Table A7.2.2. OLS Regression Results using Four 
Different Types of Defence Spending (Turkey) 
Dependent Variable LY 
Coefficient t statistics 
Constant 1.77 0.06 
LI 0.21 1.23 
LL 0.72 0.44 
LEQU -0.06 -0.44 
LPER -0.02 -0.22 
LINFRS -0.01 -0.17 
LOTH 0.06 0.42 
Trend 0.03 0.63 
R2 0.98 
F 42.86*** 
DW 2.58 
Y is GDP, I is gross fixed investment, L is labour, EQU is defence 
equipment spending, PER is personnel spending, INFRS is spending on 
infrastructure and OTH isother operational defence expenditures. L 
represents natural logarithms. 
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